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Abstract 
Safety critical systems must satisfy stringent safety standards and there devel- 
opment requires the use of specialist safe software system development (SSSD) ap- 
proaches as the complexity and penetration of these systems increases. These SSSD 
approaches satisfy certain useful properties that make them suitable for safety sys- 
tem development. The first objective of this thesis is to select a candidate SSSD 
approach and evaluate its capabilities against a set of useful properties identified 
from reviewing a group of existing SSSD approaches, and thus show that this can- 
didate SSSD approach is appropriate for use in safety system development. 
In addition, a second objective is to use this candidate SSSD approach to improve 
the early life cycle phase of an existing industrial safety development process used to 
develop embedded avionics applications. In particular to allow issues to be resolved 
earlier in the development, which are currently not being uncovered until much later 
in the development when they are much more difficult and expensive to correct. This 
involved the identification of further properties and issues that the candidate SSSD 
approach must address. 
The overall aim is to demonstrate that this candidate SSSD approach can be used 
in the early phase of a safety system development to derive a validated specification 
that can be subjected to safety analysis to show that it satisfies the identified system 
safety properties and thus forms a viable basis for the rest of the development. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Embedded computer systems are becoming more pervasive [64,57] and their scope 
and complexity is ever increasing [90]. These are used in areas such as avionics, 
rail and process control and more recently in medical applications [64]. The harm 
potential of such systems is recognised: the outcry associated with a major rail 
accident, air crash or nuclear power incident demonstrates the importance of safety 
as a significant non-functional requirement [96]. This concern has been expressed 
in a variety of national and international safety standards such as the UK MoD's 
Defence Standard (DS) 00-56 [125] and the international IEC 61508 [51], and the 
production of safety critical and safety related systems is increasingly being regulated 
and controlled. All the major safety standards are concerned with the management 
and mitigation of risk as a key element. Risk is managed through the concept of a 
safety life cycle [125,51,28], and although terminology differs the basic sequence 
of hazard identification, hazard analysis and risk mitigation is followed by all [65]. 
Further, this safety life cycle must run in parallel to and be integrated with the 
design and development life-cycle. That is, the production of a design artefact is 
associated with a corresponding safety analysis task. The goal is to ensure that 
safety is not a "bolt-on" extra performed when the design is finished, but that it has 
appropriate influence on the design decisions as the system development progresses 
1 
[66,30,69]. It follows that there is a need for safe software system development 
(SSSD) approaches that integrate the safety and development life cycle to manage 
the safety risks. 
1.1 Issues in Current Safety Engineering 
The safety standards require hazard identification and preliminary hazard analysis 
to occur in the early phases of the development process (e. g., [89]). This is con- 
sistent with studies that have shown that a large proportion of anomalies occur at 
the requirements and specification stages of a system development 129,69). A study 
by Lutz concluded that safety-related software errors arose most often from inad- 
equate or misunderstood requirements [79], indicating the need for a more careful 
analysis of the requirements to ensure adequate assimilation and comprehension of 
them. Further, other work has highlighted the need to conduct a safety analysis 
of the requirements [26,33]. These factors all support the notion that safety must 
be built into the design, and that the evolving design representations analysed to 
demonstrate that they have the desired safety properties [70] as early as possible in 
the life cycle - preferably during the requirements phase. One of the objectives of 
this work is to propose an approach able to support safety analysis within the early 
phases of requirements analysis and high-level architectural design. 
A direct result of the increasing use and penetration of software intensive systems 
is the increase in system complexity which it allows [64]. More things can be done 
with a software system - so they are [19]. In certain sectors system complexity is 
rising exponentially [911. There is a need to cope with this increased complexity 
as part of the development process, and this is often achieved by using reduction 
techniques [69] and/or abstraction to structure the problem [71]. The complex 
interaction between diverse system elements (e. g., operators and computer control 
system) can result in unsafe behaviour due to unexpected emergent properties (721. 
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As a result increased complexity can arise in a number of forms which must be 
covered by an adequate safety analysis approach. Another objective of this work is 
to propose concept tools to deal with the complexity of analysing safety problems 
and synthesising adequate safety solutions. 
Formal specifications have been a focus of software engineering research for many 
years and have been applied in a wide variety of settings [126], including safety 
critical applications [80]. Formal specification is required by a number of safety 
[51] and security [15] standards for their highest integrity applications. The use of 
such techniques is not universal, but to some they provide a "gold standard" [43] of 
what can be achieved. However researchers have noted that the perceived benefits 
of applying formal specification techniques are not being realised [44,126]. This 
has been attributed to a number of causes including no methodological guidance 
for using formal techniques [44]; formal techniques are not well integrated with the 
system analysis phase - there is a need to analyse the system and its environment 
before producing the specification [44,57]; and many of the techniques have poor 
separation of concerns in that the desired behaviour of the environment is not well 
distinguished from the extant properties of the environment [126]. 
As an approach, some have advocated extending the scope of formal techniques 
within the structure of an integrated RE process based on formality covering elic- 
itation, modelling and analysis, communication and validation, and also stressing 
the importance of the environment [128][44]. This has been successful in extend- 
ing the reach of formal methods, but has not overcome the disconnect of Turski's 
problem [120]: that real-world domains are not necessarily expressible in any single 
linguistic system; and that the notion of mathematical (logical) proof does not apply 
to them. This disconnect manifests itself for formal methods in the following ways: 
they do not adequately bridge the gap between the uncertainty of the real-world and 
the formality of the formal world; they do not distinguish between the indicative 
properties of the environment and the optative properties of the requirements; they 
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neglect the validity aspects of the requirements; and they are not good at validating 
progress towards the solution. Formal models are precise entities whose properties 
can be demonstrated by proof. The real world is more variable, and the formal 
models produced are only approximations to it. Yet another objective of this work 
is to address Turski's divide and propose an approach in which formality is properly 
situated within safe engineering practice. 
Engineering is different from science and mathematics [82], although the tech- 
niques and approaches used in both science and mathematics can be used in an 
engineering context. In much simplified terms, engineering is concerned with build- 
ing artefacts which transform the physical world [82], whilst science is concerned 
with universal properties of the universe and mathematics universal truths [54]. In 
fact, engineering tools are most useful when they are specific to a particular prob- 
lem, and different classes of problem may demand different languages to represent 
them [82]. Further, software engineering itself covers a broad range of quite differ- 
ent application areas, which are best served by specific problem oriented language 
notations [121]. 
If software engineering (SE) is to attain the benefits achieved by other engineering 
professions such as aeronautical engineering, then it must seek to satisfy the "normal 
design" principles and where possible avoid radical ones [82,55]. Vincenti [131] 
defines "normal design" as what the engineer is engaged in when s/he knows from 
the outset 
"how the device in question works, what are its customary features, and 
that, if properly designed along such lines, it has a good likelihood of 
accomplishing the desired task. " 
Much of the routine design encountered in traditional engineering disciplines works 
normally. Some have recently observed that software engineering does not: Maibaum 
[82] states that 
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"SE ignores the principles of engineering design and almost always adopts 
radical design methods, to its detriment. " 
Jackson states [55] 
"Though less conspicuous than radical design, normal design makes up 
by far the bulk of day-to-day engineering enterprise. Unfortunately, this 
is not true of software engineering. " 
To write useful software it is not enough to deal with just the computer and its 
software, one must also deal with the complexities of the natural or "real" world in 
which the application resides - and the gap between the specification and the re- 
quirements phenomena must be bridged by the problem domain properties (domain 
knowledge) [54]. The importance of domain knowledge is identified by a number 
of authors [54,82,121,127]. Further, Maibaum [82] identifies systemising domain 
knowledge and the use of architecture to encapsulate design choices as two key re- 
quirements for achieving normality in design. A key characteristic of the approach 
we propose is a clear separation of concerns between the system under design, its 
desirable properties and the extant properties of its deployment context. 
1.2 Aim, Objectives and Method 
The first objective of this thesis is to propose and evaluate an SSSD approach for 
safe software system engineering able to meet the following specific goals: 
" integrate safety analysis within the early phases of development, particularly 
requirement analysis and high level architectural design 
. allow for both formal and informal safety analysis techniques to take place 
capture and separate contextual knowledge from the design of the system and 
its desirable properties 
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" keep track of safety artefacts for validation and certification purposes 
" integrate with current safety engineering practice. 
The approach we propose is based on problem orientation [133), and particularly. 
their embodiment in the Problem Oriented Software Engineering (POSE) framework 
[41,39] whose particular choice is argued and justified in Chapter 2. 
The second objective is to improve the early phases of an existing safety develop- 
ment process. The work is situated within the safety development process in use in 
the author's company; this process is tailored to the production of embedded safety 
systems with a significant software content and has been used to produce a number 
of safety critical avionics systems that have been accepted into service. The process 
is representative of the industry, and is generally acknowledged to be successful and 
robust. However, a number of issues have been identified with it, particularly in the 
early stages of the development. One of the major drivers for this research was to 
investigate how to address these issues. As well as providing a useful driver, situat- 
ing the work within a practical industrial process is also beneficial in the evaluation 
of the research outcome, whose impact can be measured directly through industrial 
application and case studies. 
Therefore the method used in this research is a combination of literature survey, 
problem analysis and the use of case studies. In more detail, the role of the literature 
survey is to: 
" identify the underlying safety principles (the safety context) that impact the 
research 
" identify issues and properties associated with the early phases of a safety 
development process 
" evaluate existing safety analysis and safe software system development ap- 
proaches 
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" use this information to produce a set of generic properties that our proposed 
engineering approach should possess, and against which it can be evaluated. 
Problem analysis is performed within the context of the author's company devel- 
opment process and practice, with a view to identify additional specific properties 
and issues that the candidate engineering approach should also be able to address. 
The ensuing research work based on case studies is used to evaluate the proposed 
approach against the established metrics. The overall aim is to demonstrate that 
POSE, and its extensions developed by this work, can be used in the early phase of a 
safety system development to derive a validated specification that can be subjected 
to safety analysis to show that it satisfies the identified system safety properties and 
thus forms a viable basis for the rest of the development. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is organised as follows. 
The initial task is to scope and investigate the safety context and this is addressed 
in the early part of Chapter 2. This will consider the impact of safety standards, 
the use of safety terminology, the safety life cycle, safety analysis techniques and 
making safety case arguments. A number of approaches that have been successfully 
used to develop safety systems are then introduced and used later in the chapter to 
identify a set of properties that an appropriate safety engineering approach should 
possess. The chapter concludes with the justified selection of POSE as the safety 
engineering approach. 
Chapter 3 introduces the early phases of an industrial safety development pro- 
cess used by the author's company to develop embedded safety systems. Some 
problems that have been identified with this process are discussed and these are 
summarised into a number of properties and issues which are used in conjunction 
with the properties identified in Chapter 2 to evaluate POSE in the remainder of 
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the thesis. 
Chapter 4 introduces POSE in its basic, "vanilla" form through its application to 
an avionics Decoy Controller case study. Its capabilities in dealing with the identified 
properties and issues are evaluated and its performance recorded in tabular form. 
The identified shortfalls provides a focus and target for the major research work 
that is reported in the chapters that follow. 
The goal of Chapter 5 is to develop an algorithm for the POSE Problem Pro- 
gression Transformation (PPT) that supports its application to allow requirements 
to be transformed such that the specification of the system can be derived directly. 
An extension of the Decoy Controller case study introduced in Chapter 4 is used 
to illustrate the ideas involved and to demonstrate the successful application of the 
PPT. This chapter also covers the development of a safety analysis process which 
exploits POSE's characterisation of software problem to achieve an adequate and 
effective safety analysis. Next, a Stores Management System (SMS) case study is 
introduced that demonstrates how POSE can be used in conjunction with formal 
development techniques. 
The goal of Chapter 6 is to address the remaining identified issue of early safety 
analysis. The POSE safety pattern is introduced (section 6.1) to achieve this goal 
and its utility demonstrated through its application to a third, Audio Warning 
System, case study. The case study, presented in section 6.3, provides evidence to 
support the usefulness of all the POSE extensions developed in the earlier chapters 
and demonstrates that they successfully address all properties and issues identified. 
The thesis finishes with a detailed discussion and conclusions of the results ob- 
tained in Chapter 7 and possible future work is covered in Chapter 8. The appendices 
provide additional information that supports aspects of the research work, which are 




The aim of this chapter is to introduce and discuss in detail the background and 
basis for the research into problem orientation and in particular the use of Prob- 
lem Oriented Software Engineering (POSE) to build "safe software". The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the problems associated with the different definitions 
that abound in safety engineering and identifies the nomenclature used in this work. 
Then the important areas of system safety and system safety analysis are reviewed, 
together with a number of development approaches used to produce safety software, 
followed by a discussion of problem orientation. An analysis is performed in sec- 
tion 2.5 to identify ten useful properties that a safety development approach should 
possess which are used to select a candidate approach - POSE - for use in the 
remainder of this thesis. The chapter ends with a summary. 
2.1 Nomenclature 
The term requirement [53,127,96] covers a number of levels varying from entities 
at the high level such as the users required behaviour (functional requirements) 
and dependability requirements (e. g. safety and security) through to lower level 
entities such as specific requirements allocated to the hardware or software. In this 
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document the term requirement or system requirement is used to refer to the high 
level entities unless explicitly stated. For example, in the solution of the entailment 
sequent W, S I- R used extensively in this work, the term R is the overall system 
requirement, whilst S represents the specification of the processing machine. In 
effect, S represents the allocated software requirement for the machine, but will be 
called the specification or machine specification in this document. 
Similarly, it is also worth noting that the term architecture [103,17,34J also 
occurs at a number of levels covering system architecture, software architecture 
and hardware architecture. As this work is concerned with the early phases of a 
development it is the system architecture that is the main focus. However the prefix 
of system, software or hardware will be used where this aids comprehension. 
This work is concerned with software safety with respect to embedded real-time 
systems. Actually the term software safety is something of a misnomer, software 
by itself cannot cause harm. It is only in the context of a system operating in a 
potentially unsafe environment that "unsafe" software can result in a safety problem 
[93]. For example, an aircraft flight control system operating on a ground-based test 
rig has far different safety implications to that same flight control system being 
used to control a fast jet in low level flight operations. That is, software safety is 
a property requiring software and a potentially unsafe context. In this work the 
term software safety will be used as an abbreviation for the safety aspects of the 
software operating in its system context that in turn, is operating in the overall 
system environment. 
Moreover, there is no agreed definition of the terms used in the description of 
a potentially unsafe environment; in particular, there are differences between the 
common usage of the terms failure, fault and error in some software developments 
and common usage in traditional safety engineering [69]. However, analysis of the 
definitions used in IEC 61508 [511, DS 00-56 [1251 and by Leveson in her book 
Safeware [691 does show a good correlation for the important terms harm, hazard, 
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Term Source Safety Term Definition 
IEC 61508 Physical injury or damage to the health of people either directly or 
indirectly as a result of damage to property or to the environment 
DS 00-56 Same as IEC 61508 
Harm 
Leveson *** Not Used *** (Uses Loss) 
IEC 61508 Potential source of harm 
DS 00-56 A physical situation or state of a system, often following from some 
initiating event, that may lead to an accident 
Hazard 
Leveson A state or set of conditions that contributes to an accident 
IEC 61508 Combination of probability of occurrence and the severity of that harm 
DS 00-56 Combination of the likelihood of harm and the severity of that harm 
Risk 
Leveson Hazard severity, likelihood and exposure 
IEC 61508 Not Used 
DS 00-56 An unintended event, or sequence of events, that causes harm 
Accident 
Leveson Undesired and unplanned event that results in a loss 
Table 2.1: Safety Terminology Comparison 
risk and accident as shown in Table 2.1. Inspection shows that IEC 61508 and DS 
00-56 agree on the term harm and all three agree on the definition of risk. Leveson 
[69] uses loss in place of harm, but allowing for this it can be seen that DS 00-56 and 
Leveson have similar definitions for accident. IEC 61508 relates a hazard directly to 
harm, whereas both DS 00-56 and Leveson use accident as an intermediate part of 
the definition. 
IEC 61508 and DS 00-56 both define safety in terms of risk acceptability. In 
contrast, Leveson defines safety as freedom from accident or loss. Using a risk-based 
definition for safety is more useful from an engineering viewpoint since absolute 
safety cannot be achieved. Most modern safety standards are based on the principle 
of reducing risk to acceptable levels [8], accepting the fact that absolute safety (zero 
risk) cannot be achieved [105,90]. For example, IEC 61508 requires the identification 
of the risks posed by the system under development - and that any such risks will 
be reduced to tolerable levels by including safety functions in the design responsible 
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for providing the necessary risk reduction. Therefore risk management is an integral 
part of modern safety system development. IEC 61508 and Leveson do disagree 
on the relative status of failure and fault, but are similar for error. DS 00-56 has 
the same definition for error as IEC 61508. This text will use the definitions from 
the international standard IEC 61508 supplemented with the use of accident (as 
in DS 00-56). However, the text will avoid the use of the term fault as there is 
less agreement and more confusion concerning its definition in different texts. This 
means that a failure is the 
"termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required 
function", 
and an error is 
"discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condi- 
tion and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition". 
The latter is similar to the Leveson definition of error which is "design flaw or 
deviation from desired or intended state". 
2.2 System Safety 
According to Leveson [69]: 
"The primary concern of system safety is the management of hazards: 
their identification, evaluation, elimination and control through analysis, 
design and management procedures" 
System Safety is governed by a variety of national and international safety stan- 
dards such as the UK MoD's Defence Standard (DS) 00-56 [125] and the interna- 
tional IEC 61508 [51]. All the major safety standards contain the notion of a safety 
life cycle [125], [51], [28], [109], and although terminology differs the basic sequence 
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of hazard identification, hazard analysis and risk mitigation is followed by all [65]. 
As noted at the beginning of Chapter 1, this safety life cycle must be integrated with 
the design and development life cycle. The safety life cycle expects comprehensive 
hazard identification and safety analyses to demonstrate that the implemented sys- 
tem is adequately safe with respect to the system's integrity requirements. 
The safety standards are backed up by a legal framework that differs from coun- 
try to country [65]. For example in the UK the legal framework includes the Health 
& Safety at Work Act (HSWA) 1974, The Management of Health and Safety at 
Work Regulations (MHSW Regs), contract law (Tort), Sale of Goods act and other 
EU derived legislation. In particular, the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Prac- 
ticable) principle [29] is laid down in law within the HSWA and is an important 
aspect of IEC61508 [51] and DS 00-56 [125]. ALARP provides high level adequacy 
criteria for determining when you have done enough, although it is not so easy to 
apply in practice, since it is difficult to define what constitutes enough. Therefore, 
good practice and legal necessity combine to demand that an appropriate (as defined 
above) safety life cycle should be followed, and this means that hazard identification 
is a key task that must be performed at a suitable early point in the development 
process. In DS 00-56/2 1, [123], the early tasks of the safety life cycle (hazard identi- 
fication, preliminary analysis and initial risk estimation) are collected together into 
the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) phase. Leveson also uses PHA as the initial 
safety life cycle phase [69]. Other standards [28], [109] use a different terminology, 
but the task is essentially the same. This research uses the term "Preliminary Safety 
Analysis" (PSA) to cover the specific early safety analysis phase it wishes to cover - 
the term PSA (refer to section 4.4) being selected so it would not be confused with 
the terminology used by the different standards and guidelines. 
'Version 2 of DS 00-56 contained a full safety life cycle description, later versions of DS 00-56 
adopted a more objective-based stance, and relegated the safety life cycle details to the guidance 
text. 
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2.2.1 Safety Cases 
A safety case [125,62,12] is a documented body of evidence providing a compelling, 
comprehensive and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given 
application in a given environment. Safety standard DS 00-56 [125] mandates that 
a safety case should address: 
" the management of risk commensurate with the potential risk posed by the 
system and its complexity; 
" the validity of the safety requirements, i. e., that they are derived through 
thorough analysis and are traceable with respect to the system as designed 
and implemented, together with evidence of their satisfaction; 
" the well-foundedness of assumptions about the system, its operating envi- 
ronment or modes of use upon which the safety argument is based, with a 
justification that such assumptions are realistic and reasonable. 
Ideally the safety case should be made about the product as product-based ev- 
idence is more compelling [93]. However, there is still a need for process evidence 
to cover the system configuration, and the fact that it is often difficult to provide 
enough direct supporting evidence for a product, and process evidence has to be 
used. 
The UK safety industry has moved towards the widespread use of safety cases 
to present the safety argument for system safety, since the Cullen Report [22] on 
the Piper Alpha disaster. The trend [61] is that recent safety standards such as 
DS 00-56 Version 4 [125] and CAP 670 [3) have adopted a goal based approach 
for the presentation of a cogent argument backed by adequate evidence that the 
developed system is safe for its intended use. The argument is required to show 
that the safety risks associated with deploying the developed system have been 
reduced to a tolerable level. Therefore risk management is an integral part of safety 
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system development. Early safety cases were very large monolithic documents that 
were difficult to comprehend, this resulted in the development of goal structuring 
notation (GSN) to present the safety arguments in a more accessible, systematic 
form [59]. GSN is a graphical means of showing the structure of the overall safety 
argument, and has become the de facto standard means for presenting safety cases 
for UK military systems. 
In GSN goals represent statements that must be true for the safety argument 
to hold. One useful strategy is to divide the target goal into a number of sub-goals 
that are individually addressed. Eventually, the process of refining produces goals 
that are sufficiently detailed to be supported directly by appropriate evidence (these 
are termed leaf goals), in which case a solution is used to designate the evidence. 
Contexts are used in conjunction with the Assumptions to provide a description 
of the circumstances and constraints under which the safety case is valid. They 
can also be used to provide explanations of the terms used in the other constructs. 
Assumptions are used to document statements that are taken to be self-evidently 
true in the safety case. 
Even with goal structures there remain acknowledged difficulties in the construc- 
tion of safety cases, and here we adopt the characterisation from [35]: 
" The difficulty of Disparate Descriptions: that of combining disparate pieces of 
the evidence, such as narrative, requirements, claims, plans, activities or goals 
[14,132]; and 
" The difficulty of Post-Hoc Assurance: that, traditionally, safety cases are 
developed post-design and testing with known drawbacks including: expen- 
sive redesign when the current design is indefensible; expensive system over- 
engineering so that the design can be defended; and loss of the rationale for 
the safety aspects of the design [60]. 
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The later chapters in this thesis will show how POSE can be used to mitigate these 
difficulties. 
2.2.2 System Safety Analysis 
The safety standards expect appropriate safety analysis tasks to be applied early in 
the life cycle, iteratively and on an ongoing basis. Generally this is taken to mean 
it should occur during the requirements capture and high level specification phases 
(e. g., see [89], [110]). As noted at the beginning of Chapter 1, this is consistent 
with the studies that have shown that a large proportion of anomalies occurs at the 
requirements and specification stages of a system development [29], [69]. Further, 
investigations have shown that the anomalies of interest are not restricted to just 
component or function failures, but include significant contributions from factors 
that are emergent properties of the interactions of complex systems [69], [98]. The 
abstract descriptions available in the early phases of the development support the 
need for a comprehensive analysis of the interactions between the system compo- 
nents, operators and environment - an analysis that becomes much more difficult 
as the amount of design detail increases. Therefore it would be useful if the PSA 
consisted of the requirements model being subjected to a comprehensive safety anal- 
ysis to demonstrate that it can satisfy the required system integrity requirements 
(including emergent properties), and hence form an adequate basis for the ensuing 
development [33]. So, there is evidence that supports the notion that the safety 
analysis should be applied to a suitable representation of the requirements so that 
its emergent safety and failure behaviour can be investigated. 
There are many techniques that underpin modern safety analysis and each tech- 
nique has its advantages and disadvantages. The most commonly used techniques 
are inductive techniques such as Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) [109,92], HA- 
ZOPS [6,1061 and Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
[95,27], and deduc- 
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tive techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [130]. However, they all share a 
number of common properties. For example, the success of these techniques depends 
directly on having an appropriate representation model that must be validated, and 
the validation must cover mis-representation of information [1]. Basically if the 
model does not include the feature of interest then the analysis is unlikely to cap- 
ture it. They are systematic, but rely on informal reasoning. This means they can be 
applied to a large class of representations both formal and informal (e. g. [30,112]). 
However, establishing the efficacy and rigour of the results obtained is less easy than 
for example, those results obtained from formal proof or model checking [99]. 
Attempts have been made to enhance these techniques specifically for use with 
embedded real-time systems. For example [106] with HAZOPS, Software Failure 
Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (SFMECA) [81], Software Fault Tree Analysis 
(SFTA) [81] and SHARD [102] have all been used successfully, can be integrated 
and used to provide productive results. However, a number of significant issues 
are raised when applying conventional safety analysis techniques to software based 
systems [107]. These techniques are manual, so depend on human understanding, 
which can be limited for a complex software system; if a formal model exists then it is 
possible to harness the power of formal analysis and proof techniques to demonstrate 
desirable properties [4,119], by using formal analysis in place of manual (albeit 
systematic) analysis. For example, a technique called Software Deviation Analysis 
(SDA) can be applied to an RSML model [107]. 
There is a consensus (e. g., see [110,112,125]) that inductive techniques such 
as FFA, HAZOPS and FMEA, should be used for the identification of hazards; 
whilst a deductive technique, such as FTA, should be used for finding the causes 
of and contributors to an identified hazard. Many current approaches use a single 
technique, often combined with a checklist based on previous experience. This has 
its problems as no single technique is ideal for all the required hazard identification 
and analysis tasks, and therefore is not the most appropriate way to proceed at 
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such a crucial phase (Leveson notes that 70% - 90% of safety related decisions are 
made in the concept phase [72]). Ways of combining the capabilities of techniques 
for safety analysis form one of the objectives of pursuing this research. 
2.3 Safe Software System Development Approaches 
A number of development approaches have been specifically targeted at safety re- 
lated systems, whilst others have included safety as a significant clement. The 
important safe software system development (SSSD) approaches with significance 
to this work are summarised in the following, and will be further analysed in sec- 
tion 2.5. 
2.3.1 Software Cost Reduction 
The Software Cost Reduction (SCR) method follows a four step process for con- 
structing a requirements specification that is based on the concepts defined in the 
Parnas 4-Variable Model [19,1001 - including the notions of monitored and con- 
trolled quantities, and the relations NAT and REQ. An SCR form of this model, 
from [9], is shown in figure 2.1. The first step creates an idealised SRS (Systems 
Requirement Specification). The desired system behaviour is documented in the 
SRS by describing the relations NAT and REQ, where NAT represents constraints 
imposed by the environment (such as physical laws) and REQ defines the idealised 
required behaviour in terms of the monitored and controlled quantities - these are M 
and C respectively in Figure 2.1. The SRS describes the desired behaviour in terms 
of the system interacting with its environment, and does not include implementa- 
tion detail (hence the term idealised). This demonstrates that the SCR process is 
consistent with [133], and concentrates on WHAT is required, not HOW it is to 
be achieved. The ensuing phases cover the HOW aspects, by refining this idealised 































Figure 2.1: SCR Four-Step Process (Based on Parnas 4-Variable Model) 
The SDS (System Design Specification) is developed in the second step. This 
introduces the system's input and output devices (e. g., sensors for monitored and 
actuators for controlled quantities). Step 3 creates the SoRS (Software Requirements 
Specification) which refines the SDS by adding input/output design detail. This is 
achieved by adding modules which use values read from input devices to calculate 
values of the monitored quantities (D_IN) and which use the computed values of 
controlled quantities to drive output devices (D_OUT). The Input Device Interface 
Module (D_IN) takes the input variables output by the sensors and produces an 
estimate of the monitored quantities, M. This means that the Device Independent 
Module can produce an estimate for REQ, which mimics the REQ at the overall 
system level and hence its requirements are those defined in the SRS. It produces an 
estimate for C as its output. This estimate is fed into the Output Device Interface 
Module (D_OUT), which produces the output variables to drive the actuators. 
The fourth step in the SCR process adds further design detail concerned with 
hardware failure and exceptions. A typical SCR specification will consist of moni- 
tored variables, a mode class and its modes, internal terms and controlled (output) 
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variables, conditions and events. The behaviour of these quantities are related by 
three types of table: Mode Transition Tables, Condition Tables and Event Tables. 
A condition is a predicate defined on a system state, whilst an event is a predicate 
defined on two system states that differ in the value of at least one variable [47]. The 
notation @T(c) denotes an event which has the informal meaning "that condition 
c becomes true", whereas @F(c) means "condition c becomes "false". Formally, 
@T(c)=- -, cAc' 
where the unprimed c is evaluated in the old (or current) state, and the primed c' is 
evaluated in the new (next) state. A conditioned event has the form @T (c) WHENd 
which means condition c becomes true when condition d holds. Its formal meaning 
is defined by: 
@T(c)WHEN d--, cAc'Ad. 
A mode class is a state machine whose states are called modes and whose tran- 
sitions are triggered by events [48]. The Mode Transition Table is a special form of 
the Event Table which defines the next state relation for the Mode Class. 
A term is any function of input variables, modes, or other terms. They are useful 
for collecting together complex or repetitive behaviours and have a similar role to 
macros in RSML. Typically, a term will be used to make a specification more concise 
and its behaviour will be defined by an Event table. Often the controlled output 
variables can be defined as a condition on the current state, and are hence defined by 
a Condition Table. SCR has extensive tool support for editing, animation and model 
checking [46]. It includes tools to demonstrate well-formedness [45] such as: the Con- 
sistency Checker that demonstrates the specification is syntactically and type correct 
with no circular dependencies, no duplicate names or unused/unspecified variables, 
and no violations of disjointness or coverage properties; the Property Checker Salsa 
[10] further analyses the state machine; the Dependency Graph Browser graphically 
displays dependencies among the variables in the SCR tables; the Simulator for exe- 
cuting scenarios and evaluating behaviour; the Invariant Generator for checking that 
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state invariants hold. SCR has also been integrated/interfaced to model checking 
and theorem proving tools [45]. Further, SCR is still being developed and enhanced, 
e. g., currently SCR only supports primitive data types but this is being addressed 
by providing support for arrays and records [45,46]. 
2.3.2 SpecTRM and RSML 
SpecTRM [66,70] is designed to assist in the development of software intensive safety 
critical systems. It forms part of a human centred, safety-driven process which is 
supported by an artefact called an intent specification [71]. An intent specifica- 
tion is stratified into a Program Management level (Level 0) and six further levels 
System Purpose, System Design Principles, Blackbox Behaviour, Design Represen- 
tation, Physical Representation and System Operations [66]. The whole process is 
supported by a toolkit consisting of a specification editor, a simulator and analysis 
tools, and is designed in such a way as to support peer review. The formal model 
on which the tools operate corresponds to the Blackbox Level 3 of the intent speci- 
fication, and is written in a language called SpecTRM-RL. A SpecTRM-RL model 
consists of four main components: 
1. A specification of the supervisory modes of the controller being modelled 
2. A specification of its control modes 
3. A model of the controlled process 
4. A specification of the inputs and outputs of the controller. 
A major driver for the SpecTRM development has been the desire to remove im- 
plementation bias from the model. This is why a SpecTRM-RL model has a greatly 
simplified graphical representation compared with RSML (which is also based on 
the Parnas 4-Variable model), to remove internal behaviour which was found to be 
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problematic [73]. The mode concept has been introduced. A mode is just a collec- 
tion of states, but its significance is to the user. It represents how a user or operator 
views the system being developed, it is not an internal implementation detail. For 
example, operating modes could be start-up, take-off, normal flight and landing for 
an avionics application. A major reason for including modes is to allow the mod- 
elling of the "mode confusion" concept, whereby an Operator action induces an error 
- perhaps leading to a hazardous situation - because he/she thinks the system is in 
a different mode of operation. A typical SpecTRM graphical model component has 
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Figure 2.2: SpecTRM Graphical Model 
The top-left is the supervisory interface, which consists of a model of the operator 
controls and the means by which status is communicated (displayed) to the operator. 
The bottom-left quadrant is the control modes of the controller, whilst the RHS 
represents inferred information about the operating modes and states of the system 
being controlled. 
Interfacing to the component, are the Supervisor (control input, display output), 
the Controlled Device (Control command out, measured variable in) and the Envi- 
ronment Sensor (inputs measured variables). The graphical model is supported by a 
series of specification definitions which cover output message definition, input vari- 
able definition, and state variable definition. These definitions can be supported by 
further macro and function definitions which are aimed at improving the structure 
and readability of the SpecTRM-RL specification by abstracting complexity. 
During trials of the RSML approach it was discovered that the use of proposi- 
tional logic did not scale well to complex expressions in terms of its readability. It 
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was found to be error prone and that domain experts had difficulty in understand- 
ing what it meant [70]. The response was to develop a tabular representation of the 
complex logic, which presented it in disjunctive normal (DNF) form. These tabular 
representations were called AND/OR tables, and due to their success were retained 
for SpecTRM. 
The SpecTRM-RL model represents the behaviour of the system as a state ma- 
chine, and this allows a number of static checks to be applied to the model to verify 
its consistency (ensure the model is deterministic) and requirements completeness. 
The toolset supports a simulation capability, and the next phase in the analysis 
process is to run the simulator to allow the behaviour of the model to be validated. 
Once the analyst has confirmed consistency, completeness and behaviour of the 
model, then the final phase is to undertake the more heavyweight safety analysis. 
The toolset supports SMHA (State Machine Hazard Analysis) which is a backward 
search technique [104], and SDA (Software Deviation Analysis) [107] which evaluates 
the robustness of a specification. 
2.3.3 Parnas 4-Variable Model Developments 
Work at the University of York aimed to extend the Parnas 4-Variable model as part 
of the Practical Formal Specification (PFS) initiative [32] to address a number of 
development issues. The goal being to apply formality to embedded safety system 
development by providing two enhancements to the 4-Variable model. The first 
providing additional structure outside the control computer in the model, the second 
providing some additional structure within the computer. 
The first, "outside", enhancement adds structure to the Parnas 4-Variable model 
to deal with two key issues. The first issue covers the concern about identifying more 
clearly the role of the embedding system (the control computer, its software and in- 
terfaces) and to ensure it is properly distinguished from its environment context. 
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This is achieved by enhancing the Parnas 4-Variable model by including embed- 
dingInput and embeddingOutput variables which represent the inputs and outputs 
of the embedding system directly in the enhanced model. The second issue covers 
the concern that it is not always possible to monitor and/or control key properties 
directly through an environment parameter. The solution is to introduce additional 
variables into the model. These being real-world sensed and actuated variables 
which are affected directly by the system under development, and which are influ- 
enced by and/or influence the monitored/controlled variables in the original Parnas 
4-Variable model. 
The second, "inside", enhancement involves elaborating the 4-Variable model by 
expanding SOFTREQ (the computing system and software level specification) to 
include the hardware structure and the software architecture covering such issues as 
digitisation noise, sensor management and actuator dynamics data selection. 
This work is based on developing the use of Matlab/Simulink/Stateflow (MSS) 
[18] by adding formalism to MSS specifications in a non-obtrusive manner (i. e. allow- 
ing those competent in using MSS to use formalism without the need for extensive 
training in formal techniques). This has three core elements which comprise: apply- 
ing notational restrictions; representing important assumptions about the domain 
behaviour in MSS specifications; providing rules for "healthiness" of specifications 
which are checked by a Simulink/Stateflow analyser (SSA) tool. 
The PFS/SSA approach addresses some of the identified issues and the authors 
acknowledge that it should be considered as one component of the work needed to 
address the major challenge of providing an integrated and usable approach for the 
development of safety critical systems. 
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2.3.4 KAOS 
KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification) [24,128] is an approach 
that provides a specification language for capturing why, who, and when aspects as 
well as the usual what requirements. It has a goal-driven elaboration method and 
draws on a number of concepts from Artificial Intelligence work on knowledge repre- 
sentation and acquisition [128]. A KAOS specification has a two level structure; an 
outer semantic net layer for declaring concepts, their attributes and links to other 
concepts; and an inner formal assertion layer for formally defining the concept. The 
latter combines a real-time temporal logic for the specification of goals, constraints, 
and objects, and standard pre/post conditions for the specification of actions and 
their strengthening to ensure the constraints [25]. KAOS is a form of goal-oriented 
RE that uses goals for requirements elicitation, elaboration, organisation, specifica- 
tion, analysis, negotiation, documentation and evolution. Goals are objectives to 
be achieved by the system under consideration. The term "system" refers to the 
software to be designed and its environment [68]. Goals are formulated in terms of 
optative statements which may refer to functional or non-functional properties and 
range from high-level concerns (the system will play audio warning messages to the 
pilot) through to lower level ones (if the message identifier does not correspond to 
the selected message then the audio mute discrete will be set active). A suitable 
goal directed acquisition strategy can be made up of the following steps: 
1. Acquisition of goal structure and identification of objects. 
2. Preliminary identification of agents and their actions. 
3. Operationalisation of goals into constraints. 
4. Refinement of objects and actions. 
5. Derivation of strengthened conditions. 
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6. Identification of alternative agent responsibilities. 
7. Actual assignment of actions to responsible agents. 
Agents are active system components which act as a "processor"for some actions 
- an action being a mathematical input-output relation over objects. Achieving 
goals in general requires the cooperation of multiple agents. Although the steps are 
ordered, the strategy allows for some of them to run concurrently (e. g., 1.2 and 3) 
and for backtracking and iteration. Tactics can then be applied to each step of the 
strategy, as detailed in [241. For example the tactic "Reduce goals into subgoals so 
that the latter require co-operation of fewer potential agents to achieve them" can 
be applied to step 1 of the strategy. A typical model fragment after step 1 would 
have the form: 
System Goal Achieve tM.. d QRegwstSatisfed1 
Instance of SatistactIonGosl: Concerns ..; 
ReducedTo Informal Del 
FormalDef 
('dr: Ioitiator, m: mcmina, p IbrUCipuu) 
Requesnnp(r. m) A Feuible(m) o O. r.. w ScAaduldlm) 
A InvitaMp. m) =* 0"AV, wr Ktttw(p. m) 
The goal refinement process stops when goals are reached that can be assigned 
as responsibility to single agents. Terminal goals assigned to agents become require- 
ments; terminal goals assigned to agents in the environment become assumptions. 
The later cannot be enforced by the software to be and have to be validated since 
the overall design will rely upon their properties. 
KAOS supports separation of concerns between domain definitions (the environ- 
ment) and system requirements and is consistent with the Parnas 4-variable model 
[19,67,133]. Further, the formal layer incorporates a library of reduction templates 
that are "pre-proved" using standard temporal logic techniques. Thus an analyst 
can use these templates with the knowledge that they are correct, and will not have 
to prove this later in the process. It is worth noting that the formal aspects of KAOS 
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were emphasised in the early work since it was found to be very useful in finding 
bugs in the resulting specification [128]. 
The use of KAOS in practice identified a number of issues concerning the very 
top-down nature of the approach. The solution developed was to introduce scenarios 
as discussed in detail in [129]. This effectively introduces a hierarchy of goals, 
requirements and scenarios. 
2.3.5 AdLS 
The AdLS approach is based on the belief that substantial improvement in the 
dependability of computer based safety-critical systems can be achieved by applying 
a detailed safety analysis to the requirements specifications of the software before 
proceeding to any subsequent phases of the development. The approach involves 
modelling the system and its environment, iterative simultaneous requirements and 
safety analyses, and documentation of linkages identified between artefacts produced 
by these analyses with a safety Specification Graph (SSG) [26]. 
The Methodology for the analysis of safety requirements involves the phases 
shown in Table 2.2, which provide a framework for partitioning the analysis into 
smaller phases obtained from a hierarchical model of the structure. AdLS uses a 
set of informal and formal techniques appropriate to the issues to be analysed. A 
typical AdLS development begins with an environment analysis to understand the 
environment context and to identify the accidents relevant to the system. This is 
followed by plant analysis that identifies rules of operation (assumptions) and plant 
safety specifications. The latter identify hazards that in conjunction with certain 
conditions in the environment could result in an accident. Safety constraints are 
then developed to counter the hazards and these are supported by plant safety 
strategies which are schemes for maintaining a safety constraint. The accidents, 
hazards, safety constraints and plant safety strategies can then be formed into a 
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hierarchical SSG. The SSG is used to direct the vulnerability analysis. The process 
proceeds with plant safety analysis followed by safety controlling system analysis. 
Analysis Purpose 
Environment analysis aim, purpose & accidents 
Safety plant analysis identifies hazards 
Safety plant interface analysis behaviour of sensors and actuators 
Safety controlling system analysis top level organisation for the controlling system 
Table 2.2: AdLS Structure 
At each phase the requirements analysis produces safety specifications, and the 
safety analysis checks acceptability - this is an iterative process. The safety speci- 
fication imposes restrictions, and it is necessary to check these are consistent with 
the mission goals. Explicitly documenting assumptions enables impact of changes 
in them to be traced through the SSG. 
2.3.6 Agenda-Based Methods 
The goal of the agenda-based methods (44] was to counter some significant problems 
identified with the use of formal specifications: no methodological guidance given 
for the application of the formal technique; there is a need to perform requirements 
analysis before writing the specification; the formal techniques are not well inte- 
grated with the requirements analysis phase. The solution to these issues was to 
provide a requirements elicitation agenda to be followed which ensured that due 
notice was taken of analysing the requirements and distinguishing the environment, 
along the lines described in (133]. This agenda comprised of six items: 
I. fix the domain vocabulary (domain theory, entities (nouns) and relationships 
(verbs)) 
2. state facts, assumptions and requirements in natural language 
3. identify possible user operations and input/output parameters 
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4. list all relevant system events and their parameters 
5. classify the events 
6. formalise facts, assumptions and requirements as constraints on system traces 
The starting point is expected to be an informal customer requirements doc- 
ument, and there is a need for communication with the customer to validate the 
process. The role of the first five steps is to understand the problem, the sixth is 
to initiate the formalism from which the formal specification can be derived. The 
latter also includes a heuristic approach for dealing with requirements conflict. The 
formal specification agenda is a two step process: define a first approximation of 
the software system state, and augment the specification by incorporating the re- 
quirements in turn. Completeness is identified as an important characteristic of the 
method, directly supported by the first steps of the requirements elicitation agenda 
and by feedback from the specification phase. 
The agenda-based methods are not confined to any particular notation, but 
can be used with a number of formalisms. For example, later work demonstrated 
how Problem Frames and architectures could be used as part of a pattern-based 
specification and design approach following a four step agenda [17]. This involved 
providing additional problem frame templates to map to particular architecture 
styles. 
The agenda-based approach has many similarities with KAOS. The main dis- 
tinctions being that KAOS has its own language and takes a much broader perspec- 
tive modelling the software system and the environment in detail. In contrast the 
agenda-based approach only models those aspects required to support an adequate 
specification. This means it is efficient, but raises concerns about how it might 
handle safety requirements which are system wide - i. e., includes the environment. 
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2.3.7 Formal Safety Analysis of Models and SCADE 
Using a formal model to provide enhanced, formal safety analysis capabilities has 
emerged as an important research topic in recent years 158), 1101), 12). 197). Tradi- 
tionally safety engineers perform manual analyses using the techniques described in 
section 2.2.2. These are based on informal design models and requirements docu- 
mentation. The results tend to be quite subjective and dependent on the skill and 
experience of the analyst. There are also concerns that it is difficult to demonstrate 
that these manual analyses are complete, consistent and error-free (58). This re- 
sulted in work which applied formal safety analysis to formal models of the system 
with the following advantages: 
" close integration between the system and safety analyses as they use the same 
models 
" the ability to perform a meaningful analysis of the architecture early in the 
development 
" the ability to prove that the model has the required properties. 
First the system formal model is developed and validated to establish nominal 
correctness, then failure injection is applied to investigate the system's safety ca- 
pabilities. One approach identified a manual method for injecting failures (581. but 
other work noted the increased workload problem on large systems and developed 
tool support for automatic injection [101], [2]. A potential problem is that if the 
model is inadequate then so will be the analysis, therefore [97] encourages inde- 
pendence and diversity in the application of safety analysis techniques to ensure 
adequate coverage. In this work the POSE/Alloy [52] combination will be used to 
achieve a similar level of formal safety analysis of the formal requirements model 
and the PSA will be developed to support this task. 
30 
Both [58] and [2] used SCADE as the basis for their work, and SCADE was also 
used in recent work on developing AMBERS [23]. AMBERS also uses the Parnas 
4-Variable model (based on the SCR variant) and tables for the requirements phase 
and targets the SCADE [31] system for the subsequent development. AMBERS 
has similar goals to and is also compatible with POSE, but it does not include the 
specific early (PSA) safety analysis feasibility check introduced in this work. 
2.3.8 Automated Safety Analysis of Complex Systems 
The importance of safety and embedded critical system development has been iden- 
tified by a number of European Union (EU) funded research projects such as the 
ESACS (Enhanced Safety Assessment for Complex Systems), ISAAC (Improve- 
ment of Safety Activities on Aeronautical Complex systems) and ASSERT (Au- 
tomated proof-based System and Software Engineering for Real-Time applications) 
[5] projects and through a number of pan-industrial collaborations using AADL 
(Architecture Analysis and Design Language) and the AltaRica project - AltaR- 
ica was used and further developed on the ESACS, ISAAC and ASSERT projects 
[11]. These projects have sought to improve the analysis and development of critical 
systems by addressing process issues and developing supporting analysis tools. 
For example, an AltaRica model for use with PSSA [50] focuses on the poten- 
tial fault propagation inside a system. Abstraction is used to reduce complexity 
in these models by replacing concrete variables (with potentially numerous values) 
that would be typically used in a functional model, with more abstract quality vari- 
ables which have just two values - correct or erroneous. This abstraction produces 
smaller models, but at the expense of the AltaRica model not being the same as the 
functional development model - raising the obligation to demonstrate that the two 
model views are equivalent. The system hazards are represented as "feared events" 
which are encoded into the model using observer nodes. The analysis then proceeds 
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using tools to identify sets of unacceptable sequences (sequences where at least one 
feared event or qualitative system requirement is infringed). These unacceptable 
sequences are then analysed to identify the smallest set of software events that are 
required to eliminate these unacceptable sequences. This smallest set of software 
events is then formed into derived requirements which if satisfied ensure the unac- 
ceptable sequences cannot occur, and these derived requirements are added to the 
software specification. 
One of the goals of the ASSERT project which ran from 2004 through to 2007 
was to use AADL and proof techniques to improve co-operation between system and 
software development teams and produce re-usable building blocks to facilitate the 
development of complex embedded applications. 
Automating and integrating the safety analysis tasks to cope with increasing 
complexity are features of these projects. Two prominent automated safety devel- 
opment approaches [77] used on these projects are those based on Failure Logic 
Modelling (FLM) and those based on Fault Injection (FI). FLM allows analysts to 
model the failure behaviour of a system as the design progresses and examples are 
AltaRica, FPTN and Hip-HOPS [77]. In contrast, FI allows automated analysis of 
detailed design models and uses SCADE and Simulink models as its input - exam- 
ples being from the ESACS project and [58] (also refer to section 2.3.7). [77] argues 
that the two approaches are complementary as they deal with different parts of the 
development life cycle and they should be integrated - and this work was developed 
as part of the ISAAC project. [77] also notes that even FLM represents a significant 
cost and suggests the need for "lightweight" methods to be used in the early phases 
of a development to assist with such things as architecture evaluation and selection 
- and notes that [76] is an example of a possible lightweight PSSA approach. 
The lightweight PSSA approach described in [76] is based on software architec- 
tures (although with some modification to the process it can be extended to cover 
hardware and system architectures) and consists of three main phases: dependency 
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modelling with both forward and backward model views; deductive exploratory 
analysis; inductive verification analysis. 
In dependency modelling two views (called Forward and Backward Dependency 
Views) of the architecture are constructed to capture information about dependen- 
cies between services of different modules of the architecture - where a service could 
be a delivery of a data item, process communication or synchronisation. The two 
dependency views are then used in the analysis phases of the assessment. 
The task of the deductive exploratory analysis is to identify and analyse po- 
tentially hazardous chains of dependencies in the architecture. These chains are 
identified by considering hazards (identified at earlier stages of the safety process), 
specifying them in terms of the services that modules provide, and then walking 
through the views in order to establish all the dependencies of critical services, as 
well as any mechanisms that minimise these dependencies. 
Finally, in the inductive verification analysis hypothetical failures of some key 
modules services are considered and their potential effects on the system as a whole 
are established. Therefore, the purpose of this phase is to verify both the complete- 
ness (in terms of hazardous dependency chains identified) and correctness (especially 
with respect to potential single causes of failure) of the deductive analysis. 
Each of these three main phases is broken down into a number of sub-phases 
which breaks the overall analysis down into manageable incremental tasks and pro- 
vides verification for important aspects of these tasks. It will be shown that the 
development of the POSE/Alloy [52] combination in this work could also form a 
possible lightweight PSSA approach which could be used at the front end of the 
overall process described in (77]. 
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2.4 Problem Orientation 
By problem orientation (PO) we mean a body of work whose origins can be traced 
back to the seminal "Four Dark Corners of Requirements Engineering" paper by Zave 
and Jackson [133]. This paper identified four weak or dark areas in requirements 
engineering (RE) and concluded that there is a need in RE: 
1. for terminology to be grounded in the reality of the environment; 
2. to avoid describing the solution machine, rather describe the environment 
before and after the machine is applied; 
3. to identify which entities are controlled by the environment, which are con- 
trolled by the machine and which environment entities are shared with the 
machine; 
4. to recognise that the primary role of domain knowledge is in supporting the 
refinement of requirements into specifications. 
The PO approaches find their genesis in these four issues: 
1. for terminology to be grounded in the reality of the environment; Problem: 
the reality of the environment has no precise description so that requirements 
exist in the real world which consists of some inherently non-formal and hence 
imprecise elements. The difficulty for software is that software concerns the 
operation of the machine, a formally describable system, so that software prob- 
lems (i. e. real-world problems that have software as their solution) consist of 
partly imprecise and partly precise elements [53]. This complicates the require- 
ments sub-life cycle, identified by Lamsweerde [127] as consisting of Domain 
analysis, Elicitation, Negotiation and agreement, Specification, Specification 
analysis, Documentation and Evolution. With major real-world concerns such 
as sociological, political, organisational and economic issues being apparent to 
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the requirements, as well as formally describable issues of computation such as 
control flow, parallelism, etc. the path from requirements to code is required 
to combine both informality and formality. PO approaches, with their focus 
on the problem, must attempt to address the informal of the real world and 
the formal of the machine together. Also, any problem oriented approaches 
must be sufficiently expressive. This requires two capabilities [133]. The first 
is that they must provide for the declaration of a finite collection of action 
types that partition the space of all possible actions. The action types are (a) 
unshared environment controlled (UEC), (b) shared environment controlled 
(SEC) and (c) shared machine controlled (SMC). The second expressive ca- 
pability is that the languages must allow assertions about the three action 
types, in both the indicative (about the environment) and optative (about the 
requirement) moods. 
2. the source of this dark corner is the mad rush to a solution that overcomes the 
need to understand a problem before it is solved, avoiding the description of the 
solution machine in the requirements forces a consideration of the complexity 
of the context and requirements of the problem. However, it is easy to state 
that you should concentrate on understanding the problem before undertaking 
the solution, but this can be very difficult to achieve in practice. As a result, 
PO approaches tend to provide tools for the manipulation of the problem, 
rather than the of the solution. The problem world is a big place and it is 
not always straightforward to identify the relevant parts of the environment. 
In such cases domain knowledge and experience are essential to success, as 
is appropriate modelling and analysis [127]. There is a need to include just 
the right parts of the environment. Too much information involves wasted 
effort and potential obfuscation by irrelevant detail, too little and essential 
behaviour may be omitted. The former is wasteful, but the latter is potentially 
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disastrous for the development since the developed machine will not interact 
correctly with its environment. Systems theory introduces the concept of 
"emergence", which is the idea that at a given level of complexity there are 
properties characteristic of that level [161. It amounts to the idea that the 
"sum" is somehow more than the "parts" and presents a problem for the 
related concept of reductionism, so important in many aspects of science and 
which has a long history [78,115]. The reductionist approach to complexity 
is to partition the problem into simpler tasks and attack these separately, 
and this has proven to be of immeasurable value in many areas of science, 
particularly the physical sciences of chemistry and physics [16]. However, the 
concept of emergence means that checks have to be introduced to ensure that 
something important is not lost through the application of reductionism. Some 
problem oriented approaches split the problem into simpler parts and work on 
these: only considering the composition problem of combining these parts 
after the solutions to the individual parts has been successfully established. 
This "divide and conquer" approach follows from the premise "if you cannot 
solve the smaller problems, then you will not be able to solve their composite" 
[55]. It recognises that the composition may be difficult, but argues this is 
facilitated by the knowledge gained from solving the simpler problems and not 
having to try to solve the simpler problems at the same time as dealing with 
the composition. 
3. the separation of environment and solution is another aid in managing the 
complexity of the problem as it allows the specification to be distinguished 
from the requirements. These are both optative entities, but the requirements 
are formulated in terms of objects in the real world in a vocabulary accessible 
to the stakeholders. Requirements capture required relations between objects 
in the environment that are monitored and controlled by the software [191. In 
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contrast, the specification is formulated in terms of objects manipulated by 
the software in a vocabulary accessible to programmers and captures required 
relations between input and output software objects. There is a semantic gap 
between the requirements and the specification which has to be bridged for 
a successful development to take place, and domain knowledge of the envi- 
ronment has a key role in bridging this gap. An important aspect of the PO 
approaches is the tools they provide to assist this bridging process. In [133], 
Jackson and Zave noted that requirements that are not implementable fail to 
be so for three general reasons: 
(a) Environment Constraint. Some requirements can only be satisfied by con- 
straining an action that is controlled by the environment. For example, in 
a turnstile entry system there might be a requirement that the number of 
people allowed entry must not exceed the number of payments received. 
This represents a constraint on the entry actions which are controlled by 
the environment. 
(b) Unshared Information. Some requirements are not directly implementable 
because they are stated in terms of unshared phenomena. For example, a 
lift must arrive at a floor where people are waiting - how can the machine 
know that people are waiting? The resolution of this problem requires 
request and arrive actions to be shared with the machine. It also relies 
on the domain knowledge about human behaviour that people will tend 
to wait after they have made a lift request. 
(c) Future Reference. Some requirements are not directly implementable be- 
cause they are stated in terms of the future. A high-level requirement 
from an aircraft stores management system might state "A store on a 
store carrier selected for release, must be successfully released before an- 
other store from the same carrier can be selected for release. If the first 
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store is not successfully released, then it must be declared as hung and no 
further store release attempts are allowed from that carrier". The stores 
management computer (SM) does not know if the store has gone or not. 
The SM provides the control signal to set the release process in motion, 
but it has no way of knowing (by itself) whether the release - which is 
a future event - is successful or not. To satisfy the requirement, the SM 
has to take in data from the environment. In this case data from the 
store carrier stating if the store has gone or not, and knowledge that the 
explosive devices used in the release mechanism will have completed well 
within a 500 millisecond limit. This knowledge allows the requirement 
to be re-expressed in a more implementable form as "A store on a store 
carrier selected for release, must be successfully released within 500 ms, 
otherwise the store will be declared as hung and no further release at- 
tempts to the carrier should be allowed. Successful release is defined as 
the store carrier informing the SM that the store has gone". This imple- 
mentable form of the requirement includes domain knowledge and relies 
on environment controlled phenomena. 
Note that all of these types use domain knowledge to fill-in behaviour infor- 
mation to make them implementable. In fact these three types are not "non- 
implementable" in the strictest sense, but rather they cannot be implemented 
directly without the addition of further information. Therefore this text will 
refer to them as being "non-feasible" rather than "non-implementable" - the 
idea being that they can be implemented if the required information is sup- 
plied. In fact, Zave and Jackson [133] classified requirements into four types, 
the above three non-feasible requirements and they also identified a fourth 
class that are directly implementable. 
4. formally Zave and Jackson express this in the entailment: 
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W, S ý- R 
In the entailment W represents the indicative properties of the environment 
domain (the world context), S is the specification of the machine and R rep- 
resents the desired or optative properties of the requirement. The entailment 
is taken to mean that if a machine satisfying the specification S is operating 
in the world with environment domain (indicative) properties W then the op- 
tative properties defined by the requirement R will be satisfied. That is, the 
relationship between the software solution and the requirements is given by 
the context into which the solution is deployed. Satisfying this entailment is 
an important first task in the software development process, and involves un- 
derstanding the environment domains and establishing the requirements that 
will result in the desired behaviour before specifying the computer machine 
that forms the solution. 
The completeness of requirements engineering can be formally formulated in 
terms of this entailment: 
(a) There is a set R of requirements. Each member of R has been validated 
(checked informally) as acceptable to the customer, and R as a whole has 
been validated as expressing all the customer's desires with respect to the 
software development project. 
(b) There is a set W of statements of domain knowledge. Each member of 
W has been validated (checked informally) as true of the environment. 
(c) There is a set S of specifications. The members of S do not constrain 
the environment, they are not stated in terms of any unshared actions or 
state components, and they do not refer to the future. 
(d) A proof shows that W, S F- R. This proof ensures that an implementation 
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satisfies the requirements. 
(e) There is a proof that S and W are consistent. This ensures that the 
specification is internally consistent and consistent with the environment. 
In the following we will review a number of approaches which have developed 
from these ideas. 
2.4.1 Problem Frames 
Problem Frames (PF) [53] allows one to construct the specification (S) for a ma- 
chine (M), such that the machine M satisfying S, in conjunction with properties 
of the problem world, W, satisfies the requirements represented by R. This cov- 
ers part of the W, S F- R entailment described in section 2.4 and is represented 
diagrammatically in Figure 2.3. 
Machine: Problem 
-, R M World: W 
Figure 2.3: A Typical PF Problem Diagram 
The machine M and the problem world W are both physical entities, so they are 
shown as solid lines in Figure 2.3. In contrast, the requirements R are intangible so 
are shown dashed. The machine interacts with the problem world at an interface 
represented by the shared phenomena a. Shared phenomena are either controlled 
by one of the machine or the problem world and observed by the other [551. The 
requirements refer to the physical phenomena, represented by b, of the problem 
world. The arrow denotes that the requirements place constraints on these phenom- 
ena. In general, the requirement phenomena b are distinct from the specification a. 
Although they can be the same and it is often convenient to achieve this, if possible, 
as it simplifies the analysis. 
PF are targeted at real world engineering problems, but not to what might 
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be called computational problems such as factorising a large integer or finding the 
shortest path in a graph [55]. The latter are ideal candidates for formal development 
[43] due to their closed nature (i. e., no interface to the real world). PF can also work 
with formal development systems [113,114,17], but as noted in section 1.1 care is 
required in mapping between the real world entities and their formal equivalents. 
The gap between what is desired at the interface b (requirement R) and what can 
be directly monitored and controlled by the machine at the interface a is bridged by 
the given properties of the problem world W as shown by W, S f- R and explained 
in section 2.4. Showing this relationship holds is called the basic problem concern. 
Therefore, a PF development begins with a description in the real world involving 
R, b, W, S, and a, and from this a set of related sub-problems are derived - where 
the sub-problems map to known patterns called basic frames. Jackson identified five 
basic frames [53] these being: 
" Required Behaviour: the problem is to build a machine that will control some 
part of the physical world to satisfy certain conditions. 
" Commanded Behaviour: the problem is to build a machine that will control 
some part of the physical world in response to commands issued by an operator. 
" Information Display: the problem is to build a machine that will obtain infor- 
mation about the physical world and display it appropriately in the required 
form. 
" Simple Workpieces: the problem is to build a machine that will allow a user 
to create and edit certain computer text, graphics or similar objects so that 
they can be processed as required. 
" Transformation: the problem is to build a machine that will transform given 
input files into output files in the required format. 
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PF are the most researched of the problem oriented approaches and have an 
active research community developing and extending their scope [20,21]. Some 
authors have provided extensions to the basic set of PF templates to cover a par- 
ticular problem domain. PF have also been used in conjunction with architectural 
styles to form a systematic software development process based on patterns and 
the agenda concept [17]. Patterns are a way to reuse software development knowl- 
edge at different levels of abstraction. In this scheme PF provides problem patterns 
and the architectural styles provides solution patterns. The agenda encodes process 
knowledge. It is the combination of the patterns and the agenda that provides the 
systematic development process. 
A more generic extension to the PF approach is the architectural frame or 
AFrame, which provides an architecture-driven problem decomposition [103]. This 
uses AFrames as architectural styles located in the solution space to guide the anal- 
ysis of the problem space. AFrames have been developed for the linear pipe and 
filter, and model view controller (MVC) architectures to show the utility and power 
of the approach. They also address two criticisms raised against PF: the assumption 
of a green-field development process and expertise is required to guide the appropri- 
ate decomposition [103]. The AFrame concept addresses these criticisms as follows. 
AFrames provide guidance on how the problem needs to be restructured to fit a 
particular solution form. They also assist in the solution synthesis by guiding the 
decomposition of sub-problem solutions into a solution of the original problem. The 
AFrame structure encodes expert knowledge, which directly supports the software 
development process. In this way, AFrames provide a link between the problem and 
solution spaces. 
In their standard form [53] PF are focussed on the problem domain and do not 
have tools to bridge the gap and access the solution space. The development of 
AFrames addresses certain aspects of this issue, while POSE, which is considered in 
section 2.4.3 below, takes the work even further. 
42 
2.4.2 REVEAL 
REVEAL [42] provides a process to elicit the real world requirements in the context 
of the proposed operating environment (domain). It provides a means to develop the 
specification of a machine that will satisfy the requirements when operating in the 
context of the environment it is to be used in. The process is supported by checklists 
to ensure adequacy, quality of expression and self-consistency of the requirements. 
The process also provides support for managing and resolving requirements conflicts 
and for managing change. Although REVEAL is a process it is tool independent. 
It is informal in operation, but can be used as part of a formal development. It can 
also be used in conjunction with other common requirements tools such as DOORS. 
One of the key principles of REVEAL is that Requirements Engineering begins 
with a description of the whole application domain, including domain entities that 
do not directly impact with the system. Iteration covers the transformation from 
high level requirements about the world into specifications about the machine and 
its interface. Scenarios are used as a tool for describing and exploring such dynamic 
behaviour. This approach readily establishes traceability, but goes further with its 
notion of Rich Traceability - which provides heuristics to support the development 
from the requirements into the specification. For a given requirement, its Rich 
Traceability consists of an argument that explains: 
" which statements (e. g., requirements, specifications or domain knowledge) 
combine to satisfy it; 
" how/why the particular combination achieves the given statement. 




Problem Oriented Software Engineering (POSE) [39,40,41] is an extension and 
generalisation of Jackson's Problem Frame approach [53]. The following is a brief 
summary of its main characteristics based on the more detailed descriptions in [39, 
40,41]. In POSE, software development is viewed as solving a problem, the solution 
being a machine (a program running in a computer) that will ensure satisfaction 
of the requirement in the given problem world consisting of real-world domains. 
Like Problem Frames, POSE views the problem world as a collection of domains 
described in terms of their known, or indicative, properties, which interact through 
their sharing of phenomena, i. e. events, commands, states, and so on. 
POSE is defined as a transformational system, similar in form to a Gentzen- 
style sequent calculus [63] that allows problems to be transformed into problems 
that are easier to solve, or that will lead to problems that are easier to solve. A set 
of transformation rule schema capture (atomic) discrete steps in development. Each 
requires a justification of application in order for the transformation to be solution 
preserving (this means that a solution to a transformed problem is also a solution to 
the original problem), but the justifications need not be formal. The combination 
of the justifications is an argument that the solution is adequate as a solution to the 
original problem. 
POSE provides a structure which supports different development activities and 
allows them to be combined - this includes bringing together both non-formal and 
formal development activities. Development commences with the instantiation of 
the null problem about which little is known, and software development then pro- 
ceeds by the application of problem transformations, each of which develops some 
aspect of a problem description - including gaining knowledge about the require- 
ment and the environment context. The choice of which transformation to apply 
at any point is only tentative as each transformation must be justified before being 
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accepted as contributing adequately to the development. Sometimes a sequence of 
transformations will lead the problem to a "dead-end" and it will be necessary to 
backtrack to the point of departure and then follow a different path to an adequate 
solution. Note that these "dead-ends" provide useful insight into the problem space. 
This information can be very useful to help avoid cases where for example an over- 
enthusiastic maintainer may want to follow a path that has previously been shown 
to be a "dead-end". POSE is the basis of our candidate SSSD approach and will be 
introduced in detail in Chapter 4. 
2.5 Literature Analysis 
In this section we analyse the SSSD approaches described in section 2.3 with a view 
to identify some key properties that they exhibit. We then use such properties 
to evaluate the PO approaches described in section 2.4 with a view to justify a 
candidate approach to use in the remainder of this thesis. 
2.5.1 Property Identification 
Inspection of the SSSD approaches described in section 2.3 allows a number of key 
properties to be identified that an approach targeted at the development of the early 
phases of a safety development process should possess. The following paragraphs 
identify ten such properties. 
Understanding the system environment context (Context) is a central feature 
of the Parnas 4-Variable based techniques such as Parnas Tables, SCR, SpecTRM, 
AMBERS and the PFS development work (section 2.3.3). It is also important in 
the AdLS, FLM and KAOS approaches, although in KAOS it is not given the same 
level of prominence as other features. 
One way of reducing the risk of rework is by selecting an appropriate system 
architecture that facilitates the resolution of the key issues as an integral part of the 
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development. Without such a selection, then one may end up with an inappropriate 
architecture that is not capable of assisting with the resolution of all or even some of 
the key issues. The result is that the development of a satisfactory solution becomes 
much more problematic and inevitably more expensive. So the capability of mod- 
elling different candidate architectures is a highly desirable feature of any proposed 
approach (Architecture). KAOS, PFS and FLM have features that provide strong 
support for architecture, whilst the other techniques (Parnas Tables, AdLS, SCR, 
SpecTRM, and AMBERS) provide some support. 
All of the safety techniques discussed in section 2.3, apart from AdLS, have some 
capabilities in producing a specification that spans the gap between the problem 
world and the solution space. The full process approaches of KAOS, AMBERS, 
SCR, SpecTRM and Parnas Tables cover this in some detail, but it is not a specific 
highlighted feature of PFS or the FLM approaches. It follows that the language of 
the selected approach must be able to span the problem and solution spaces (Spec. 
Join). 
Implementation bias (Avoid Bias) can result in unnecessary and inappropriate 
constraints on the solution, and the avoidance of this property is a desirable. The 
KAOS approach has good capabilities in dealing with this property through its 
multi-level abstraction and validity checking mechanisms, and the linkage and focus 
provided by the SSG means AdLS is also good at avoiding bias. The high level of 
abstraction and other features also mean that the FLM approaches and PFS have 
good capabilities in avoiding bias - but the other techniques are not so strong in 
this area. 
The Parnas 4-Variable based techniques ensure that the model, domains and 
interfaces are grounded in reality (Model Reality), and this property is also an 
important feature of PFS with its enhanced features. The SSG linkages mean AdLS 
has good capabilities with respect to this property. However, it is not a strong 
feature in KAOS or the FLM approaches. 
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All the techniques support the task of validating that the right system is being 
produced to a certain extent (Validation). Some, like SpecTRM, SCR, PFS, the 
FLM approaches, KAOS and AMBERS go further by providing tool support for 
validation, including simulation and/or proof. 
KAOS manages complexity through its ability to structure the problem, so that 
large complex problems can be broken down into smaller problems that are easier 
to solve (Simplification). The other approaches such as AMBERS, Parnas Tables, 
SCR and SpecTRM use simplification as part of their development process, but do 
not have the process support offered by KAOS. PFS offers strong capabilities with 
its modelling and refinement support, whilst the FLM approaches make use of their 
"divide and conquer" features such as abstraction to handle complexity. 
Tool support (Tool Support) is an important practical consideration with re- 
spect to both efficiency, error-avoidance and repeatability, so this is certainly a 
desirable property and techniques such as the FLM approaches, PFS, KAOS, SCR, 
SpecTRM and AMBERS support this. Specific tool support is not a feature of 
Parnas Tables or AdLS. 
Safety standards require analysis to be performed early in the life cycle, so the 
ability to work at a suitably early point, i. e., the right level of abstraction, is also 
important (Right Abstraction). KAOS, PFS, AdLS and the FLM approaches 
have very good abstraction capabilities and support comprehensive analysis tasks, 
as does AMBERS. SCR and SpecTRM also support extensive analysis capabilities 
although this tends to be relatively later in the life cycle. Parnas Tables do not have 
analysis tool support but allow a manual analysis to be conducted. 
Finally, one of the aims of this work is to improve an existing process (i. e. to 
support "normal design" principles), so the selected approach must be capable of 
working with an existing life cycle method (not replacing it! ) - i. e. it must inte- 
grate with it (Integrates). Approaches such as KAOS, PFS, SCR, SpecTRM, and 
AMBERS have a specific tool supported process which is different from the existing 
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process introduced in detail in Chapter 3. These approaches could be adapted, but 
it would be a significant undertaking. In contrast AdLS and Parnas Tables could 
be adapted for use with the existing process and the FLM approaches could be used 
directly. 
Although these ten properties were derived from an analysis of the SSSD ap- 
proaches presented in section 2.3 they are also supported by other sources in the 
literature and all this is summarised in Table 2.3. 
Property Description Literature Support 
Context Importance of Domain Context [54,82,121,127] 
Architecture Architecture to encapsulate [82] 
Spec. Join Specification as "join" [121] 
Avoid Bias Avoid implementation (solution) bias [133,16] 
Model Reality Model domain and interfaces grounded in reality [133,16] 
Validation Validate the model represents reality [122,16] 
Simplification Support simplification [69,16] 
Tool Support Tools to support application of approach [96,45,90] 
Right Abstraction Early analysis requires abstraction [82,71] 
Integrates Integration with Existing Life Cycle 
Table 2.3: Ten Properties of SSSD Approaches 
A comparison of the relevant SSSD approaches with these ten properties is shown 
in Table 2.4, where the property descriptor from Table 2.3 is used to represent the 
desired property as appropriate. The FI techniques (section 2.3.8) apply to detailed 
design models so are not considered for the early development phase work that 
is the focus of this document. In this comparison table (Table 2.4) "Y" denotes 
that the approach supports the property based on supporting evidence from the 
literature, "P" means the approach partially supports the property or might support 
the property but there is insufficient evidence from the literature, whilst "N" means 
the approach provides little or no support for the property based on the published 
literature. 
The Parnas Table based methods are strong contenders, since they were devel- 
oped to produce safety systems, and the system context and handling requirements 
are an important aspect of their operation, but they are more appropriate to the 
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Property SCR SpecTRM Parnas KAOS AMBERS AdLS PFS FLM 
Context Y Y Y P y y y y 
Architecture P P P Y P P Y Y 
Spec. Join Y Y Y Y Y N P P 
Avoid Bias P P P Y P Y Y Y 
Model Reality Y Y Y P Y Y Y P 
Validation Y Y P Y Y P y y 
Simplification P P P Y P Y Y Y 
Tool Support Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Right Abstraction P P P Y Y Y Y Y 
Integrates N N P N N P N Y 
Table 2.4: Comparison of Properties by SSSD Approaches 
design rather than the early development phases. SCR, SpecTRM and AMBERS 
have extensive tool support, but the modelling supported by these methods is again 
more suited to the design phase. Neither are they very strong on the architectural 
aspects. They provide some support for simplification and can avoid bias, but this 
is not a specific feature of these approaches. Finally, they offer little direct support 
for the integrates property. simplification. 
AdLS has many good features but lacks tool support for the formal techniques 
associated with it which affects its validation capabilities, and does not have strong 
support for the Architecture or Spec. Join properties. However, with some work it 
could be integrated with different development approaches. 
In many respects KAOS is a strong contender, it has good tool support, sup- 
ports a combination of formal and informal development and has strong elicitation 
capabilities. However, although KAOS does note the importance of the environment 
and that it is necessary to distinguish between the requirements and the environ- 
ment; its environment context capabilities are not strong when compared with the 
PO approaches, and as a result the KAOS models are not as "grounded in reality" 
as desired. KAOS is also weak with respect to the integrate property due to its 
prescriptive nature. 
That PFS features strongly is no surprise since it was conceived to handle em- 
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bedded safety critical applications and took the Parnas 4-Variable model approach 
as its basis, but added enhancements to the model and formality -- "where formality 
adds engineering value" [321. The Spec. Join property is not (currently) specifically 
supported and it is centred on MSS (Matlab/Simulink/Stateflow) - therefore it will 
not integrate easily with other development approaches. 
Finally the FLM approaches have good capabilities and AltaRica was developed 
for avionics applications. However, they are primarily approaches for achieving 
automated safety analysis of complex systems (hence Model Reality and Spec. Join 
are specifically supported) and need to be used in conjunction with an appropriate 
development approach. 
2.5.2 Assessment of the PO Approaches 
In this section we assess the problem oriented approaches of section 2.4 against the 
identified properties: 
" Context: the importance of context knowledge is one of the basic tenets of 
problem orientation, hence characteristics of all PO approaches reviewed. 
. Architecture: This is not part of the original work of [133]. The architecture 
work of [103] partially addresses architectural design within problem frames. 
POSE fully supports architectural design as part of its basic transformation 
(as we will see in Chapter 4). 
" Spec. Join: of the reviewed approaches, POSE has spanning problem and 
solution spaces as one of its key objectives. 
" Avoid Bias: avoiding solution bias is a characteristic of the PO approaches, 
which stress the importance of fully understanding the problem, before design- 
ing a solution, and of expressing requirements solely in terms of the context 
phenomena. 
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" Model Reality: the concept of designating descriptions and phenomena in 
the real world is key to many PO approaches, particularly Problem Frames 
and POSE. 
" Validation: a notion of validation is present in Problem Frames embodied in 
the concept of basic problem concern. It is a central concept in POSE where 
the notion of adequacy with respect to stake-holders and step justification 
come together to provide explicit tools for validation. 
" Simplification: the idea of problem progression was introduced within Prob- 
lem Frames to signify the move from requirements to specification during re- 
quirements analysis. It was then developed, independently into techniques by 
[74,75,113,114]. POSE defines its own transformation notation of problem 
progression. 
" Tool Support: none of the PO approaches offer any specific automatic tool 
support, except perhaps for a prototype Prolog-engine for POSE transforma- 
tions [38]. From the literature there is no evidence of integration with other 
tools. 
" Right Abstraction: all PO approaches are permissive when it comes to the 
choice of descriptions, so that identifying an appropriate level of abstraction 
remains an open problem for all of them. However, some guidance might be 
derived from Zave and Jackson's requirements taxonomy and their character- 
isation of implementable specification [133]. 
" Integrates: the only PO approach which so far has been integrated into 
practice is REVEAL, which in fact was defined in an industrial context. 
From this analysis it follows that PO approaches in general, and POSE in partic- 
ular, offer good capabilities with respect to the ten properties identified in Table 2.3. 
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By definition all PO approaches focus on gaining an adequate understanding of the 
system context and the requirements. Problem Frames scores well on most of the 
criteria, except that it is weak in addressing the solution domain and has no tool 
support. In contrast, POSE is capable of scoring highly on all the criteria except for 
tool support. Therefore, on balance POSE appears to offer the best fit with respect 
to the properties identified in Table 2.3. However, evidence will need to be collected 
to support this proposition, and this will be covered in the chapters that follow. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter began with a definition of the safety terminology to be used in this 
thesis, followed by an investigation of the safety context that underpins this work 
- including the need to produce evidence to support a safety case. The need to 
perform a safety analysis in the early phases of the development life cycle was justi- 
fied, and some techniques that might be used to achieve this were introduced. Then 
a number of safe software system development (SSSD) approaches were presented. 
Next problem orientation was introduced, the concepts involved explored and some 
problem oriented approaches discussed. The chapter concluded with the identifica- 
tion of the ten generic properties based on the SSSD approaches, against which the 
SSSD and the problem oriented approaches were compared. The comparison indi- 
cated that Problem Oriented Software Engineering (POSE) appeared to be capable 
of addressing most aspects of the ten properties and was therefore selected as the 
candidate approach to be used in the rest of this thesis. 
Although much of this work will concentrate on the early phases of the develop- 
ment process and the task of deriving a safe specification from the system require- 
ments, it is important to note that the selected method must have capabilities that 
can span the gap between the problem and solution spaces, because the ultimate 
aim is to develop safe code to implement the safe specification. POSE has these 
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capabilities, providing further evidence to support its selection for this work. 
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Chapter 3 
Analysis of an Industrial Safety 
Process 
Chapter 2 identified a set of ten key properties that an appropriate safe software 
system development (SSSD) approach should possess. The aim of this chapter is to 
describe and analyse the early phases of an industrial safety development process 
with a view to identifying additional properties and process issues the discharge of 
which could lead to a notable improvement of the process, and that our proposed 
approach should address. 
3.1 Process Overview 
The specific aspects of the safety development processes followed by different com- 
panies depends on the standards they are required to follow and this is often deter- 
mined by the business sectors they operate in. The author's company (the Company 
henceforth) operates primarily in the UK defence sector, so its safety process is based 
around DS 00-56 [125]. As will be explained there are some unique aspects of the 
process, but generally it is typical of the safety processes used by other UK com- 
panies operating in the military sector, and it shares many similarities with safety 
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processes in general (e. g those following IEC 61508 [51]). 
The Company follows an integrated product development process (IPDP) for 
all their development projects, including safety - thus satisfying the goal discussed 
in section 2.2 that the safety process should be integrated with the development 
process. For developments with functional safety requirements the basic process is 
augmented with high integrity activities; these will be described where appropriate in 
the description of the IPDP that follows. The IPDP is split, as shown in Figure 3.1, 
into an over-arching Management phase and three main technical phases which 
are historically called: (a) Concept Evaluation (CE), (b) Demonstration/Validation 
(Dem/Val) and (c) Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD). With 
the latter phase being by far the major component, it is further sub-divided into 
the major sub-phases of Preliminary Design, Detailed Design, System Validation 
and Certification. The IPDP has been used for over 10 years and has evolved as 
a result of feedback from its use on a wide variety of projects. This evolution 
has meant that some of the phase/task titles no longer capture completely all the 
activities undertaken to support them, as will become clear when some of the tasks 
are described in more detail below. It should be noted that Figure 3.1 concentrates 
on the initial part of the IPDP since this is the area of interest for this work - 
namely the CE phase, the Dem/Val phase and the EMD Preliminary Design sub- 
phase. These phases are further sub-divided into high-level tasks, which in turn are 
further divided into sub-tasks and so on, to form a hierarchical task structure. That 
is, the development process is partitioned into a series of inter-related tasks. These 
tasks cover management, planning, analysis, development, validation, verification 
and review activities; and as noted, the safety tasks are an integral part of the 
structure. Each task details the input criteria, what is to be achieved by executing 
the task and the output criteria. Following this IPDP has given the Company a 
repeatable, consistent and controlled development process. 
The exit from one phase/sub-phase to entry to the next is controlled by a major 
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Figure 3.1: The Integrated Product Developuxeut Procetiti (1I'I )P ) 
review - these are the SRR, SDR and PDR on Figure 3.1 and explained in more 
detail below. The transition between phases is only allowed if appropriate review 
criteria are satisfied. 
The safety management tasks of safety planning (output being the Safety Pro- 
gramme Plan) and safety audit and monitoring are included as part of the Man- 
agement phase. The IPDP safety tasks are based on a safety life cycle model that 
follows the approach defined in the second edition of DS 00-56 [123]. These IPDP 
safety tasks are under continuous development to ensure that they satisfy the safety 
goals of the products being developed. The later version of DS 00-56 [125] is goal 
oriented and does not prescribe what sort of life cycle should be followed. However, 
it does identify the type of safety artefacts that should be produced (including haz- 
ard list, hazard analysis and risk mitigation) and requires that a safety case should 
be developed to provide the argument for safety. A detailed review [84] shows that 
the IPDP safety tasks provide the required safety artefacts and a safety develop- 
ment process that supports the production of an appropriate safety case argument. 
Thus the IPDP safety process has been evolved such that it continues to satisfy the 
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provisions of DS 00-56 as the latter is developed over time. 
All projects in the Company have to follow the safety life cycle built into IPDP, 
since every project has safety obligations that must be discharged. For many 
projects, these are just non-functional health and safety based obligations which 
discharge the Company's obligations to satisfy EU Directives and their correspond- 
ing UK safety regulations. However, for safety involved and safety critical develop- 
ments the level of analysis and need to provide sufficient evidence increases many 
fold, and the safety case is a much more detailed structure. It is the latter types of 
system that this work is interested in supporting. Experience within the Company 
has demonstrated that these safety systems require much more work to cover their 
functional behaviour aspects. This is characterised by the need for: 
" development of a logical argument for safety 
" specific architectural features to support the safety argument 
" significantly more and diverse evidence, including proof for safety critical work. 
Using this process to build these architectures and adopting a policy of "keep it 
simple" has resulted in systems that have been accepted into service at the highest 
levels of criticality by the various regulatory authorities. The Company is keen to 
continue along this successful path, but is also keen to continue to improve the 
integrity and efficiency of the IPDP safety process. To support this the Company 
runs a Lessons Learned Database (LLD) which is used to record the good and the not 
so good elements of all completed programmes. The aim is to capture any problem 
issues arising so that (a) the lesson is recorded and is learned, and (b) corrective 
action is implemented to avoid the same problem in later programmes. Discussions 
on and comparisons with the safety development processes used by other companies 
operating in the sector indicate that these processes share the same issues and 
problems '. 
'The Company works with other industry representatives through its presence on a number of 
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In the following sections, we describe enough of the early phases of the 1PDP to 
allow the identification of a necessary property and some advantageous properties 
that we would like our development approach to possess. In addition, we identify 
six issues, instances which are repeatedly found in the LLD that will be addressed in 
our work. To this end, we will separate and provide a short description of each issue 
that will allow them to be traced through the remainder of this work. Although 
most of the issues are observed in the CE phase, they are also issues with the 
following phases; after their description and capture from a description of the CE 
phase, we continue to identify their impact on the subsequent phases in section 3.3 
and section 3.4. 
The case study work in Appendix A shows an example of the tasks involved in 
the CE, Dem/Val and EMD Preliminary Design phases - this section can be read 
without reference to the Appendix, but the latter does provide additional informa- 
tion if required. 
3.2 Concept Evaluation (CE) Phase 
The first part of the CE phase involves understanding the system context, identifying 
the main system components and gaining an understanding of how they interact. It 
proceeds by performing tasks targeted at developing the conceptual design, eliciting 
the functional requirements and analysing the safety requirements attributed to the 
system to be developed. 
3.2.1 System Context and Conceptual Design Issue 
It has been observed that (via the LLD) the CE phase tasks are not systematic 
in deriving a consistent understanding of the system environment. Similar types 
safety working groups such as the GSN User Group, MoD safety forums and the SBAC (Society 
of British Aerospace Companies). 
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of entry in the LLD indicates that often too many details are left vague or not 
investigated with enough rigour. The result of this issue is that the domain and 
interface descriptions are ambiguous, which results in problems later in the life 
cycle as different engineers interpret the environmental context features in different 
ways, which increases the risk of rework. The need to model aspects of behaviour 
in the Dem/Val phase does highlight some of these ambiguities, but many are not 
uncovered until the more detailed Use Case modelling that occurs during EMD. The 
later this issue is uncovered, then the more costly it is to remedy which increases 
project risk in terms of expense and schedule time. This is identified as our first 
issue: 
[Envirll]: Incomplete understanding of the system context increases 
the risk of rework. 
3.2.2 Initial Functional Requirements Issue 
The elicitation tasks involve assimilating requirements from the various stakeholders 
including the customer, those in the Company responsible for business objectives 
and those responsible for ensuring that necessary legislation is satisfied. The infor- 
mation sources includes customer documentation, discussions with the customer and 
interviews with the other stakeholders. At this stage a certain amount of overlap 
and contradiction is not unexpected, the idea being that these issues are resolved by 
the analysis work undertaken in the following Dem/Val and EMD phases. The main 
issue identified with these tasks (from inspection of the LLD) is that of missing a 
requirement or not completely capturing all the desired aspects of a requirement in 
line with the findings in [79]. The later a problem is uncovered, then the greater 
will be the cost of remedying it. This leads to our second issue: 
[Requl2]: Incomplete requirements increases risk of rework. 
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3.2.3 Attributed Safety Requirements 
The initial IPDP safety work involves assimilating the contracted customer safety 
requirements and then performing safety analysis to see if additional hazards apply 
and to identify failures and behaviour modes that might result in safety issues. The 
task consists of assessing hazard lists derived using domain knowledge, analysing the 
issues and problems encountered on similar systems and performing brainstorming 
sessions to formulate an initial hazard list for the system to be developed. 
It has been observed via the LLD that because the detailed models necessary 
to support a full preliminary safety analysis are not available until relatively late in 
the early life cycle phases with the existing IPDP, the safety engineering lags the 
rest of the development and can cause costly re-work when changes are required 
due to any discovered safety issues. A significant improvement to the safety aspects 
of IPDP could be effected by moving the safety analysis earlier in the life cycle, 
without compromising its effectiveness. This results in our third issue: 
[Late13]: Late effective safety analysis increases risk of rework. 
Another issue concerns traceability, which is an important aspect of many critical 
development processes and has a number of forms. Safety standards such as DS 00-56 
and guidelines such as DO-178B demand traceability from the top level requirements 
all the way through to the code that implements them, and require traceability to the 
evidence (test, code walkthrough etc. ) that validates them. A lack of traceability 
makes it difficult to check that a requirement has been implemented adequately. 
This identifies another important issue, our fourth, that can be captured as: 
[TraceI4]: Traceability incompleteness increases the risk of rework. 
3.2.4 The SRR Gateway Review 
A System Requirements Review (SRR) is used to validate that all the necessary tasks 
have been adequately completed and this covers: (a) determining that the system 
60 
requirements have been completely and properly identified, (b) reviewing that the 
mission requirements definition process has been correctly followed and (c) ensuring 
that the system certification and safety needs are appropriately considered from the 
outset. The latter includes confirming that a safety plan and safety case are being 
developed commensurate with the level of the safety requirements attributed to the 
system. The SSR acts as a gateway between the CE phase and the Dem/Val phase. 
The programme is only allowed to proceed to the next Dem/Val phase when all the 
items listed above are deemed to have been completed to a satisfactory standard. 
One major issue that can occur during the SSR (as observed in the LLD) is the 
fact that certain tasks are not completed at all because they have been "tailored 
out" of the development process. During the initiation of a project, programmes 
are allowed to tailor the IPDP to fit in with their particular circumstances. This 
can result in tasks being removed that are deemed necessary by the SRR reviewers, 
resulting in re-work before the programme is allowed to pass SRR. This can be 
considered as part of a broader problem defined as our fifth issue: 
[Incoml5]: Task incompleteness increases the risk of rework. 
3.3 Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Phase 
The main purpose of the Dem/Val phase is the development of the system specifi- 
cations and it consists of three tasks: (a) develop the system theory of operation, 
(b) develop the sub-system theory of operation, and (c) derive the system speci- 
fications. These tasks will now be described and issues identified earlier but also 
affecting this Dem/Val phase will be highlighted and any new issues introduced 
where appropriate. There are safety analysis activities associated with each of these 
tasks. 
During Dem/Val the initial requirements are reviewed and where necessary trans- 
formed into more detailed requirements. These transformations tend to be informal 
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and text-based, but are validated through formal peer reviews which check issues 
concerning soundness, completeness and consistency. The goal is to produce a set 
of requirements that could be implemented. 
3.3.1 System Theory of Operation 
This task involves system requirements analysis, identification and analysis of the 
initial system architecture and the production of various models to support the 
analysis. The models tend to be informal, based on block diagrams supported by 
descriptive text that are focussed on satisfying a particular task - thus they only 
have a limited reasoning capability. Neither are the models particularly well inte- 
grated, as each is produced to satisfy a particular need as required. For example, 
many of the Company's systems have serial links to allow communications between 
units. These links are modelled by specialist "firmware engineers" (i. e. engineers 
with extensive experience in implementing communications networks and protocols 
at the hardware/software interface) to ensure that they have the necessary capacity 
to support the design and any growth requirements. The analysis and modelling 
of these links are checked by the project's Software Architect and the Lead System 
Engineer to ensure they are accurate and complete. However, they are not formally 
checked by the rest of the team, some of whom have to interact with and make use of 
these communication links. As noted, the modelling is informal and only the limited 
reasoning that derives from using the descriptive text is available. In the past this 
has allowed ambiguity and lack of detail in the descriptions to result in misinter- 
pretations of the design concept, and thus relates to [Envirll] defined above. This 
identifies a need for stronger modelling capabilities, ideally supporting simulation 
so that the engineers that have to use the links can gain a better understanding of 
how they operate, their capabilities and their limitations. 
The analysis and modelling work culminates in the production of a system theory 
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of operation document that is also descriptive text. The system theory of operation 
document is validated with the customer before embarking on the next set of tasks 
which involve more detailed architectural analysis and the development of the sub- 
system theory of operation. 
A problem observed from the LLD for this and the next task was that of in- 
consistent completion of the sub-tasks associated with the task. The amount of 
work undertaken to complete a task was found to be variable, and in some cases the 
tasks were not completed, with items being poorly addressed or even omitted. In- 
vestigations indicated that often the task descriptions were high level and allowed a 
wide range of interpretation or engineers thought that other elements of the task had 
been covered elsewhere. This is another example of [IncomI5] Task incompleteness, 
introduced above. 
3.3.2 Sub-System Theory of Operation 
The sub-system theory of operation task involves further analysis and modelling and 
the development of the solution system architecture. The modelling in this sub-phase 
has similar issues to those recorded above. The resulting sub-system theory of oper- 
ation document describes the main functional blocks, together with their interfaces 
and interactions at a reasonably detailed level such that the following requirements 
issues are identified: requirements functionality omitted or not completely covered; 
ambiguous or incomplete requirements; requirements inconsistencies and clashes. It 
has been observed that there is no support for iteration back to earlier tasks in the 
IPDP and the task of deciding where to iterate back to is exacerbated by the parallel 
and overlapping nature of some of the tasks. Being able to trace back through the 
design is another instance of issue [TraceI4] introduced in section 3.2.3. 
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3.3.3 System Specifications 
Work then develops the specifications and sub-system design descriptions resulting 
in the Equipment Specifications (ES), the final Interface Requirements Specification 
(IRS) and the initial allocation of requirements (ASR) to software and/or hardware, 
including allocation of the safety requirements. These are all textual documents 
that have to undergo safety analysis as part of the IPDP work, but the LLD has 
recorded issues with the effectiveness of some of these analyses - which relates to 
issue [Latel3]. 
The last part of this System Specifications task and before entry into the SDR, 
each specification requirement has a validation method defined for it, but there is 
no way of confirming that overall "the right system is being produced". That is, 
without the ability to simulate sets of requirements on a broader scale it is difficult 
to be confident that the system has the desired behaviour. In fact these issues could 
not be checked formally until the implementation phase. This increases the risk that 
the right system is not being produced and is part of issue [R. equI2]. 
3.3.4 Safety Analysis Discussion 
As noted above, the Dem/VAL phase includes a number of safety analysis tasks. 
The abstract and textual descriptive nature of the source information available tends 
to motivate the use of FFA, which is the most appropriate form of analysis to use 
with the current IPDP because design instability and lack of design information in 
a suitable form means that the cost of running a HAZOPS is not justified at this 
point. Unfortunately, as noted by McDermid [90], FFA relies heavily on human 
skill, is judgemental and only identifies about 80% of the safety issues - information 
recorded in the LLD supports this. The initial Dem/Val FFA work for the DC 
system reported in Appendix A. 3 is an example of this problem (related to issue 
[Late13]). The need for a sufficiently strong CRC was not identified by the FFA, 
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even though this information was part of the DS environment information - as 
shown by the later, specific, serial link analysis which did identify the information 
and thus highlighted the issue. Thus an adequate safety analysis requires that the 
system environment is sufficiently understood (part of [Envirll]). 
As discussed in section 2.2.2 an effective safety analysis requires an appropriate 
model and inspection of the overall IPDP process indicates that a suitable model 
to support a HAZOPS could be formed from the architectural information that is 
available, and from structural (e. g. interface and timing) information that could be 
derived with some re-ordering of the tasks. For example one of the IPDP safety 
tasks in this phase requires that a safety analysis is applied to the combination of 
the sub-system theory of operation and the system block diagram (section 3.3.2). 
Currently FFA is used, but inspection of the information available prior to SDR 
indicates that the sub-system theory of operation and the block diagram could be 
used as the basis for a HAZOPS model during Dem/Val as long as: the architectural 
analysis was used as the basis of the analysis model, extra information was collated 
concerning critical timings and sufficient knowledge concerning the interface to the 
environment (including potential adverse impact on this environment) could be col- 
lected. Currently HAZOPS is not used until the later EMD phase, and the ability 
to move it earlier in the life cycle is a mitigation for issue [Late13]. This potential 
improvement to the IPDP safety analysis process is considered further in Chapter 5. 
3.3.5 SDR Gateway Review 
When Dem/Val is complete a System Design Review (SDR) is held to review the 
maturity of and assess the risks involved with the allocated requirements and spec- 
ifications. The SDR also confirms that the safety and certification issues are ade- 
quately addressed, i. e. that all requirements have a reasonable validation method 
assigned and that all appropriate safety analysis has been undertaken. It has been 
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observed that the existing IPDP approach forms a collection of useful, but disparate, 
models. Each model performs an important task, but these models are neither well 
integrated nor easy to validate. 
The SDR inspects the artefacts produced during the Dem/Val phase, considers 
their quality and validates that they are appropriate and fit for purpose before 
allowing the programme to proceed to the EMD phase. If any of these artefacts are 
incomplete then rework must be done. However, it has been observed from the LLD 
that projects that have incomplete validation criteria applied to the requirements 
encounter significant problems later in the development life cycle. This indicated 
the need for improved measures to ensure that the validation criteria assigned to 
each requirement is complete. Therefore another important issue, our sixth, can be 
captured as: 
[Valid16]: Validation incompleteness increases the risk of rework. 
3.4 EMD - Preliminary Design Phase 
The Preliminary Design sub-phase is the first set of activities in the EMD phase, 
and is the only phase of EMD discussed in this document. It uses the documents 
emanating from the SDR and starts with a detailed analysis of the customer require- 
ments and their allocations to the software, the hardware or both. The architecture 
is developed and it also produces high level design descriptions to feed into the fol- 
lowing more detailed design phases (not considered here). As part of this process 
the requirements are analysed in more detail and developed to support the evolv- 
ing design. A variety of safety analysis tasks are conducted during the Preliminary 
Design phase. 
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3.4.1 Requirements Allocation and Architecture Design 
Requirements are allocated based on hardware/software trade-off activities and all 
designs, analyses and evaluations are documented and all applicable specifications 
are updated before proceeding with the next tasks. The design task then splits into 
its software, hardware and system components, which are handled by the appropriate 
development teams. 
The architectural design refines and develops the system architecture produced 
during Dem/Val, to add more detailed functional and interface descriptions. This 
process also identifies derived requirements reflecting the design decisions that are 
made to support the architectural development. 
It has been observed from the LLD that the detailing of the requirements allo- 
cations and transformations do not always produce requirements that are feasible, 
nor are they necessarily sound, consistent or complete. Peer reviews are conducted 
and these resolve many issues, but some problems can remain - this relates directly 
to [R. equ12]. 
3.4.2 Preliminary Design Tasks 
The preliminary design tasks are Preliminary System Design, Preliminary Software 
Design, and Preliminary Hardware Design. They all involve analysis of the require- 
ments allocated to their discipline in conjunction with a more detailed architectural 
design (system, software and hardware) . For example, the purpose of the software 
analysis and detailed architectural design activities are to define how the software 
will realise the requirements on it, and to define a stable software architecture based 
on the Object Oriented principles [13,56] used in the development. All designs, 
analyses and evaluations are documented and all applicable specifications are up- 
dated before proceeding with the design. A similar process is followed by the other 
disciplines. 
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Detailed design is not allowed to be started until after successful completion of 
the PDR checkpoint gateway review. Failure to observe this rule on some previous 
projects (as recorded in the LLD) has resulted in expensive rework - the causes 
being instances of our six issues identified above. 
The hardware development follows a single pass strategy, but it is typical to run 
the software development over a number of iterations. The first iteration de-risks 
any software architecture concerns by providing a prototype whose behaviour can 
be evaluated, and if successful this iteration is used as the basis for the subsequent 
iterations. Otherwise a viable alternative is produced, informed by the problems 
identified with the original architecture (system and/or software) . This 
has cost 
and schedule implications for the development as IPDP does not easily support 
an iterative loop structure (it has been specifically updated to "hard code in" the 
software iterations), any identification of problems causes a dislocation in the sched- 
ule which is scrutinised by senior management - hence there is pressure to avoid 
iteration and adopt a "patch and proceed" mentality. The ability to analyse the ar- 
chitecture earlier in the development cycle and the ability to manage iteration have 
been identified as two significant enhancements to the capability of the IPDP. This 
demonstrates the need for direct support for iteration, which is a form of traceability 
issue and thus is part of [Tracel4]. 
At this point in IPDP a higher integrity process is used for system developments 
which have functional safety requirements that involves: 
" the use of special safety architectures (system, software and hardware) which 
include protective and defensive features; 
" the specifications being written in the Z formal method [116] to define the 
safety behaviour; 
9 the use of proof to show that the implemented code satisfies the Z specification. 
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3.4.3 EMD Preliminary Design Safety Analysis 
The EMD Preliminary Design phase includes eight safety analysis tasks including 
reviews to cover health and safety and the legislative aspects. For developments 
with functional safety requirements a modified form of HAZOPS is applied to the 
developed architecture, using the allocated requirements and detailed descriptions 
of the context derived from the earlier tasks. The analysis begins around PDR and 
yields good results (no issues recorded in the LLD), albeit rather later in the process 
than desired - hence it is related to [Latel3]. 
3.4.4 PDR Gateway Review 
The Preliminary Design phase is exited after successful completion of a Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR). The role of the PDR is to assess that the maturity of the 
design is appropriate and to approve initiation of the detailed design. It involves 
formally authenticating all the Development Specifications and releasing them as 
approved. Further goals are to evaluate the technical adequacy and risk management 
of the selected design approach, and to confirm that the certification and safety 
aspects are apposite. 
The successful completion of the PDR means that an appropriate design speci- 
fication, S, has been produced, and inspection of the LLD shows that the majority 
of projects achieve this goal. Therefore a necessary property of any approach that 
is to be used in conjunction with IPDP is that it should be at least as good as the 
current IPDP at deriving a design specification. This is captured as the necessary 
property (NecessaryP): 
[NecessaryP]: The approach used must be capable of deriving the de- 
sign specification. 
Any approach which does not satisfy [NecessaryP] cannot be considered for use 
with IPDP. 
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A factor influencing why the safety team lags behind the other disciplines (refer 
to section 3.2.3) is the need to produce a specific safety model to support the safety 
analysis work and the task of keeping it up to date. If the safety analysis used 
the same model as the other disciplines then this would be much more efficient and 
less error prone (no need to validate the safety model). Therefore an advantageous 
property of an approach can be stated as follows: 
[SameAl]: The safety analysis uses the same model as the rest of the 
development. 
For developments with functional safety requirements IPDP follows an aug- 
mented process that includes the use of formal specification and proof techniques, 
therefore it is highly desirable that any approach used should be capable of sup- 
porting formal development processes. This is captured as the second advantageous 
property: 
[FormalA2]: The approach used should support formal development 
processes. 
3.4.5 Summary of Issues and Properties 
In general the Company has found IPDP to be an excellent mechanism for organ- 
ising and running projects. It promotes completeness and consistency across the 
projects and has reduced variation significantly. The experience gained from run- 
ning many projects through IPDP has resulted in improvements to the process to 
support how the Company organises its work (e. g., inclusion of an iterative software 
process) and this improvement is an ongoing process. However, as discussed in the 
previous sections, some significant issues have been observed which the following 
text summarises. 
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It is worth noting that these issues and properties apply to safety development 
processes other than IPDP. That is, the issues and properties identified in the pre- 
ceding sections are important for any safety process as well as for the IPDP used 
for safety development and the identified issues are: 
1. [EnvirIl]: Incomplete understanding of the system context increases risk of 
rework. 
2. [Requ12]: Incomplete requirements increases risk of rework. 
3. [Latel3]: Late effective safety analysis increases risk of rework. 
4. [TraceI4]: Traceability incompleteness increases risk of rework. 
5. [Incoml5]: Task incompleteness increases risk of rework. 
6. [Valid16]: Validation incompleteness increases risk of rework. 
The identified properties are: 
1. [NecessaryP] : The approach used must be capable of deriving design speci- 
fication S. 
2. [SameAl]: The safety analysis uses the same model as the rest of the devel- 
opment. 
3. [FormalA2]: The approach used should support formal development pro- 
cesses. 
Any approach introduced to improve the capabilities of an existing process, IPDP 
in this case, must integrate into this existing process. It must address at least some 
of the issues identified with the existing process and it must be straightforward to 
implement, as undue complexity could result in resistance and it not being used 
effectively. This need for good integration can be added to the list of advantageous 
properties as follows: 
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[IntegA3]: The approach used should integrate with IPDP. 
In the remainder of this thesis we show how POSE can be used to address 
these six identified issues whilst satisfying the properties identified so far (i. e., the 
ten properties from section 2.5 and the four identified in this chapter). Specifically, 
Chapter 4 introduces POSE in its basic, "vanilla" form and evaluates its capabilities 
in dealing with the identified issues and properties. The chapters that follow develop 
POSE to address any outstanding issues and properties. 
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Chapter 4 
Supporting the Process Using 
POSE 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether POSE could be successfully used 
within the IPDP (addressing property [IntegA3] of Chapter 3), and to which extent 
in its "vanilla" formulation, as defined by [39,40,41], it would be able to address 
the properties and issues summarised in section 2.5 and section 3.4.5. 
Throughout the chapter we make use of a case study, the Decoy Controller 
(DC), to introduce POSE and its features, illustrate its application, and evaluate 
its potential for real-time embedded avionics safety systems. The DC case study 
refers to a real development problem at the Company, which was originally addressed 
using the IPDP. It was also used by the author in [87] to introduce the capabilities 
of POSE in the context of embedded avionics applications. Here it is investigated 
in more detail in the context of working within the IPDP. 
4.1 Introduction to Problem Solving with POSE 
Our first task is to introduce the Decoy Controller DC case study that will form the 
basis for the rest of this chapter and will also be used in the initial part of Chapter 5. 
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4.1.1 Decoy Controller Case Study Description 
The Decoy Controller DC system's main components are now introduced (a more 
complete representation of the case study and its use of IPDP is given in Ap- 
pendix A). The DC is part of the defensive aids suite (DAS) on an aircraft and 
its block diagram is shown in Figure 4.1. The DAS is controlled by a Defence 
System (DS) LRU (Line Replaceable Unit) which sends control and information 
messages to the DC over a serial link. The DC controls the selection and release 
of flares from the Dispenser Unit (DU) based on control inputs it receives from the 
DS, the pilot and the aircraft status. The latter indicates if the aircraft is on the 















Figure 4.1: Decoy Controller (DC) Block Diagram 
The IPDP CE phase safety work was conducted on the conceptual model formed 
from the system block diagram (see Figure 4.1), the system description (derived from 
the work completed to date) and the system requirement RDC - as described in 
Appendix A. 2. The requirement RDC was the original requirement as used on the 
project, it does not reflect current good practice based on using the DOORS tool to 
capture the requirements and their traceability [1181. In particular it does not define 
only one requirement at a time and includes multiple instances of using conjunctions 
that make multiple requirements in a single statement. The reason why we use the 
"original" requirement was to show that POSE could be used successfully with 
requirements that might be encountered on actual projects and with requirements 
74 
that were not doctored to make then easier to use. A re-worked DC case study 
based on using [118] to re-structure the requirements into a good practice form is 
shown in Appendix H. 
The requirements were further refined and detailed by tasks completed during 
the Dem/Val phase (refer to section 3.3) to form Rdc as detailed in Appendix A. 3. 
The analysis work for the Dem/Val phase, also recorded in Appendix A. 3, identified 
a number of safety issues and process problems when using the task descriptions in 
the existing IPDP process. For example, in the DAS the DC has to communicate 
with the Defence System (DS) over a serial link. The FFA safety analysis identified 
that a high integrity algorithm should be used to obtain the required integrity for 
the message passing function. Unfortunately, this was misinterpreted as the stan- 
dard parity and message block system used for most of the Company's serial link 
implementations. The specific requirements that demanded the use of a Cyclic Re- 
dundancy Check (CRC) algorithm were not assimilated and the problem was not 
discovered until a specific serial link safety analysis identified the integrity shortfall. 
As in this case, any such issues are identified during the system analysis and inte- 
gration phases, but these are well into the development life cycle where changes are 
costly and have a negative impact on the schedule. Therefore, as noted above, there 
is an identified improvement to the IPDP in trying to capture such issues earlier in 
the life cycle - this is issue [Late13] defined in Chapter 3. 
The EMD Preliminary Design phase work of Appendix A. 4 shows how the final 
system architecture for the DC system was derived. It also notes that this system 
architecture was chosen because it was based on an existing prototype that was 
known to be capable of satisfying the functional requirements, and it is typical of 
industrial safety design strategies that attempt to minimise the number and extent 
of the safety related functions by localising them to simple, distinct blocks. 
In what follows we revisit the DC development problem detailed in Appendix A, 
but this time applying POSE as appropriate to provide specific support to the 
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relevant IPDP tasks. The case study is cut down only in the sense that some detail 
has been removed for brevity: it retains all essential complexity. 
At this point it is useful to recall briefly all the phases involved in the process of 
eliciting the requirements. As part of the successful contracting process the mechan- 
ical outline, approximate weight and power envelope of the system was established. 
Further, the initial high level functional requirements, RA - RD, were agreed as 
defined in section A. 2. Subsequent communications with the customer were used to 
clarify the requirements and properties of the system environment and resulted in 
agreement that RS defined the safety requirements attributed to the system from 
the aircraft and system level hazard analyses. All these requirements formed the 
basis under which the remainder of the system was developed. 
4.1.2 Software Problems in POSE 
Hall, Rapanotti and Jackson [39,40,41] introduce a software problem as having 
three elements: a real-world context, W, a requirement, R, and a solution, S, which 
are related by the entailment W, S I- R. 
The problem context is a collection of domains (W = D1, ..., Dn) 
described in 
terms of their known, or indicative, properties, which interact through their sharing 
of phenomena (i. e, events, commands, states, etc.. [53]). More precisely, a domain 
is a set of related phenomena that are usefully treated as a behavioural unit for 
some purpose. A domain can be a unique, physical entity, or it can be an aggregate 
of physical entities that are combined to achieve a specific effect - the selection will 
depend on the context of the problem being solved. 
In POSE all problem solving starts from the null problem, the problem of which 
we know nothing other than it exists [41]: 
P,,. ull :W: null, 
S: null I- R: null 
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null is used as the description for W, R and S to indicate that nothing is known 
about them: null has less information than any description that can be written in 
any language chosen for descriptions. 
4.1.2.1 Domain Context in POSE 
The environment context is described in terms of domains. A domain D(p)0 =N: E 
has name (N) and description (E), the description indicating the possible values 
and/or states that the domain's phenomena (in pUcUo) can occupy, how those values 
and states change over time, how phenomena occur, and when. Of the phenomena: 
c are those controlled by D, i. e., visible to, and shareable by, other domains but 
whose occurrence is controlled by D; o are those observed by D, i. e., made visible 
by other domains, whose occurrence is observed by D; p are those unshared by D, 
i. e., shareable by no other domain. The p are often termed internal phenomena and 
can be omitted if they have no impact on the development. 
As an example of the first step in using POSE consider the DC case study. This 
first step involves collecting information about the existing environment which the 
proposed system is to operate in. Initially this information will just be an identifica- 
tion of the domains involved, but this will be enriched by further investigation and 
analysis which will ensure a detailed understanding of the environment is amassed 
that allows the appropriate domains to be identified, together with a knowledge of 
the properties that they have and an appreciation of how they interface to each 
other. It maps well with the system environment and initial requirements tasks 
in the CE phase (see section 3.2). The approach is in line with the "understand 
the environment before the new system is applied ideas" introduced in section 2.4 
which is an important aspect of the problem oriented methods and thus supports 
property Context from Table 2.3. The domains in the DC case study are drawn 
from the entities represented in Figure 4.1 and comprise of the pilot Pilot, Defence 
System DS, Dispenser Unit DU, Safety Pin status SP, the Aircraft Status AS and 
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the Decoy Controller DC domains. Knowledge about these domains is increased 
by investigating their respective interface phenomena, the results of this work are 
shown in Table 4.1 on page 82. 
4.1.2.2 Requirements in POSE 
A problem's requirement states what is required of the problem solution. Like a 
domain, a requirement is a named description with phenomena, R J; ' =N: E. A 
requirement description should always be interpreted in the optative mood, i. e., as 
expressing a wish. As to the requirement's phenomena: cons are those constrained 
by R, i. e., whose occurrence is constrained by the requirement, and whose occurrence 
the solution affects in providing a solution; refs are those referenced by R, i. e., whose 
occurrence is referred to but not constrained by the requirement. Knowledge about 
the requirements is assimilated and organised in terms of the identified domain 
structure and interfaces. This means the requirements are reviewed and articulated 
into an appropriate form such that they are written in terms of the problem space 
as a customer would understand them, i. e. in terms of the environment domains. 
Care is taken to ensure these requirements avoid any implementation bias, and this 
supports property Avoid Bias from Table 2.3. 
As an example, in the DC case study the various information sources - the 
customer requirements, customer meeting minutes and email communications - were 
reviewed in-depth to support this work and this allowed the initial problem to be 
developed (supporting properties Model Reality and Validation from Table 2.3) 
as follows. The requirements were refined and detailed from RDC to Rdc = Ra A 
Rb A Rc A Rd A RS as defined in section A. 3 and the requirements represented by 
Rdc are repeated below: 
Ra The DS shall command which flare is selected using a field in its con message 
issued to the DC. The DC shall obtain the selected flare information from this 
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field in the con message, and use it in its sel message to the DU to control 
the flare selection in the DU. 
Rb The DS shall command the DC to issue a fire command in its con message. 
This shall be the only way in which a flare can be released. 
Rc The DC shall cause a flare to be released by issuing a fire command to the DU, 
which will fire the selected flare. 
Rd The DC shall only issue a fire command if its interlocks are satisfied, i. e. aircraft 
is in air (AS = on), SP safety pin has been removed (SP = off) and Pilot has 
issued an allow a release command (Pilot = on). 
RS The DC shall mitigate H1 and H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh); where 
Hl and H2 are defined in Appendix A. 2. 
4.1.2.3 Solution in POSE 
From [39], a software solution is a domain, S(p)ö =N: E, that is intended to solve 
a problem, i. e., when introduced into the problem context will satisfy the problem's 
requirement. The possible descriptions of a solution range over many forms, from 
high-level specification through to program code. As a domain, a solution has con- 
trolled, observed and unshared phenomena; the union of the controlled and observed 
sets is termed the specification phenomena for the problem. In the initial description 
of the case study problem the solution domain is DC. 





s(p)o I- R 
, f' 
where the name P is optional. By convention (e. g. see [41]), the problem's solution 
domain, S, is always positioned immediately to the left of the F. Note that the 
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descriptions of a problem's elements may be in any language, different elements 
being described in different languages, should that be appropriate [39]. 
As an example of a Software Problem return again to the DC case study. Prob- 
lem solving starts with the null problem ([41], page 230), P,,,, Il, and the target of 
the first phase of applying POSE is to form the initial problem, Plnitsai, based on 
Figure 4.1. Eventually this will have the form: 
Plnitial : 
D. S'(co7L)con, DU(fire, sel)fi, ý 8eý, 
SP(out)out, 
As(air)air P(ý%Cýok DCrfire, ael 
ýl1ý ok, air, con, ouE I- Rdc"`el con, out, air, ok 
However, before this can be derived we have to introduce a number of POSE trans- 
formations. 
4.1.3 POSE Problem Transformations 
Problem transformations capture discrete steps in the problem solving process [35]. 
Many classes of transformations are recognised in POSE, reflecting a variety of 
software engineering practices reported in the literature or observed elsewhere [39]. 
Problem transformations relate a problem and a justification to (a set of) problems. 
Problem transformations conform to the following general pattern. Suppose we have 
problems W, S I- R, Wä, Si I- Ri, i=1, ..., n, 
(n > 0) and justification J, then we 
will write: 
R1 W1iS1ý- 
W, Sý- R 
Wn, S F' R,, [NAME] 
V)) 
to mean that, derived from an application of the NAME problem transformation 
schema (discussed below): 
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S is a solution of W, SHR with adequacy argument (CA1 A... A CAn) AJ 
whenever S1,... ' 
Sn are solutions of W1, S1 F- R1, ..., Wn, Sn F- R, with 
adequacy arguments CA1, ..., 
CAn, respectively. 
This transformation allows W, S I- R to be replaced with W1, S1 I- R1, ..., W., S. I- 
R with the justification given by J. The idea being that each Wt, Si f- R2 from 
W1, Si f- R1, ..., W, a, 
S F- R,, is easier to solve than the original W, S I- R. This 
notion of moving from difficult problems to easier to solve sub-problems is an impor- 
tant aspect of the POSE approach, and supports the property Simplification from 
Table 2.3. POSE problem transformations with appropriate examples are explained 
in detail in [39]. 
Therefore, software engineering design under POSE proceeds in a step-wise man- 
ner: the initial "null" problem forms the root of a development tree with transfor- 
mations applied to extend the tree upwards towards its leaves [35]. Branches are 
completed by problem transformations that leave the empty set of premise problems. 
Appropriate transformations applied to the null problem transform it to represent 
an initial form of the software problem to be solved - the initial POSE requirement 
model. This involves instantiating knowledge about the environment domain context 
(to address [Envirll]), the requirement (to address [Requ12]) and to introduce the 
solution domain. The environment domain context information is introduced using 
the CONTEXT INTERPRETATION transformation ([41], page 228) and the acquired 
requirements knowledge is introduced using the REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION 
transformation ([41], page 233). The software solution domain is introduced using 
the SOLUTION INTERPRETATION transformation ([41], page 234), which makes use 
of the Architectural Structure AStruct[... 
] ([41], page 236) to introduce known solu- 
tion components and the solution components to be designed - the AStruct[... ] is 




fire Command to release the selected flare 
sel Indicates which flare type should be selected 
out Pin status; out = yes indicates pin has been removed 
con Contains command to fire and selected flare type 
air Aircraft status; air = yes indicates aircraft is in the air 
ok Pilot intention; ok = yes indicates allow release 
4.1.3.1 Introducing Context in POSE 
As an example of the use of introducing the context into the software problem return 
to the DC case study and the information in section 4.1.2.1. The initial environ- 
ment context work includes the description of Sys on page 228, which provides an 
overview that introduces the individual domains that comprise the complete system 
of interest. These domains are Pilot, AS, SP, DS and DU. This basic information 
allows the software problem description to be enhanced from P, 'Wj about which noth- 
ing is known to Pd,,, where the domains involved are identified using the CONTEXT 
INTERPRETATION transformation as follows: 
Pdoms :W: [P: null, AS: null, SP : null, DS : null, DU: null], S: null I- R: null (CI) 
S: null I-R: null 
((JC)) Pnu!! : W: null, 
where CI is CONTEXT INTERPRETATION and the justification JC is that context 
analysis has identified the listed domains as being relevant to the problem 
Each of these context domains is then investigated in detail to understand its 
behaviour, note any concerns about its operation and identify its phenomena (sup- 
porting the IPDP theory of operation tasks). The descriptions Pilot through DU are 
those listed on page 228, and those are the relevant parts of the domain knowledge 
gathered from the information sources. 
The phenomena associated with these domains are defined in Table 4.1. The 
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fire and sel phenomena are inputs to the DU and the representation of the DU 
in POSE is given by DUfi,, 9el. 
The SP provides the status of the pin out as an 
output and in POSE this is represented as SP"'. This means that the SP term in 
the requirement Rd of SP = off maps to the phenomena out = yes, and SP = on 
maps to out = no. Similarly the AS provides the in air status as an output using 
air (air = yes maps to AS = on in Rd), and the Pilot sends the switch selection 
using ok (ok = yes maps to Pilot = on in Rd). In POSE these are respectively 
represented as ASair and Pilot°k. The con command message is an output from the 
DS - con is also used in Rdc so no mapping is required. In POSE this is represented 
as DS, n. The mappings defined above show that the model is grounded in reality 
(supporting property Model Reality from Table 2.3). 
This increased knowledge is then introduced into the software problem using a se- 
ries of CONTEXT INTERPRETATION transformations - as described in [41] pages 232 
to 233 - to form the software problem PDOm. In this software problem, PDom, and 
those that follow we will often omit the denotations "W : ", "S :" and "R :" whenever 
they can be inferred by context - in PDom the "W :" is omitted. 
Ppo,: DUfi,, sel, . SPout, DS'co", 
ASair, Pok, S: null ý- R: null 
The collective justification for these CONTEXT INTERPRETATION transformations 
(J0) is that the analysis of the information sources identified that the environment 
consisted of a DS defence system that can send command messages to the DC 
which can then control the release of flares from the DU taking due account of 
the inputs received from the Pilot, AS and SP domains. The information sources 
were then peer reviewed to confirm and validate that these were the only significant 
environment domains providing evidence for [Envirll] and property Context from 
Table 2.3. 
83 
4.1.3.2 Introducing Requirements in POSE 
Next the requirements are introduced into the problem model using the REQUIRE- 
MENTS INTERPRETATION transformation ([41), page 233). As detailed in Appendix A. 2, 
the initial customer requirements were represented by requirement RDC and these 
requirements were refined and detailed as part of the IPDP CE and Dem/Val phase 
work to produce the final requirement Rdc, which is listed in full above in sec- 
tion 4.1.2.2. In POSE this refining and detailing is achieved using the REQUIRE- 
MENTS INTERPRETATION transformation. An example will illustrate the process 
followed. One of the original requirements from RDC concerned the messages sent 
by the DS and had the form: 
RA The DS shall command which flare is selected for release by using a field in 
the con message it transmits. 
This is refined and detailed by the analysis of the initial system architecture 
shown in Figure 4.1, conducted as part of the tasks in the Dem/Val phase, to form 
the more detailed requirement: 
Ra The DS shall command which flare is selected using a field in its con message 
issued to the DC. The DC shall obtain the selected flare information from this 
field in the con message, and use it in its sel message to the DU to control 
the flare selection in the DU. 
Similar detailing was applied to the other requirements in RDC to form Rdc, 
and these can be introduced into the problem using a series of REQUIREMENTS IN- 
TERPRETATION transformations. That is, the step from Pao,,, into PDO, &R which 
introduces the requirement Rdc into the problem is actually a sequence of REQUIRE- 
MENTS INTERPRETATION transformations -a similar arrangement is detailed in 
[411 
for the refinement and detailing of the Package Router requirements. 
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Pnnm.:, R" 
DS(Con)con, DU(fire, sel)h7e sel, SP(out)out' 
AS(air)air, P(ol£)ok, S: null f- Rdcficon, osel ut, air, ok 
where the analysis included identifying the requirements phenomena cons and ref, 
which for the DC case study are defined by the following: 
cons = {fire, sell 
ref = {out, air, ok, con}. 
The justification for this REQUIREMENT INTERPRETATION transformation (Jb) is 
that the Rdc = RaARbARcARdARS were validated against the information sources 
and found to be adequate representations of the intended behaviour of the system 
and were confirmed as apposite by the customer, providing evidence to support 
[Requ12] and property Validate from Table 2.3. 
4.1.3.3 Introducing Solutions in POSE 
The Architectural Structure, AStruct [41], is used to initially introduce the solution 
domain, but it is also used to add structure to this solution domain, through an 
application of SOLUTION INTERPRETATION. That is, it can be used to introduce 
different solution architectures into the POSE requirements model. An AStruct 
combines, in a given topology, a number of known solution components' (the Ci 
below) with solution components yet to be found (the S; below). Its general form 
is: 
A StructName [ Cl, ..., C, n] (Si, ..., Sn) 
'There are also constraints on the phenomena sets, which we omit here for brevity, refer to [39] 
for the full definition. 
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with AStructName the AStruct name. Once the solution is interpreted by provid- 
ing and justifying an AStruct, SOLUTION EXPANSION generates premise problems 
by moving the already known components C; to the environment--expanding the 
problem context-whilst simultaneously refocussing the problem to be that of find- 
ing the solution components S; that remain to be designed. The requirement and 
context of the original problem is propagated to all sub-problems. 
A particular case, which is relevant to the case studies, is when there is only one 
component to be found, that is, the AStruct has the following form: 
AStru, ctNarrae[Cl, ..., 
Cm](S) 
In this case expansion only generates one premise problem as follows: 
W, C1, ..., Cm, S: null f- R SOLUTION 
W, S: AStructName C 
EXPANSION] 
An example of an AStruct is used to introduce the solution domain, DC, into 
the software problem as follows. At this point we know that DC is the domain 
to be designed and there are no known components. The description of the DC is 
listed in the IPDP: Dem/Val Phase subsection of section A. 3, and analysis identifies 
its interrelationships and the phenomena it shares with the existing domains, such 
that it can be written as DC ä r, con, ot 
The specification to be found of the DC is 
introduced through SOLUTION INTERPRETATION using an AStru, ct ( [411, page 236) 
of the form: 
S: DCSQ(DC)ok, air, con, out 
The justification for this solution interpretation step (Je) is that it just introduces 
the solution domain, DC, into the software problem. Further, similar system archi- 
tectures have been used successfully on other aircraft recording the fact that the 
overall architecture represented by PDO, RS has a good track record. The SOLU- 
TION INTERPRETATION transformation (1411, page 234) is applied to transform the 
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software problem from PDom&R into PDomRS. 
PDomRS : 
DS(C07L)COn, DU(fire, Sel) fir, sel7 
SP(OUt)out) 
AS(air)air, P(ok)ok, S: DCSO(DC)ok, air`con, out f- Rdcfi7e, se! con, out, air, ok 
The next step is to expand S: DCS[](DC)fok, 
re, sel 
air, con, out using SOLUTION EXPANSION 
to transform the problem from PDomRS into Pjnitial as follows: 
P/nitia! 
DS(con)con, DU(fire, sel)fire, sel, 
SP(out)out, 
AS(air)air, P(ok) ok, DCokair con, 
out ý Rdýon, out, air, ok 
Inspection of the process so far shows that the problem derivation is problem 
oriented and does not involve the introduction of any detailed structures from the 
solution space. This avoids solution bias issues, providing support for property 
Avoid Bias from Table 2.3. 
4.1.4 Problem Solving Steps 
4.1.4.1 Problem Transformation Schema and Templates 
The general form of a POSE problem transformation schema was introduced at 
the beginning of section 4.1.3, and an example of CONTEXT INTERPRETATION pre- 
sented in section 4.1.3.1. The REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION and SOLUTION 
INTERPRETATION problem transformation schema have a similar form to that of 
the CONTEXT INTERPRETATION schema. The justification associated with each 
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problem transformation schema can vary in strength from a vague notion through 
to an extremely strong and compelling linkage [39,40]. In general the latter is pre- 
ferred, but is not essential - it depends on the context, e. g formal proof might be 
required for safety critical developments, whilst weaker evidence will be sufficient 
for less critical ones. 
Each transformation has associated with it a number of elements that are an 
important part of its structure and the transformation must be viewed in conjunc- 
tion with these elements. For example, some of the transformations in [41] include 
Concerns and/or Phenomena descriptions as well as the justification - it would be 
incorrect to present just the transformation part without these elements. We will 
now present a template structure that allows the transformation and its elements 
to be conveniently collected into a single unit, with the additional advantage that 
it separates them from the narrative (following our work in [35]). Suppose we wish 
to transform the problem P(= W, S I- R) under the NAME transformation schema, 
then we will write [35,41]: 
i Application of NAME to problem P JUSTIFICATION J: describing the named justification (J) for the application of trans- 
formation NAME to P. The name can be used elsewhere in the development to refer 
to this justification. The body of the justification can have many components-prose, 
formal descriptions, figures, for instance-and any or all elements of the following struc- 
ture may be present: 
INCLUDES: identifying any relationship between this justification and others in the 
development such as those that occurred from an earlier step, that was subsequently 
discovered to be inadequate and so backtracked from. The inadequacy can also be 
described here. 
CONCERNS: A collection of standard concerns associated with each transformation 
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schema. Each concern is discharged by argument and evidence supporting a claim of 
the following form: 
CLAIM: Claim statement 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The reason to believe the claim, or the reason it does not 
hold. 
PHENOMENA: Should the schema introduce phenomena, or need to detail their shar- 
I 
ing, the details can be included here. 
Note that this transformation template construction has used concepts from pre- 
vious work including "Concerns" from Problem Frames [53] and the use of "Claims, 
Argument, Evidence" ideas in a similar way to Adelard's ASCE tool [12]. 
4.1.4.2 Problem Transformation Steps 
The individual POSE transformations operate at a detailed level and a number have 
to be combined in sequence to achieve a useful step in the development process. For 
example, the formation of PI,,; ti in section 4.1.3.3 involved a series of interpretation 
and expansion transformations. Inspection of the use of POSE in the literature 
[41,87,86,85,88] indicates that this formation of an initial software problem is a 
standard practice and it is a useful extension of the basic POSE approach to capture 
this sequence, and others like it, as a distinct entity. In this work the collection of a 
series of POSE problem transformations into a useful step in the development process 
will be called a Problem T znsformation Step and in accordance with the original 
introduction of the template structure in [35] we will use a template structure to 
capture each problem transformation step. 
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4.2 POSE Support for IPDP 
The aim of this section is to show how the POSE transformations can assist in 
supporting the IPDP safety process, although the concepts can equally be applied 
to other similar safety development processes, by ascertaining to what extent they 
can address the properties and issues identified in section 2.5 and section 3.4.5, using 
the ideas and notation introduced in section 4.1.3. 
At this point in the case study the context and requirement have been established 
as part of the IPDP CE phase work, the requirement developed, and the AStruct has 
been used to establish the initial system architecture (early part of IPDP Dem/Val). 
Therefore the transformation sequence involved in forming the initial software prob- 
lem, Prnattiai, can be summarised by the following POSE transformation sequence, 
where Prnztja. i is the top line of the sequence. 
.. -'---'',, ----'---, '-S-. ' [SolutionExp. j 
DU(fare, sel)h, ý BEi, 
SP(out)°t t, DS(can)CO^, AS(air)a"', P(ok)°k, S: DCSG(DC)ok aieon oie 
Rdc, `ýj 
DU(fire, sel) fiý ae1, SP(out)°"c, DS(con)`°", AS(air)°', P(ok)°k, S: null F- Rdcf 
DUf, 
fe ae! > 
SPout DS°°°, ASair Pok S: null F- R: null 
DU(fire+9CLýfiý ael+SP(out)out+DS(con)°O"+AS(air)air+P(ok)ok DCok air`con, out 
Fý Rdccýoýs 
W: (P: null, AS : null, SP : null, DS : null, DU : null], S: null F- R: null 
Puu: W: null, S: null FR: null 




Substituting in for cons and ref (see page 85) allows PI,,; t; ai to be re-written as: 
Plnitia! : 
outý D. 5'(C01t)con, DU(fire, 3el) fi,, ael, 
SP (out) 
AS (12r' air ok fire, ae ýýý P(ok) 
, 
DCok, 
air, con, out 
Rdctn, se! 
con, out, air, ok 
This problem, PIii, can also be represented as an alternative view using the PF 
problem diagram as shown in Figure 4.2. The model represented by PI iti., and 
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Figure 4.2 corresponds to the output of the System and Sub-System Theory of 
Operation tasks in the IPDP Dem/Val phase (refer to section 3.3 and Appendix A. 3). 
The series of transformations followed in developing Prnati. t from P,,,, ll consisted of 
gaining knowledge and understanding of the environment context, the requirements, 
the system architecture and how they all interact. This sequence covers a number 
of the IPDP tasks in the CE and Dem/Val phases as discussed above, and is typical 
of those steps required in the initial phases of all developments as discussed in 
section 4.1.4.2. Therefore, these POSE transformations can be combined into the 
PSi Initial Problem problem transformation step represented by the structure 
shown below. 
PSi: Initial Problem application to transform problem Pnuu 
into PInitial 
JUSTIFICATION JI: The identified requirement, domains and their relevant properties 
are summarised as defined in sections A. 1- A. 3 and in the development of Pln=ti. 1 above 
and J1=J0AJbAJJ. 
PHENOMENA: Phenomena and their control and sharing (see Piniti! ) are known from 
the existing system components as shown in Table 4.1. 
CLAIM: The interpretations are well-founded 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The choice of domains follows from the aircraft level safety 
analysis and the required choice of interlocks. The DS, DU, AS and SP are existing 
components of the avionics system, with well-known, validated properties. The Pilot 
is trained to follow protocols rigorously. 
The customer functional requirements (Ra to Rd) were provided as an input to the 
developer team, and were validated with the customer. The development of the safety 
requirement RS is as related in sections A. 1 and A. 2, and discussed above. 
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CLAIM: The overall architecture is feasible 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The selected overall system architecture has been used 
successfully on similar safety systems. Inspection confirms that the identified domains 
and their associated phenomena can interact as needed - aim being to avoid Unshared 
Information issues (see section 2.4) later in the development. 
CLAIM: Sound judgement followed 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The development is based on IPDP used successfully on 
many previous developments and enhanced with POSE to mitigate some known issues 
with IPDP. Claim this follows normal and not radical design concepts as defined in 
[131]. 
CLAIM: In-air indicator in Aircraft Status System is reliable 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The in-air indicator is obtained from the weight on wheels 
and landing gear up indications: if the landing gear is up and there is no weight on the 
wheels then the aircraft is assumed to be in the air. The landing gear is detected as 
being up by a number of sensor switches. The switches use a multi-pole arrangement 
of appropriately selected "Normally open/Normally closed" contacts. This imbues an 
error detection capability that is used to achieve very good failure rates, well within 
the required margins. 
i 
The PS1: Initial Problem structure contains examples of the use of the jus- 
tification and claims/argument/evidence elements necessary to support the POSE 
transformation sequence that supports the formation of the initial problem Pl,,; e; i. 
Just as the justification strength (refer to section 4.1.4) can vary from quite weak 
(e. g. information based on a data sheet) through to very strong (e. g. diverse evi- 
dence from formal proof and test results); so the claim/argument/evidence structure 
operates similarly. Near the end of a development the evidence to support the final 





















Figure 4.2: PF Problem Diagram for the DC Problem, Pllitzal 
a "lighter" approach is reasonable where the route to gaining sufficient supporting 
evidence is clearly outlined, but not as yet necessarily followed. The idea being 
that the strong argumentation and evidence required by the final safety case will 
be supplied later in the development. In the early stages the argument strategy 
is made extant so it can be reviewed to judge if it is capable of supplying the re- 
quired strength of supporting evidence. This "lighter" structure is consistent with 
the early development stages where different candidate solution system architectures 
are evaluated and the most promising candidate selected. Until the analyst has ev- 
idence that the candidate architecture is capable of satisfying its safety obligations 
(i. e. shown it is feasible) it is potentially wasteful to spend effort collecting too 
much evidence. However, once the candidate system architecture has been shown 
to be feasible, then the required evidence collection should proceed - the problem 
transformation step structures such as PS1 above provide an easy means of ascer- 
taining what the current evidence status is and hence what further evidence might 
be required. 
The claim/argument/evidence structures used in PS1, and in the other transfor- 
mation steps to be introduced (e. g. PS2 below), are all examples of the "lighter" 
structure in that they outline the strategy but do not (as yet) provide the full level 
of argumentation and evidence. For example the Claim in PS1 that The overall 
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architecture is feasible is based on similarity with previous successful systems and a 
review of the domain interactions; so it is expected to be feasible, but the analysis 
to provide this evidence - based on the PSA results - has not been collected at this 
point. 
4.3 Refining the Solution Architecture 
The IPDP Dem/Val phase has detailed architecture analysis as part of its Sub- 
system Theory of Operation task (refer to section 3.3). This task involves the 
development of structures and concepts that will enable the requirements to be 
satisfied. The POSE solution expansion AStruct (refer to section 4.1.3) is a good 
candidate to support this work since it allows various candidate system architectures 
to be investigated. In this case study, the following AStruct encodes the candidate 
system architecture chosen for the Decoy Controller: 
DecoyContAS[IIoktair, 
out+ 
DMconý`re? ]lSCi, n 
, jn? 
) 
which includes two extant components, II and DM and one to be found component 
the safety controller SC. These domains are as defined in section A. 4 and in Figure 
A. 2. This architecture can be introduced using the SOLUTION INTERPRETATION and 
SOLUTION EXPANSION transformations described in section 4.1.3.3. These transfor- 
mations and the REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION transformation can be used to 
transform the software problem from Pi, «t; at into 
PER,. 
DS(con)eOn, DU(fire, sel)fi BEI, 
SP(out)out, AS(air)ai, 
PExp : 
P(ok)°k flint DMsel, fire? , sCfi" ý R'fire, ae! ý ok, air, out+ con snt fire? con, out, air, ok 
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First the SOLUTION INTERPRETATION transformation is used to introduce the 
architecture represented by the AStruct DecoyContAS[II,... DM, ... 
](SCn into 
the problem, then SOLUTION EXPANSION is used to expand out this AStruct and 
finally REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION is used to appropriately modify the re- 
quirement from Rdc into R' to allow for the introduction of the system architecture. 
Experience from using POSE on some avionics examples [87,86,85,88] indicates 
that this sequence of introducing a candidate system architecture is used frequently, 
and can be combined into the PS2 Solution Interpretation and Expansion 
problem transformation step represented by the structure shown below. 
PS2: Solution Interpretation and Expansion applied to 
problem 
Plnitiai to form PEP 
JUSTIFICATION J2: The identified system architecture, its components and relevant 
properties are as summarised in section A. 4 and in Figure A. 2. The justification for 
this (architecture) solution expansion transformation is that this system architecture 
was successfully developed as a prototype and is 
known to be capable of satisfying the 
functional requirements. 
The requirements are transformed from Rdc to R' as detailed at the end of section A. 4 
on page 233 and modified by Table 4.1. However, R'd is modified to include reference 
to the phenomena int for representing the interlock status. Note that RS is not changed 
by this transformation. The efficacy of the requirement transformations were validated 
by independent review. Now R' is: 
R'a The DS shall command which flare is selected using a field in its con message 
issued to the DM. The DM shall obtain the selected flare information from this 
field in the con message, and use it in its sel message to the DU to control the 
flare selection in the DU. 
R'b The DS shall command the DM to issue a fire? command in its con message. 
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The DM will request the SC to send the fire command. This shall be 
the only way in which a flare can be released. 
R'c The SC shall cause a flare to be released by issuing a fire command to the DU, 
which will fire the selected flare. 
R'd The SC shall only issue a fire command if its interlocks, represented by int, 
are satisfied, i. e. aircraft is in air (air - yes), SP safety pin has been removed 
(out = yes) and Pilot has issued an allow a release command (ok = yes). 
RS The DC shall mitigate H1 & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
PExn is as defined above. An equivalent PF representation is shown in Figure 4.3 below. 
CLAIM: Rdc and R' are equivalent 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: Rdc and R' refer to and constrain the same phenomena, 
albeit shared between different domains . 
CLAIM: The choice of candidate solution architecture exhibits sound safety engineer- 
ing judgement 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The system architecture is chosen to minimise the number 
and extent of the safety related functions, localising them to simple, distinct blocks in 
accordance with best practice. 
CLAIM: The chosen solution architecture does not prevent the satisfaction of R' (Fea- 
sibility). This claim is not yet supported. 
PHENOMENA: The new phenomena introduced by the architecture are: 
fire? - Command to release the selected flare type 
int - Status of combined interlocks 
I 
This POSE system architecture work provides supporting evidence for property 
Architecture from Table 2.3. 
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Figure 4.3: Problem PE2, after Solution Interpretation and Expansion 
4.4 Preliminary Safety Analysis 
The justification of the previous transformation step is incomplete: the Feasibility 
concern remains to be discharged. The related claim is that the chosen system 
architecture candidate should not prevent an adequately safe solution. In the worst 
case, to continue the design without checking feasibility uncovers the risk that the 
final product cannot be argued safe. Traditionally, such risks are mitigated through 
over-engineering of the solution, but this typically adds to the complexity of the 
design and increases the development cost. 
Here, the risk is managed through a Preliminary Safety Analysis (PSA), applied 
as part of the IPDP safety analysis tasks in the attempt to discharge the Feasibility 
concern. The goal of a PSA is to: 
" confirm the relevance of hazards allocated by the system level hazard analysis; 
" identify any further hazards to be added to the list; and 
" validate the architecture against the safety targets associated with the identi- 
fled relevant hazards. 
Many techniques can be applied to perform a PSA. In [87] we used a combination of 
mathematical proof, Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) [109] and functional Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) [130]. The PSA uses the same software problem model as the 
development, Pte, which provides supporting evidence for [SameAl]. 
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Note that at this point the PSA is not a POSE transformation per se (no POSE 
schema defines a PSA). Instead it is a technique which we use to discharge one of 
the claims in the PS2 problem transformation step structure. The continuation of 
this PS2 structure is shown below. 
PS2: Solution Interpretation and Expansion applied to 
problem PInitiat to form PEA(cont'd) 
CLAIM: The chosen solution architecture does not prevent the satisfaction of R' (Fea- 
sibility). This claim does not hold. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: We applied FFA to each architectural component in turn. 
The results from applying FFA to the DM are shown in Table 4.2, where three problem 
cases were identified: F2, F3 and F5, with `Yes' in the Hazard column. 
Table 4.2: FFA Summary for Safety Controller 
Id Failure Mode Effect Haz 
F1 No fire? Release inhibited No 
F2 fire? at wrong time Inadvertent release Yes 
F3 fire? when not required Inadvertent release Yes 
F4 Intermittent fire? Could inhibit release No 
F5 Continuous fire? Inadvertent release Yes 
A functional FTA applied to DM based on the model for PEX, (and Figure 4.3) and 
using the three FFA problem cases F2, F3 and F5, indicates that a failure in uP 
(systematic or probabilistic) could result in the fire? failing on. The Pilot's allow input 
provides some mitigation, but as soon as this is set (ok = yes) a flare will be released, 
which is undesirable behaviour. 
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In other words, with this system architecture, H2 is only protected by the Pilot's allow 
input. If fire? failed on, then as soon as the Pilot indicated an intention to allow 
flare release, by selecting the switch, then the flare would be released, which is not 
the design intention. Therefore the safety analysis indicates that fire? needs to have 
a safety involved (but not critical) integrity. The current design does not satisfy 
the safety requirements. 
ii 
The safety analysis indicates that fire? needs to have a safety involved integrity. 
This can only be achieved with the existing design by upgrading all of the design 
to be safety involved. That is, by assigning fire? to the uP, we require that all uP 
functionality must be at the same safety integrity as fire, which is safety involved. 
However, the bulk of the uP's functionality (timing, BIT, etc. ) is not safety-related. 
Further, any updates to the uP software have to satisfy the safety involved integrity. 
The conclusion of the PSA is that the selected DM system architecture is not a 
suitable basis for the design - no adequate solution can be derived from its parametri- 
sation. Choices at this point include: designing the DM to be safety related, or 
re-structuring the DM system architecture to partition the safety and non-safety 
elements. The first option is undesirable due to the expense and long term impact, 
i. e. timing and selection are not safety functions and are expected to be fine-tuned 
to support different flare types. Making this safety-related would have a detrimental 
impact on the affordability of the solution. The second option is more appealing, 
and was the option chosen for this development. This case study is continued in 
Chapter 5. 
The fact that PSA could be applied to the POSE problem model, PEA, provides 
some support for the property Right Abstraction, although more evidence is 
required to support this fully. 
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4.5 Discussion 
From our initial work on using POSE on the DC case study we can now start to 
assess the ability of POSE to support the IPDP and address the properties and 
issues we have identified. 
4.5.1 Properties and IPDP Issues 
The work reported in section 4.1.3 showed that context interpretation was used to 
develop a good understanding of the environment context to identify the domains 
involved and investigate their interfaces and communication mechanisms. The prac- 
tical result of following this process in IPDP was a thorough understanding of the 
environment context, which provides mitigation for [Envirll]. 
The work reported in section 4.1.3 also demonstrated that the effort in apply- 
ing the requirements interpretation addressed the concerns raised by [Requ12] in 
comparison with the real development summarised in Appendix A. It showed that 
the requirements produced using this process were more focussed and had less con- 
tradictions and consistency issues, when compared with performing the same tasks 
without POSE. It made explicit the relationship between the requirements and the 
environment domain phenomena, which assisted the later modelling work. 
The PSA work of section 4.4 demonstrated that POSE has potential with re- 
spect to supporting the IPDP safety analysis tasks by providing a suitable model 
structure on which the analysis could be based. The PSA used the model based on 
PExp and Figure 4.3, along with the associated domain, phenomena and behaviour 
descriptions referenced from the POSE steps PS1 and PS2. That is, the safety anal- 
ysis used the same model as the development (PEA, ) in agreement with [SameAl]. 
As expected, POSE (a PO approach) is very good at addressing [Envirll] and 
[Requl2]. However, this POSE model structure is available much earlier in the de- 
velopment life cycle than the Preliminary Design phase. In fact the model could be 
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formed at the end of the Dem/Val phase and the feasibility check could be used as 
a checkpoint in the IPDP SDR. This is a very significant factor because if it can be 
demonstrated in a more general context, then POSE embedded within IPDP would 
allow a meaningful safety analysis to be conducted much earlier in the IPDP life 
cycle than is currently the case - thus satisfying [Late13] identified in section 3.4.5. 
At the Dem/Val SDR phase the design is more abstract and compact than at the 
end of Preliminary Design, and it is much easier to incorporate changes. It follows 
that any iteration back associated with failing the PSA feasibility check conducted 
at the end of the Dem/Val phase can be contained within a relatively small number 
of related IPDP tasks within the phase. In contrast, failing the feasibility check 
conducted during EMD Preliminary Design involves iterating back over many tasks 
over a number of phases. Therefore, checking at the Dem/Val phase allows the 
necessary corrective action to be instigated earlier and have less impact on cost and 
schedule compared with finding a problem later in the life cycle during Preliminary 
Design. The inference is that performing the PSA early would address [Late13] and 
also cover the part of [Tracel4] concerned with iteration. 
In the DC case study the initial system architecture failed the feasibility check 
and this showed that there is a need to provide direct support for iteration in the life 
cycle, and it supported the findings of a significant number of other IPDP projects 
that required re-working. Basically a decision point is required such that if the 
architecture model passes the feasibility check then the project can continue to the 
next phase of the development, otherwise there is a need to iterate back within the 
current phase to allow corrective action to be applied. As noted above, performing 
the check during SDR has the advantage that the iteration can be incorporated into 
a small number of related tasks thus minimising its detrimental impact. Integrated 
as part of IPDP, iteration then is part of the normal, expected task transactions 
and does not attract the adverse senior management scrutiny that currently occurs 
with the existing non-POSE, ad hoc iteration 
handling mechanisms. The need for 
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a decision point and how to achieve support for iteration will be considered further 
in Chapter 6. 
Inspection of the model used for the safety analysis (see PEA and Figure 4.3) 
indicates that it is more complex than necessary and involved domains that were not 
directly relevant to the issue under investigation. A more efficient safety analysis 
would be obtained if it were possible to remove these extraneous domains and just 
concentrate on the core domains of the safety problem. Another driver for removing 
extraneous domains is the fact that the requirement R' is still expressed in terms 
of the system environment, and not in terms of the system to be designed. For 
example, in the case study R'd involves terms in air = yes, yet the SC has no 
interface to the AS, so as they stand the requirements R' are not implementable 
with respect to the SC. This means that there is no direct way of extracting the 
specification of SC using the problem PE, and thus at this point [NecessaryP] 
has not been demonstrated. To achieve the goal of extracting the specification, it 
is necessary to be able to transform R' so that it more directly relates to the SC. 
The next chapter introduces the POSE problem progression transformation (PPT) 
as a means of mitigating these two issues by removing extraneous domains whilst 
correctly re-writing the requirements to compensate. 
The adequate completion of IPDP task activities was identified as an important 
factor in the successful application of IPDP and an area where problems have been 
detected in the past, this was captured in section 3.4.5 as [IncomIS]. The work 
in section 4.2 suggests that POSE can assist with this completeness issue in three 
main ways: 
" the framework ensures that the environment domains are adequately consid- 
ered, requirements assimilated and also ensures that the distinction between 
the indicative and optative properties are well understood; 
. the POSE transformations provide a mechanism for completing the objectives 
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of certain important tasks in the development; 
" the POSE problem transformation steps (see section 4.1.4.2) provide a tem- 
plate structure for ensuring that all the relevant factors in completing a devel- 
opment task have been addressed and this can be easily reviewed and validated. 
However, more work is required to ensure that all the necessary task activities 
have been identified and accurately captured. Finally, POSE is known to have 
the capability of supporting formal development processes [39,88], but evidence to 
support this has not been provided as yet. 
4.5.2 IPDP Process 
These initial results are encouraging and indicate that POSE can be used as part of 
the IPDP. Further, the DC case study work shows that the early IPDP phases can 
benefit from the structuring of the requirements that this can bring. In particular, 
inspection of the POSE capabilities and the safety work presented thus far in sec- 
tion 4.4 indicate that it would be useful and beneficial to develop a front-end process 
based on the POSE transformations targeted at embedded real-time safety systems 
(which are the major focus of this work), since there is good evidence from the 
DC case study that POSE addresses [SameAl], [Envirll] and [Requ12]. How- 
ever a number of improvements to better achieve these goals (as discussed above in 
section 4.5.1) pertaining to derivation of the specification S, early safety analysis, 
improved iteration, safety case support, model simplification, requirements trans- 
formations, the completion of all the necessary activities and support for formal 
development processes were identified as needing attention. These will be developed 
further in the next few chapters. 
The use of POSE within IPDP, and a measure of how well POSE integrates with 
IPDP, can be obtained from inspection of Table 4.3, where the "Ref. " entries refer 
to sections in this document. The table shows that POSE works well with IPDP for 
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this single case study, but at this point there is not enough evidence to fully support 
the properties [IntegA3] and Integrates. 
IPDP Phase IPDP Sub-Phase IPDP Ref. POSE Artefact POSE Ref. 
CE System Context 3.2.1 Initial Context 4.1.2.1 
CE System Context 3.2.1 Context Int. 4.1.3.1 
CE Initial Fun. Req. 3.2.2 Requirement Int. 4.1.3.2 
Dem/Val Develop Fun. Req. 3.3.1 Requirement Int. 4.1.3.2 
Dem/Val Sys. Theory of Op. 3.3.1 AStruct - DCS[](DC) 4.1.3.3 
Dem/Val Sys. Theory of Op. 3.3.1 plww 4.1.3.3 
Dem/Val Sub-Sys. Theory of Op. 3.3.2 PExv 4.3 
Dem/Val Safety Analysis 3.3.4 - - 
EMD Safety Analysis 3.4.3 PSA 4.4 
Table 4.3: Evidence to Support POSE Properties 
In summary, the DC case study work provides good evidence that using POSE 
within IPDP will allow [SarneAl], [Envirll], and [Requ12] to be addressed, and 
provides some evidence to support [IntegA3]. In addition, it provides some sup- 
porting evidence for the Context, Architecture, Avoid Bias, Model Reality, 
Validation, Simplification and Integrates properties identified in Chapter 2, 
and to some extent property Right Abstraction too. The problem transformation 
steps extension introduced in section 4.1.4.2 assists with the applicability of POSE 
by providing a convenient mechanism for grouping related tasks together into a 
single entity; e. g. the PS1 structure in section 4.2. 
We have summarised the evidence in Table 4.4, where "-" means no evidence 
has been provided by this work to support the property/issue, "e" means that some 
evidence has been provided by this work to support the property/issue, "ee" means 
that good, corroborated evidence (e. g. from two case studies) has been provided, 
and "E" means that significant corroborated evidence (e. g. multiple case studies) 
has been provided by this work. Entries shown in bold indicate that evidence is 
obtained from the results of this chapter. The table also includes references to the 
external papers, under "Previous Work", where evidence is provided that POSE 
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supports the property or mitigates the issue. 
Property/Issue Previous Work Chapter 4 
Context [41,87] e 
Architecture [41,87] e 
Spec. Join [39,83] - 
Avoid Bias [39] e 
Model Reality - e 
Validation - e 
Simplification [41,87] e 
Tool Support [38,87] - 
Right Abstraction [41,87] e 
Integrates [88] e 
NecessaryP [41,83] - 
SameAl [88] e 
FormalA2 [41,88] - 
IntegA3 - e 
Envirll [87,88] e 
Requ12 [87,88] e 
Late13 [85,88] - 
TraceI4 [85,88] - 
Incoml5 - - 
Valid16 [88] - 
Table 4.4: Evidence Status for POSE after Chapter 4 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we have introduced POSE and evaluated it within IPDP based on 
the DC case study. The outcomes of this exercise were discussed in section 4.5.2. 
The latter concluded that POSE within IPDP addressed [SameAl], [Envirll] and 
[Requ12], and that it could address the remaining issues with some development 
and extensions - these are the subject of the next two chapters. 
The contribution of this thesis so far to the knowledge concerning POSE and 
its use with respect to supporting these properties and mitigating the six issues is 
summarised in Table 4.5, where "vanilla" POSE is as defined in [41,39,40], i. e., not 
an expansion introduced by this work. The "Reference" column refers to section 
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numbers unless otherwise stated. 
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Property Contribution Description Reference 
All of Identified a set of properties 2.5 
Table 2.3 appropriate for SSSD. Table 2.3 
[NecessaryP] Identified necessary property 3.4.4 
for deriving specification, S. 
[SameAl] Identified three useful properties 
[FormalA2] that the SSSD approach should support. 3.4.4 
[IntegA3] 
[Envirll] Identified IPDP issue for mitigation 3.2.1,3.3.1 & 3.3.4 
[Requ12] Identified IPDP issue for mitigation 3.2.2,3.3.3 & 3.4.1 
[Late13] Identified IPDP issue for mitigation 3.2.3,3.4.3,3.3.3,3.3.4 
[Tracel4] Identified IPDP issue for mitigation 3.2.3,3.3.2,3.4.2 
[IncomI5] Identified IPDP issue for mitigation 3.2.4,3.3.1 
[Valid16] Identified IPDP issue for mitigation 3.3.5 
[Envirll] DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.1.3 
POSE mitigates this issue. 4.5.1 
[Requ12] DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.1.3 
POSE mitigates this issue. 4.5.1 
[SaineAl] DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.4 
POSE supports property. 4.5.1 
[IntegA3] DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" Table 4.3 
POSE provides some support. 4.5.2 
Context DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.1.2 & 4.1.3 
POSE provides some support. 
Avoid Bias DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.1.2 & 4.1.3 
POSE provides some support. 
Model Reality DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.1.2 & 4.1.3 
POSE provides some support. 
Architecture DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.3 
POSE provides some support. 
Validation DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.1.2 
POSE provides some support. 
Simplification DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.1.3 
POSE provides some support. 
Right Abstraction DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.4 
POSE provides some support. 
Integrates DC case study demonstrated "vanilla" 4.5.2 & Table 4.3 
POSE provides some support. 
Table 4.5: Thesis Contribution Summary after Chapter 4 
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Chapter 5 
Enhancing the Process Using 
POSE 
Chapter 5 specifically investigates the properties [NecessaryP], [FormalA2], Val- 
idation, Simplification and the issues [Tracel4], [Late13], [Valid16]; and it dis- 
cusses the evidence collected to support them and the other properties through the 
use of representative case study examples. The chapter concludes by considering 
this supporting evidence in the status table, first introduced in section 4.6. 
5.1 From Problems to Software Solutions 
Jackson's work [53] distinguishes between software requirement and specifications. 
Simply stakeholders should understand the requirement as constraining their con- 
text, whereas the specification should be implementable [133]. The requirement 
should be grounded in the reality of the context for which the machine is to be 
designed [133], whereas the specification should be defined solely in terms of the 
phenomena at the interface between the machine and its context. 
Other approaches, particularly formal ones [43,1111, recognise the gap between 
specification and code and provide techniques to bridge it. POSE with its generalised 
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notion of solution addresses the larger gaps (from requirements in context through 
the specification to code). 
Within Problem Frames a number of authors have suggested approaches to bridge 
the gap between requirement and specification. Jackson himself in [53] sketches 
out the idea of problem progression. Starting from this idea, Li [74,75], expands 
and completes the idea of problem progression exploiting the concept of causality 
between phenomena within a graph theoretical framework. Other work by Seater 
and D. Jackson [113,114] propose a notion of progression based on the addition of 
domain assumptions. 
In POSE too, there is a notion of progression which is based on the combination 
of two transformation schemas [36,39,40,41]. This is very general in nature and 
provides no particular guidance or heuristics for its application. The work in this 
section will address how to make it practical in the context of safety critical engi- 
neering by adopting a similar notion of causality as Li, and demonstrating how this 
integrates with the theoretical underpinnings provided by POSE. 
5.1.1 Problem Progression 
In [401, Hall, Rapanotti and Jackson defined transformations from which a POSE 
notion of problem progression can be derived. Their transformations are perfectly 
general and assume nothing of a domain, its phenomena, the relationships between 
phenomena or how the requirements refers to or constrains the phenomena. As a 
consequence the transformation wrought on the requirement can make no use of 
domain, phenomena or requirements structure. For embedded systems an assump- 
tion of causality between phenomena allows a more grounded engineering view of 
problem progression. The assumption of causality used in this work is based on the 
approach outlined in [94]. Our engineering form of problem progression is related to 
Li's work [74,75], which is another general theoretical framework but this time based 
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on the assumption of causality between phenomena within domains. One benefit of 
Li's approach is that it shows precisely how to construct a new requirement from 
the old one. However, Li's work applies only in Problem Frames. 
5.1.1.1 Problem Progression in Problem Frames 
The goal of a problem progression sequence can be explained graphically with refer- 
ence to the Problem Frame problem progression diagram shown in Figure 5.1. This 
is an elaboration of the progression shown on Page 103 of [53] and that used by Li 
[74] (Note that this is only an illustration and not the generic case. Li provides a 
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Figure 5.1: Problem Frame Progression Sequence 
The goal is to successively remove the domains D3, D2 and Dl whilst rewriting 
the requirement in a solution preserving form such that S in conjunction with the 
properties of the removed domains satisfies the original requirement R1. Doing this 
progression allows S to be directly derived from 0, S F- R4 since R4 is written in 
terms of phenomena, a, accessible to S, and assumptions derived from the removed 
domains. 
By combining the work of Jackson and Li, progression in Figure 5.1 can be 
described as follows. In the initial problem, the requirement, R1, is expressed in 
terms of phenomena in the real world - represented by d. Following the notion 
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of causality used by Li [74], assume that there exists a causal relation between 
phenomena c and d induced by the properties of the the domain D3, such that 
if c occurs then d occurs: we call such a relation the useful behaviour relation 
and indicate such a relation as c D3 d. Then we can omit D3 and define a new 
requirement, R2, expressed in terms of phenomenon c and derived from Rl with the 
addition of assumptions capturing the useful behaviour relation c D3 d. In doing 
so, the original problem has been progressed to a new problem with a simplified 
context, in such a way that a solution which satisfies R2 in the progressed problem, 
will also satisfy Rl in the original problem. 
In practice the engineering domains used in the architecture could have a vari- 
ety of possible behaviours, but we are only interested in that part of the domain's 
behaviour that corresponds to the relation c D3 d- hence it is called the useful 
behaviour relation. It is also worth noting that this useful behaviour relation corre- 
sponds to the Environment Constraint introduced in section 2.4. 
When progression is based on causality it is important to define relations such 
as c D3 d properly. Li provides a basic taxonomy [74] of relevant types of causal 
relations. Among them is the notion of biddable causality which relates to human 
behaviour. While in general human behaviour is unpredictable, there are cases 
in which people can be assumed to follow particular instructions or orders, from 
which causal relations can also be assumed. This type of causal relation is relevant 
to our work, as the humans involved in operating the systems produced by the 
Company tend to be highly trained pilots or other skilled military personnel, so 
that an approximation of causal behaviour can be claimed for benign scenarios. 
5.1.1.2 Problem Progression in POSE 
In POSE the domain to be removed is termed the to-be-progressed domain and is 
removed using a two step process as 
follows [39] : 
" first the phenomena associated with the to-be-progressed domain are "un- 
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shared" by internalising them into it, making an assumption in the require- 
ment equivalent to the constraints that the to-be-progressed domain places on 
its shared phenomena - this is the SHARING REMOVAL transformation shown 
below 
" second a domain that shares no phenomena may be removed from the context 
of a problem - this is the DOMAIN REMOVAL transformation shown below. 
The two rules are as follows: 
W, D(c, o) : DescD, S I- R': F' 
W, Dö : DescD, S I- R: F 
[SHARING REMOVAL) 
where the requirement becomes R' =R' and F' =cDo, F. The relation cDo 
is the useful behaviour relation introduced in section 5.1.1. 
[DOMAIN REMOVAL) 
W, SI- R 
W, DOO, Sý- R 
The key point is that constraints that the to-be-progressed domain places on its 
shared phenomena (the useful behaviour of the domain) are captured within the 
requirement as an assumption. The requirement before the progression is likely to 
refer to phenomena that have been removed as part of the progression, therefore a 
REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION transformation is usually necessary to rephrase 
the requirement in terms of the phenomena extant in the progressed problem de- 
scription. As noted above, problem progression in POSE is quite general - it can 
be applied to any domain in the problem context - and there remain difficulties 
in applying it associated with identifying the appropriate part of the requirement 
and how it should be refined. The approach adopted in this work is to restrict the 
application of the progression rules in a way which facilitates the analysis and this 
is considered in the next section. 
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5.1.2 POSE Problem Progression for Safety Systems 
The approach used to derive the problem progression transformation sequence (PPT) 
developed in this work is based on the general POSE problem progression introduced 
above, but it is made more specific to serve the needs of practical engineering. In 
particular, we apply progression under the following conditions: that causal rela- 
tions among phenomena are identified and used to establish assumptions in the 
derived requirements; that only domains whose phenomena are directly referred to 
or constrained by the requirement are the subject of progression. 
We call such domains adjacent to the requirement, as in Problem Frame notation 
they would be directly linked to the requirement by a dashed line (if referred to) or 
a dashed arrow (if constrained). 
With reference to Figure 5.1, let us assume a causal relation between phenomena 
c and d, whose derived assumption we denote by Assumption(c, d). The first step 
of progression in the figure corresponds to the following POSE transformations: 
6cac Dpa, D26i Sý R2 
Dl , D2b, 
S° F- Rd A Assumption(c, d) 
Di , D26, 
D30(c, d), Sa ý- Rd A Assumption(c, d) 
6dd Dla, D26> D3c Sa F- Rl 
[Requirementlnt. ] « Jl » 
[DomainRemoval] 
[SharingRemoval] 
based on the properties captured by Assumption(c, d). In other words, Jl has to 
justify that R2 is in some sense equivalent to Rd through Assumption(c, d). 
Repeated application of the same combination of POSE rules to the problems in 
Figure 5.1 will remove domain D2 and then domain DL . Each requirement interpre- 
tation step will need justification, namely that 
Rib is in some logical sense equivalent to 14 A Assumption(b, c) 
and that 
R4 is in some logical sense equivalent to R3 A Assumption(a, b) 
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This combination of SHARING REMOVAL, DOMAIN REMOVAL and REQUIRE- 
MENTS INTERPRETATION transformations is called the PPT in this work and in 
the sequel a problem transformation step will be used to control each application Of 
the PPT, as demonstrated in the DC case study problem progressions considered 
in section 5.1.3. 
The PPT is based on domain properties and causal relations between phenomena. 
As we will see, it is amenable both to informal and formal logical analysis: the latter 
is possible when both requirements and assumptions can be expressed logically and 
their equivalence proved through logical implication. In section 5.1.3 we illustrate 
an informal PPT on the DC case study. Later case studies will illustrate a formal 
PPT based on the use of Alloy [52]. 
The PPT approach has the advantage that it is easy to apply since it uses 
knowledge about the domains and the known requirement to guide the refinement 
of the requirement; its disadvantage is that only in the last validation step can you 
demonstrate that the derived specification S satisfies the requirement. In theory it 
is possible to go through a derivation sequence and derive a specification that does 
not fully satisfy the requirement, although this did not occur in the case studies 
reported in this work. 
In summary, the PPT uses problem knowledge to guide its application and to 
refine the requirement as domains are removed. The problem progression can be 
seen as a form of problem simplification since it allows the specification to be de- 
rived by simplifying the problem (by removing domains), thus it provides support 
for property Simplification identified in section 2.5. The PPT application also 
validates that the specification, S, you derive from applying the PPT is capable of 
satisfying the original requirement and thus supports the issue [Valid16] and the 
Validation property, as well as property [NecessaryP]. 
The assumption of causality among phenomena is an important aspect of the 
PPT approach which is reasonable for the embedded real time safety systems that 
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are the focus of this work. A domain is often representative of a piece of avionics 
equipment that has a particular function - give it the right input and it will produce 
the desired output. As part of the initial design, these domains are arranged in a 
particular system architecture to produce the required behaviour. 
5.1.3 Problem Progression Applied to the DC 
An example of applying the PPT process to remove domains will now be presented 
based on the DC case study first introduced in Chapter 4. The model of the DC 
problem PEA represented in Figure 4.3 is quite complex and the requirement phe- 
nomena do not correspond to the SC Machine phenomena, i. e., the current re- 
quirement, R', is not feasible with respect to the Machine, SC since it cannot be 
implemented with the information available. This is resolved by applying the PPT 
to remove domains and rewrite the requirement accordingly so that the Machine 
specification can be derived, and then validated that it satisfies R'. As noted in 
section 5.1.2, the problem progression begins with domains adjacent to the require- 
ment. Inspection of Figure 4.3 indicates that the Pilot switch selection domain is a 
suitable first candidate for removal. The removal proceeds by following the process 
introduced in section 5.1.2. These steps are captured in the Pilot Domain Removal 
problem transformation step PS3 shown below. 
PS3: Application of the PPT for Pilot Domain Removal to 
problem PEA to form PRedl 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J: The Pilot domain removal is based on the process given in section 
5.1.2. The Pilot domain is adjacent to the requirement R. The Pilot domain control 
phenomena ok maps directly to its output 
behaviour phenomena which is also ok. 
Therefore ok will appear in the reference part of the requirement phenomena both 
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before and after the transformation. The requirements R' are as detailed in problem 
transformation step PS2 on page 95. Inspection of R' indicates that only R'd involves 
a reference to phenomena ok - now consider the transformation from R'd into Rid: 
R'd : Pilot has issued an allow release command (ok = yes). 
Rid : II observes pilot input of ok = yes. 
Pilot Domain Description: The pilot sets the Allow switch to active to indicate that 
the intention is to allow flare release, otherwise it is set inactive. The Allow switch uses 
a multi-pole arrangement of appropriately selected "Normally open/Normally closed" 
contacts. This imbues an error detection capability that is used to achieve very good 
failure rates, well within the required margins. The setting of the Allow switch is 
determined by the Pilot domain and is output using the phenomena ok, where ok = yes 
means the Allow switch is active, whilst ok = no means the allow switch is inactive. 
Therefore ok = yes corresponds to allow flare release, whilst ok = no corresponds to 
inhibit flare release. 
The justification for this problem progression is that R1 dA Assumption(ok, ok) R'd. 
The Al = Assumption(ok, ok) is given by the Pilot Domain Description. Inspection 
of Rld in conjunction with the Pilot Domain Description shows they imply Rd as 
required. 
This requirement transformation does not require additional information not already 
in the interface nor does it refer to future events. However it does rely on the useful 
behaviour from the domain being removed being "saved" as part of the assumption 
that justifies the transformation - it is an example of an Environment Constraint non- 
feasible requirement which is discussed in a POSE context in (83]. As noted above, this 
useful behaviour contribution is contained in the Pilot Domain Description. 
The PPT application transforms the problem from PEA into PRd1, and R' is trans- 
formed into R1 as follows: 
Ria The DS shall command which flare is selected using a field in its con message 
issued to the DM. The DM shall obtain the selected flare information from this 
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field in the con message, and use it in its sel message to the DU to control the 
flare selection in the DU. 
Rib The DS shall command the DM to issue a fire? command in its con message. 
The DM will request the SC to send the fire command. This shall be the only 
way in which a flare can be released. 
Ric The SC shall cause a flare to be released by issuing a fire command to the DU, 
which will fire the selected flare. 
Rid The SC shall only issue a fire command if its interlocks, represented by int, 
are satisfied, i. e. aircraft is in air (air = yes), SP safety pin has been removed 
(out = yes) and II observes pilot input of ok = yes. 
RS The DC shall mitigate Hl & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
The domain Pilot is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The software problem is transformed to PRed1: 
P., 
_ " 
DS(con)cO", DU(fire, sel)fi,, sel, 
SP(out)out, 
- nea i' sel fire? AS(air)air, II(ok)oi"l air, out' DMýn , ý$'C=n ý, ý, e? 
I- Rlýn, 
out, air, ok 
A Al 
CONCERNS: The control input phenomena ok is the same as the domain behaviour 
output phenomena for this reference-type problem progression. This can be a symptom 
of over-specification. 
CLAIM: The pilot's intention with respect to the allowing of flare release is represented 
by the phenomena ok, so no over-specification requirement issue arises. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This is covered by the Pilot Domain Description and the 
validation as described above. 
The first application of the PPT has removed the Pilot domain as detailed in 
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the problem transformation step PS3 above. The removal of the domains AS, SP 
and DS are detailed in the problem transformation steps represented by PS4, PS5 
and PS6 respectively that are contained in Appendix B. 
After four applications of the PPT to remove the Pilot, AS, SP and DS domains 
the requirement is transformed into R4: 
R4a The DM shall decide which flare to select by observing a field in the 
con message it receives. The DM shall obtain the selected flare information 
from this field in the con message, and use it in its sel message to the DU to 
control the flare selection in the DU. 
R4b The DM shall observe the con message it receives and issue a fire? 
command if commanded. The DM will request the SC to send the fire 
command. This shall be the only way in which a flare can be released. 
R4c The SC shall cause a flare to be released by issuing a fire command to the 
DU, which will fire the selected flare. 
R4d The SC shall only issue a fire command if its interlocks, represented by int, 
are satisfied, i. e. II observes input air = yes, II observes input out = yes and 
II observes pilot input of ok = yes. 
RS The DC shall mitigate Hi & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-1 fpfh). 
and the software problem is transformed into P, , d: 
DU(fire, sel)fi? e, 9e`, 
II(Ok)ok, air, out+ PRed 
DM$Cantýn? P R4ficon; out, air, ok A Assurnp 
where Assump. is the conjugated collection of assumptions from each PPT applica- 
tion. 
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In PF problem diagram form, PRed is as shown in Figure 5.2. At this point 
the remaining domains are all adjacent to the SC and also adjacent to the re- 
quirement R4. Due to the detailed (over-specified) nature of the requirement used 
in this example, the requirement phenomena associated with R4 relate directly to 
the domain phenomena visible by the SC. Therefore, the specification of the SC 
can now be derived directly using the PRi entailment and thus satisfying property 
[NecessaryP]. Note that by applying a further REQUIREMENT INTERPRETATION 
transformation the requirements phenomena (fire, fire?, sel, air, ok, out) can be di- 
rectly related to their corresponding domain phenomena (int, fire, fire?, sel) through 
the requirementR4. 
Figure 5.2: DC Problem after PPT, PRd 
A problem with the DC case study development is that the effect of a domain 
and the causal chain phenomena associated with this effect were not clearly distin- 
guished. For example, when applying the PPT to remove the Pilot domain (refer to 
problem transformation step PS3 on page 115) the causal chain control phenomena 
ok appears in the before and after requirement statements. The requirement R'd 
contains the clause "Pilot has issued an allow a release command (ok = yes)", which 
indicates that ok = yes corresponds to the pilot's intention to allow flare release. 
However, the latter fact was established from the Pilot Domain Description and is 
not really pertinent to the requirements at this point. In reality, the ok = yes term 
was added because the specifier knew the system well and was tempted to add too 
much detail and thus over-specify. Similar issues surround the other domains. 
The specification could be derived after step PS6 because the requirement is 
more detailed than necessary. The over-specification is indicated by the fact that 
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the requirement refers to phenomena and domains that are not adjacent to it, but 
are embedded in the problem (e. g., R'b from section 4.3 refers to fire? and DM). A 
useful check that can be derived from this is that a requirement is at an appropriate 
level of abstraction if it refers to domains and phenomena that are adjacent to it - if 
it refers to domains or phenomena that are embedded in the problem then it is too 
detailed. This relates to the Right Abstraction property identified in section 2.5. 
5.2 Safety Analysis Improvement [Late13] 
The earlier PSA work reported in section 4.4 made use of a combination of FFA to 
identify hazards and functional FTA to investigate them. The FFA was applied to 
the main system functions and the results obtained from this analysis were found 
to be adequate, but the process used did not make full use of the capabilities of 
the model derived from the POSE software problem description. Specifically the 
model explicitly identifies the domain phenomena and how they inter-relate, and 
this information is not directly used in the FFA. Further, FFA has a number of 
strengths and weaknesses. Its main strength is that it can be readily applied to 
many situations. Its major weakness is that it is only likely to be 80% effective 
at detecting the issues of interest [90]. This suggests that it should be used in 
conjunction with other, diverse techniques such that the combination is likely to be 
more effective than just FFA alone. The availability of the phenomena information 
indicates that a HAZOPS style [6,106] of analysis based on applying the guide- 
words to the phenomena might be more apposite for this analysis task. This section 
will consider how FFA, HAZOPS and FTA can be used in combination to achieve 
an effective safety analysis process to support the PSA; it will then use this safety 
analysis process on the PSA re-applied to the DC case study. It will also consider 
how safety analysis can be used as part of a formal development. The goal is to 
ensure that the safety analysis is effective in support of the issue [Latel3]. 
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5.2.1 Improving the Preliminary Safety Analysis Process 
The aim of this section is to consider how the model formed by the POSE software 
problem description can be used to support the PSA task. First the model will be 
used to improve the PSA on a non-formal development, and then the use of the 
model to support the PSA on a formal development using Alloy will be considered. 
5.2.1.1 Improving a Non-Formal PSA 
Consider the possible hazardous failure modes in a domain D that relates to another 
domain SC through the phenomena: 
a controlled by SC, observed by D 
b: controlled by D, observed by SC. 
These entities are shown in Figure 5.3 along with the failure space of the domain 
D. The failure space of domain D is split into four distinct regions: 
1. D fails but not Hazardous 
2. D fails Hazardous not related to a 
3. D fails Hazardous related to a 
4. D fails & this causes b issue 
The failures in the first region are not hazardous, so these failures are not consid- 
ered further. The failures in the second region are hazardous and are caused by 
internal phenomena in domain D. These failures can be detected by applying an 
FFA to domain D's functions. However, this identifies the hazard but not which 
phenomena caused it. Understanding the causality can be important when trying 
to identify an appropriate mitigation strategy, and FFA on its own does not provide 
this information. 
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Figure 5.3: Context Diagram and Failure Space for Domain D 
The failures in the third and fourth regions involve the relationship between the 
domain D and the domain SC and their shared phenomena a and b. The possible 
causes of hazardous behaviour in D are as follows: 
" an anomaly in SC processing of a can cause a to cause hazardous behaviour 
in D 
" an anomaly in D can cause b to cause an issue in SC which results in a causing 
a hazard in D 
" an anomaly in SC processing of b can result in a causing a hazard in D. 
These anomalies that cause hazardous behaviour in D involve the domains D, SC 
and their phenomena a, b. However, as noted above, the relationship between the 
domains and the phenomena is not explicitly covered by an FFA. 
It appears that an improved safety analysis could be obtained if the relationship 
between the domains and their shared phenomena is analysed in detail. This sug- 
gested the use of a HAZOPS style of analysis based on applying the guide words to 
the phenomena. A proposed set of HAZOPS guide words is shown in Table 5.1. 
The first seven Guide Words in Table 5.1 are the "classic" words used in the 
original Chemical Industries applications of the HAZOPS technique [6], the last 
four are added to deal explicitly with computer processing and real-time processing 
systems. In theory, the last four could be covered by the original words (e. g. Early 
could be covered by Part Of), but it assists and improves the analysis task to make 
them explicit. These four words are usually included in the analysis of computer- 
based systems [124]. 
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Word Description 
No/None No part of the intention achieved 
More Quantitative increase in a physical property 
Less Quantitative decrease in a physical property 
As Well As All intentions achieved, but with additional effects 
Part Of Only some of the intention is achieved 
Other Than A result other than the intention is achieved 
Reverse The exact opposite of the intention is achieved 
Early Intention occurs before it should in time 
Late Intention occurs after it should in time 
Before Intention happens before it should in sequence 
After Intention happens after it should in sequence 
Table 5.2: HAZOPS Applied to int 
Word Local Effect System Outcome 
No None tint not active when it should be No defensive release 
No None tint active when it should not be Inadvertent release 
As Well As fire active tint fails active Inadvertent release 
Part Of Intermittently active tint May delay or inhibit defensive release 
Part Of Intermittently inactive tint May result in inadvertent release 
Other Than tint value indeterminate DR: if tint indeterminate then failsafe to inactive 
Reverse N/A N/A 
Early tint value active before it should Inadvertent release 
Early tint value inactive before it should No defensive release 
Late tint set active later than it should Release delayed 
Late tint set inactive later than it should Possible inadvertent release 
After tint after fire? and sel No release when expected 
Before tint before fire. and set Expected behaviour 
As an example, consider the application of HAZOPS to the Decoy Controller 
model of Problem PRa in Figure 5.2. Consider applying the guide words to the 
phenomena int. The results are shown in Table 5.2. 
The HAZOPS analysis is more detailed and more specific than the FFA, and 
highlights the relationships between causes and the system effects they excite. For 
example, in Table 5.2 the second entry for Late is concerned with "int set inactive 
later than it should be". The system effect is a possible inadvertent release. The 
phenomena int should be set inactive when one of the interlocks air, ok or out 
becomes inactive. It is potentially hazardous to allow a release when any of these 
interlocks are not set to indicate it is safe to release. Therefore a delay in setting 
int from active to inactive could cause a hazard because a release could occur (since 
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int is active) even though one of the interlocks indicates that release should be 
inhibited. Therefore, an int Late anomaly can cause an inadvertent release, and the 
effect inadvertent release is directly associated with its cause int set inactive later 
than it should be by the analysis. 
The advantage of the HAZOPS analysis direct cause to effect relationship is that 
it facilitates the identification of possible mitigations strategies. For example, in the 
case when fire is active and then tint fails active (it should be inactive, inhibiting 
releases) then this would result in an inadvertent release. A typical mitigation is 
to require that a release can only occur if tint was active prior to the fire request 
command, otherwise release is inhibited. Therefore with this mitigation tint failing 
active after a fire would not cause a release. There would also need to be ongoing 
BIT (built in test) to identify the tint failure and to then inhibit releases until it has 
been rectified. 
The goal of the HAZOPS is to cover all possible anomalous behaviours of the 
system under analysis by careful application of the guide words. Implicit in the 
analysis approach is the assumption that if the HAZOPS is properly organised then 
the guide words can cover all the possible anomalous behaviours. This is supported 
by experience of using the technique on many applications [6,106]. Further, the use 
of a diverse team of experts coordinated by an experienced moderator skilled in the 
use of HAZOPS maximises the chances that the can cover all is actually achieved. 
A process for using FFA, HAZOPS and FTA in combination was developed as 
follows. The FFA was used to identify the hazardous behaviours of a domain (and 
cover internal phenomena) and HAZOPS applied to the phenomena shared between 
domains (based on the POSE model). Then FTA was used to investigate specific 
entities of interest identified by the FFA and HAZOPS work. 
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5.2.1.2 Improving a Formal PSA 
The work on the DC case study has demonstrated that POSE can be used with the 
traditional safety analysis techniques such as FFA and FTA to achieve useful results. 
However, using POSE in combination with a formal technique opens up further 
opportunities for integrating the modelling with the safety analysis task to achieve 
a significant improvement in the safety analysis capabilities of the development. 
Inductive techniques such as FFA are often used to identify possible hazards. In 
a formal analysis simulation would be used to achieve the same result. The goal of 
the formal development in this work is to use the POSE problem model to derive a 
formal behaviour equivalent using Alloy [52]. 
As noted above, completeness in the HAZOPS on a POSE model relates to the 
careful application of the guide words to the interface phenomena. In the formal 
model this translates into selecting representative values of the interface phenomena 
in time and space that will drive the behaviour of the system through its range of 
significant, possible behaviours. These behaviours are then checked to identify any 
problem cases which can be investigated using the proof tools. Fortunately, Alloy 
models are finite and the models developed from the POSE software problems are 
reasonably compact with small enumerations, which places an upper limit on the 
size of the analysis task. The role of the guide words in HAZOPS is to cover all 
possibilities, in the POSE/Alloy modelling the exhaustive nature of the simulation 
ensures the coverage/completeness goal is satisfied to a known degree. 
The alternative approach is to use the Alloy proof capabilities to check specific 
safety issues. This is equivalent to a deductive analysis like FTA, and yields a proof 
that the Alloy specification model satisfies the specified proof condition. This is very 
strong, powerful, evidence to support the safety case, but does require that suitable 
proof conditions are identified a priori. Also, it is not always straight-forward to 
represent the required logic conditions adequately in the Alloy language. In practice, 
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the proof conditions are based on the high level safety analysis requirements. 
In summary, formal analysis of the model can be tailored to achieve similar 
results to traditional safety analysis techniques, but with the added power of formal 
analysis and proof. However, as noted by Turski, there is always care needed to 
relate the formal results to the reality of the real world. 
5.2.1.3 Safety Analysis Summary 
This section has identified a process that allows FFA, HAZOPS and FTA to be 
used in combination to achieve an effective safety analysis using the POSE software 
problem model as its basis. The use of this process is evaluated in the DC case study 
safety analysis presented in section 5.2.2. This section also indicated how formal 
analysis could be used to achieve safety analysis based on proof and simulation. The 
use of formal techniques will be covered in the SMS case study covered in section 5.5. 
5.2.2 Safety Analysis of the DC 
A PSA using FFA and FTA was applied to the model PE,, a in section 4.4 and the 
results are recorded in the PS2 problem transformation step. The application of 
the PPT has removed domains and simplified the model to PRM and this has been 
used to derive a specification for the DC. The aim of this section is to evaluate 
the usefulness of performing the PSA after the simplification on the model PRi, 
and using the combined analysis process of FFA, HAZOPS and FTA described in 
section 5.2.1.1. Note that the same model used for the derivation of the specification 
PRCd is also used for the PSA - thus providing support for property [SameAll. 
FFA was applied to the function of each of the domains, and this include con- 
sideration of any internal behaviour functions and phenomena. Then HAZOPS was 
applied to the shared phenomena between domains and some of the interesting re- 
sults for the SC domain are shown in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: HAZOPS Summary for the SC 
Id Guide Effect Outcome 
Hl No/None No fire? Release inhibited 
H2 No/None No int Release inhibited 
H3 No/None No fire? Release inhibited 
H4 As Well As Continuous fire? Inadvertent release 
H5 As Well As Continuous fire Inadvertent release 
H6 Part Of Intermittent fire? Could inhibit release 
H7 Part Of Intermittent fire Could inhibit release 
H8 Part Of Part of int not set Release inhibited 
H9 Early fire? when not required Inadvertent release 
1110 Early fire when not required Inadvertent release 
1111 Late fire? when not required Inadvertent release 
H12 Late fire when not required Inadvertent release 
The hazardous outcomes are shown in bold. The results were more compre- 
hensive than those obtained using just FFA and FTA on PE,, and included all 
the hazards found from that analysis which were further investigated using FTA as 
before. The results demonstrated for this example that the combination of FFA, 
HAZOPS and FTA was effective. 
A functional FTA applied to DM (based on the model of Figure 5.2) and using 
the HAZOPS problem cases (H4, H5, and H9 - H12) indicate that a failure in the uP 
(systematic or probabilistic) could result in the fire? failing on, which results in the 
same outcome as described in section 4.4. It is repeated here for completeness. The 
Pilot's allow input provides some mitigation, but as soon as this is set (ok = yes) 
a flare will be released, which is undesirable behaviour. In other words, with this 
system architecture, H2 is only protected by the Pilot's allow input. If fire? failed on, 
then as soon as the Pilot indicated an intention to allow flare release, by selecting the 
switch, then the flare would be released, which is not the design intention. Therefore 
this safety analysis (as in the PSA reported in the PS2 of section 4.4) indicates that 
fire? needs to have a safety involved (not critical) integrity. The current design 
does not satisfy the safety requirements. 
Another advantage shown by this work was applying the PSA to the reduced 
model PRM and its simpler domain structure made the safety analysis task easier. 
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The original analysis had to trace through the effects of the domains that have 
now been removed, which complicated the analysis task. The tracing through in 
the original analysis was informal. In contrast, tracing through to determine an 
outcome is still required for the reduced model, but the assumptions associated 
with each problem progression make this task more systematic and easier to apply. 
The conclusion after the PSA is that the current system architecture is not a 
suitable basis for the rest of the development. 
5.3 Traceability and Backtracking: [Trace14] 
Traceability is a crucial feature of safety development practice (as discussed in sec- 
tion 3.2.3) and safety standards such as DS 00-56 [125] and the DO-178B [108] 
guidelines have stringent requirements with respect to demonstrating traceability 
from the requirements, through the design and onto the testing and analysis that 
validates the requirements. 
A summary of a POSE development can be presented in graph form as [41,85] 
where the nodes represent problems and the arcs are justifications of the groups of 
transformations that lead to the problems. In this work the transformations are 
grouped into problem transformation steps (henceforth steps) so each node is also 
a step in the development process - similar groupings are used in [41,85]. This 
step information and the requirement associated with it can be annotated onto the 
graph to provide a richer representation of the development path where each node 
identifies: 
" the software problem name 
" the problem transformation step name 
" the requirement that results from the step 
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and as before the arc is the justification that enables the step changes. For example, 
the graph for the DC problem development up to this point is shown in Figure 5.4. 
For instance, the tracing of the development of the requirement required by safety 
standards can be traced through the nodes and the strength of the argument to 
support the transformations evaluated by inspecting the justifications on the arcs. 
In Figure 5.4 the last step in the graph (PS6) produced PRm and includes the PSA 
which demonstrated that the selected system architecture was not a suitable basis 
for the rest of the development - i. e. it is a dead-end in the development path. 
The result of reaching a dead-end is the need to iterate back to evaluate alter- 
native architectures, but guided by the knowledge of why the original architecture 
failed. A graph for the DC development is shown in Figure 5.6. The dead-end in 
the development records why a path has failed - useful information for any subse- 
quent maintenance or upgrade phases to avoid repeating the mistake. In addition, 
the graph assists the task of finding out where to iterate back to. For example, 
in the DC graph of Figure 5.6 the reason for the dead-end at step PS6 was that 
the architecture failed the PSA and the iteration (as shown) is back to the point 
where the architecture was introduced, the start of PS2 in the right-hand path of 
the figure. 
Figure 5.4: DC Problem Transformation 'Dace Graph 
The design of the modified system architecture can be undertaken using the 
POSE AStruct. In the original development the II and DM were existing com- 
ponents and only the SC had to be designed (see section 4.3); in the modified 
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architecture both the SC and DM' need to be designed, so this is a codesign prob- 
lem as outlined in [41]. The PSA identified that the fire? phenomena should have a 
safety involved integrity, and the preferred architecture solution was to separate out 
the fire? functionality from the non-safety involved timing and BIT functionality. 
The modified AStruct that supports this has the form: 
Decoy ContAS'[Iloktasr, 
outj(DMý 
lý'ý', SV ý, y). 
In fact this is a simple codesign problem as the shared phenomena do not change, 
i. e., the redesign is internal to the DM' as shown in Figure H. 2 in the problem 
transformation step PS2' shown below. A PSA was applied at step PS6' and the 
results were successful. 
PS2': Backtracked application of SOLUTION INTERPRETATION 
AND EXPANSION to Plnitia! 
JUSTIFICATION J2: The newly identified system architecture, its components and 
relevant properties are summarised below (where they differ from J2): 
DM'! {fire? } FPGA 11, MB ý*---DS! {con} 
up 
1 DM'! {sel} 
Figure 5.5: Modified DM' Architecture 
The architecture consists of a message buffer (MB), a field programmable gate array 
(FPGA [49]) and a microcontroller (uP) as shown in Figure H. 2. The message buffer 
MB holds the received control message con; the micro-controller uP decodes it to 
extract the selected flare type (leading to sel); the FPGA component decodes it to 
extract a fire command request (leading to fire? ). 
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INCLUDES: Includes J2, with alterations as discussed below. 
CLAIM: The choice of candidate solution architecture exhibits sound safety engineer- 
ing judgement 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The chosen system architecture is similar to the previ- 
ous one (see J2) except that as a result of the PSA we require the fire? signal to be 
safety involved (but not safety critical) so as to allow the overall architecture to satisfy 
its safety target. We do this by taking the safety involved functions out of the uP 
component and route them through a separate high integrity path. As a result, we 
choose a new component DM' in which there is a partition between the safety and non- 
safety elements: the simple safety functions (those associated with the fire? request) 
are routed separately through MB and FPGA, while the other complex functionality is 
routed through MB and uP. This means that only MB and FPGA, which have simple 
functionality, have to be designed to a safety related standard. 
CLAIM: The chosen solution architecture does not prevent the satisfaction of R. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The safety analysis (PSA) is applied to the revised 
system architecture and is successful - the 
is claim is supported. 
Another benefit is that the graph shows what steps need to be repeated. In this 
case five steps need to be repeated, but this process is assisted by the fact that much 
of the information from the earlier analysis can be re-used. The second iteration 
of the POSE process is similar to the first: although there is new information as- 
sociated with the revised system architecture, the remainder of the transformations 
may be carried across from the first iteration with minimal change (just change of 
name), simplifying this second (and any subsequent) iteration. The second can- 
didate architecture differs from the original in that we replace DM with higher 
integrity component DM'. The problem transformation development step is shown 
in PS2' and its associated annotated problem transformation graph is shown as the 
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right-hand path in Figure 5.6, where apart from PEA the others are equivalent, e. g., 
PRedl is the same as PRedl apart from a name change caused by introducing the 
prime character (i. e., DM to DM') and so on. The left-hand sequence in Figure 5.6 
shows the original graph, backtracking to the PS2 step (on the right-hand side) after 
the unsuccessful PSA. 
Figure 5.6: DC Revised Problem Transformation Trace Sequence 
5.4 DC Case Study Discussion 
The repeated application of the PPT using the process detailed in section 5.1.2 
allowed the domain structure to be simplified, which facilitated the safety analysis 
task - supporting the properties of simplification and [SameAl], as the same 
model PRed was used for the safety analysis as for the development. The fact that 
132 
similar results were obtained from the earlier more complex safety analysis and 
the safety analysis based on the reduced problem PEed gives some strong evidence 
to support the validity of the problem progression process. In fact in the more 
complex analysis task the analyst had to work through the domain behaviour links 
in an informal manner. With the PPT, the domains are removed systematically and 
the necessary behaviour captured as assumptions. This was found to facilitate the 
analysis task by providing a structured trace between the domains, and was superior 
to the informal approach used eaxlier. 
The DC high level functional requirement represented by Ra to Rd, are appro- 
priate in that they refer to phenomena in the environment - i. e. they address the 
problem, not the solution. However, the goal is to design an SC that can satisfy 
these requirements. As shown in section 5.1.1, this requires the requirements to 
be made feasible, and section 5.1.2 demonstrated that the POSE PPT was capable 
of achieving this goal. PRa is the simplified software problem after repeated ap- 
plication of the PPT to the DC system, and inspection of requirement R4 in PS6 
(see Appendix B. 3) shows that the derived functional requirements (R4a to R4d) 
concerned with the SC are expressed in terms of phenomena directly accessible to 
the SC. That is, the derived requirements in R4 are feasible and can be directly im- 
plemented. Inspection also shows that the specification can now be derived directly, 
supporting the properties [NecessaryP] and Spec. Join. 
The combination of FFA, HAZOPS and FFA using the process outline in sec- 
tion 5.2.1.1 provides an effective analysis that produces comprehensive results when 
applied to a POSE software problem model, providing support for the effectiveness 
of the safety analysis aspects of issue [Late13] . 
The POSE problem transformation graph is a useful mechanism for identifying 
the steps involved in the development, tracing the requirements as they are trans- 
formed through the steps, and locating where to backtrack to when a dead-end is 
reached in a particular development path. As noted in the DC case study example, 
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only the step PS2 needed to be updated to form PS2', the other steps could be 
re-used (apart from the name change). This means that this POSE problem trans- 
formation graph provides the early phases of IPDP with a useful iteration facility, 
as well as providing evidence for mitigating [Tracel4]. 
In summary, DC case study has provided support for the properties [Neces- 
saryP], [SameAl], Simplification and Spec. Join; and the issues [Late13] and 
[TraceI4]. 
5.5 Combining POSE and Alloy [FormalA2] 
This section investigates how POSE can be used with a formal method to provide a 
high integrity development process in support of property [FormalA2], and how this 
combination can provide an improvement to an existing safety critical development 
process based on Z [1161 and embedded into the IPDP described in Chapter 3. As 
introduced in Chapter 2a requirement was that the formal modelling must support 
simulation and proof in support of the property Validation. Moreover it must be 
compatible with Z- given that the original development team were experienced in 
its use. This suggested the use of the B method [1111 or Alloy [52]. 
Alloy was selected as the tool is freely available and well supported. Alloy is 
a lightweight formal method developed from the goal of combining the power of a 
SAT (Boolean satisfiability) solver with the descriptive power of the Z language. It 
has an active and growing user community and is continuously being developed and 
enhanced. It has strong simulation and proof capabilities within well-defined limits, 
and allows complex behaviour to be modelled using clear, simple constructs. 
As 
such, it fits well as the modelling tool for use with the POSE transforms. 
The case study was concerned with examining the use of the POSE/Alloy combi- 
nation in improving the early life cycle phase performance of a Z-based safety critical 
development process used in the author's Company (see section 3.4.2). The original 
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validation process correctly identified some subtle anomalies with the definition in Z 
of the high level safety properties, but these were found late in the process and led 
to substantial changes. The role of this case study is to address the safety questions: 
(a) could these anomalies have been discovered earlier using POSE and Alloy, and 
(b) would they have been discovered earlier by following a reasonable process based 
on POSE and Alloy. 
In this context, a reasonable process is one in which nothing special or specific is 
done to identify the anomalies. 
The main focus of this case study is the use of POSE in combination with Alloy to 
address the property [FormalA2]. Therefore the development of the problem steps 
will be summarised in the main text, with the detail being presented in Appendix D. 
5.5.1 The Case Study 
The case study investigated in this section is based on a Stores Management System 
(SMS) and focuses on its selective jettison (SJ) functionality, i. e., the way in which 
stores are chosen for jettison from the aircraft. Figure 5.7 shows a schematic view 
of the six release/jettison stations on the aircraft wings together with the SJ panel 
which is used by the pilot to make jettison selection choices. The Pilot can select 
SJ to be off, or jettison of all stations (Ship mode) or jettison of selected stations 
(Station mode). 
The SJ sequence does not release all the stores at once, as this could result in 
a collision hazard, rather the step release sequence used is Out 4 Mid -º In with 
a delay between each step. That is, the SJ is not an atomic action, but rather a 
sequence of three atomic actions. A balance algorithm is applied to most jettison 
sequences to ensure that the aircraft is not put into an unsafe state. The exception 
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Figure 5.7: SJ Panel (SP) and Aircraft Schematic 
The above information and more is collated as part of the application of the 
SPS1: Initial Problem problem transformation step using a similar approach to 
that described in section 4.2 for the DC case study. This captures understanding 
the environment context, the requirements and the initial system architecture in 
agreement with the early phases of IPDP. Note that as with the DC case study, the 
requirements are based on those that were originally presented and have not been 
put into a good practice form (the case study in Appendix H shows requirements 
in an appropriate good practice form). The resulting SPS1 problem transformation 
step is presented in Appendix D and leads to the initial software problem of: 
S&RE(jet_stat)jet,,, Pilot (p_mode, p_sel, p_jet)smadesscac, ssý 'Initial 
SMS InAir , ýetv ý Rjet_stat ( )smode, 
sstat, ssj p_mode, p_sel, p jet, InAir 
In this case study care was taken to ensure that the requirements were at an 
appropriate level of abstraction using the approach outlined in section 5.1.3 whereby 
a check was applied to ensure that each requirement referred to phenomena that were 
adjacent to it. 
The next step involves exploring possible solution system architectures and 
fol- 
lows a similar format to that used on the DC case study in section 4.3. The result 
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is the problem transformation step SPS2 reported in Appendix D, which leads to 
the software problem: 
PF.,.,, : 
S&RE(jet_stat)jety, Pilot(p_mode, p_sel, p jet)8mode, satat, ssjý 
y-r SP(InAir)smode, 
sstat, ssjý ýsUouty, 'sM'nvec 
ý Rpemodetp_se1, 
p jet, InAir 
The step from Ptniti. t to PEw also transforms the requirement from R to R' as 






Figure 5.8: SMS Expanded Problem, PE3 
5.5.2 Simplification Through Problem Progression 
Inspection of the software problem PEXP shows that there is a gap between the 
requirements R' and the machine to be designed, SM (see also Figure 5.8). The 
requirements phenomena are cons = (jet_stat), InAir, ref = (p-mode, p_sel, pjet), 
whilst the SM phenomena are invec, outv. This indicates the need to apply the PPT 
to simplify the problem to support the PSA and transform the requirements to be 
in terms of the SM phenomena so that the specification of the SM can be derived. 
The first domain to be removed is the Pilot - it fits the criteria of being adjacent to 
the requirements. It is shown in detail as SPS3 in Appendix D. At this point, after 
removing the Pilot domain, the software problem has been transformed into: 
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PRedl : 
S&RE(jet_stat)jet,,, SP(smode, sstat, ssi, InAir)invec, 
jety outy jet_stat 'SUouty, "SMinvec 
f- Rlsmode, 
sstat, ssj, InAir 
Note that the requirements have been transformed from R' into R1, all the SPS3 
claims are successfully discharged, and that as in the earlier problem transformation 
steps, these claims and their discharge evidence correspond to important elements 
of the safety case argument. 
So far the domain removals have all been reference-type PPTs since they cover in- 
put data into the system. The six S&RE domains are different as they represent the 
output of the system (the actual release of stores) and are therefore constrain-type 
PPTs. Although there are six S&RE domains, they are identical in functionality 
and can be treated as a single parametrisable domain in terms of applying the PPT 
to effect domain removal. The problem transformation step SPS4 follows a similar 
format to SPS3 and covers the S&RE domain removals. The details of these PPT 
applications are presented in Appendix D, where the requirements transformation 
from R1 to R2 is presented in some detail to demonstrate the steps involved. This 
simplification work provides further support for property Simplification. 
The software problem model after removing the S&RE domains is given by: 
PRed : SP(smode, sstat, ssj, InAir)z""ec, SU(jetv)oýt,,, SMinvec F- R23amode, aetat, eaj, InAir 
and this corresponds to the requirement R2. The PF diagram form of this problem 
is shown in Figure 5.9. 
The sequence of problem transformation steps to proceed from the initial problem 
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Figure 5.9: SMS Problem After S&RE Domain Removals 
problem transformation graph shown in Figure 5.10. 
Ji 
Figure 5.10: The SMS Problem Transformation Graph 
5.5.3 Deriving and Validating the Machine Specification 
The POSE model represented by problem PRd and its equivalent PF problem dia- 
gram form of Figure 5.9 are almost at an appropriate level of abstraction to support 
the safety analysis and modelling work. Inspection of these representations indicates 
there is still a small gap to be resolved between the requirements expressed in terms 
of the phenomena jets, smode, sstat and ssj, and the machine to be developed, SM, 
that interfaces to the phenomena outv and invec. There is a need to relate outs to 
jetv, and invec to smode, sstat, ssj, and InAir. 
We could apply the PPT again to remove the SU and SP domains, since this 
would relate the resulting requirement phenomena 
directly to the machine SM phe- 
nomena. However, the resulting model is not as useful as PRi for the PSA work. 
A useful way forward is to apply REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION to the SU 
and SP domains to map the phenomena adjacent to the requirement R2 to the 
phenomena adjacent to the machine 
SM. If the relationship involves only Envi- 
ronment Constraint behaviour 
(i. e., the only difference between the phenomena can 
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be directly resolved by reference to the behaviour of the intervening domain the 
phenomena map through) then this mapping can be used to derive the machine 
specification and to validate that it satisfies R2. In effect, REQUIREMENTS INTER- 
PRETATION is applied to obtain the useful behaviours of the intervening domains 
which is used to establish the relationship between the machine and the requirement 
phenomena - this mapping works if the behaviour of the domains corresponds to 
the Environment Constraint non-feasible requirement. The mapping confirms the 
correspondence between the phenomena as outy is equivalent to jets and invec to 
(smode, sstat, ssj, InAir). 
In effect, jetv and outs are functionally equivalent representations. With these 
relationships established, it is now feasible to derive the specification of the SC 
directly from the POSE entailment of problem PEquiv, which is PRed with outv 
substituted for jetv and invec substituted for InAir, smode, sstat and ssj in direct 
support of properties [NecessaryP] and Spec. Join. The resulting problem is: 
PEquiv : SP(invec)invec, SU(outv) ou tv+ 
SMioutvn i- R3outy vec invec 
and the corresponding requirement, R3 is: 
R3a The SM shall ensure the safe selection of stores through the SU phenomena 
outs when commanded by the appropriate settings in invec. 
R3b The SM shall have a Selective Jettison (SJ) facility which will select all 
stores for jettison in outv (Ship mode) or select specific stores for jet- 
tison in onty (Station mode) from the SU in accordance with invec. 
Ric The SP shall allow each of the six station selection positions in outv to 
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be selected for SJ in accordance with the invec. In Station SJ mode, a 
station must be selected before it can be jettisoned. 
R3d The SP shall have an In Air lamp indication in invec, which will be lit if 
the aircraft is in the air. SJ is only allowed if the aircraft is in the air. 
Rae The SP shall have a SJ button that allows jettison to be initiated in 
accordance with invec and it must remain pressed for the duration of the 
jettison sequence. The following must hold prior to initiating the SJ: 
1. SJ mode selected (Ship or Station) in accordance with invec. 
2. Aircraft is in the air. 
3. If Station mode, the appropriate stations are selected on the SP in ac- 
cordance with invec. 
Rif The SM shall control the selection of stores for jettison in the Duty from the 
SU, by controlling the SUs to correctly provide conditioned power and drive 
signals through its output phenomena outv. 
Rag The SM shall implement a Balance Algorithm which can remove items from 
an SJ package to ensure aircraft roll moments are contained within safe limits. 
Rah It shall be possible to SJ a store from a single station without regard to the 
aircraft balance algorithm calculation. 
Rai The SJ release sequence will be Out stores first, then Mid and then In. 
At this point the phenomena of the machine SM are the same as the phenomena 
referenced by R3, which therefore represents the specification of the machine. The 
contribution from the SP domain is to confirm that invec directly relates to smode, 
sstat, ssj and InAir. The contribution from the 
SU domain is to confirm that outv 
directly relates to jets. From this we have that: 
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Table 5.4: Definitions of outs and invec in Alloy 
outv (i relp Indicates a valid Si J sequence is in progress; 
ii pulses Defines which stations receive J pulses for this time instance; 
(iii) balsa Indicates whether the SJ is to satisfy the balance condition. 
invec : (i) mode Indicates the SJ mode selection (off, Ship or station ; 
(ii) eels Set defining the status of the SJ station selection switches; 
iii sj Indicates whether the SJ Button has been pressed; 
(iv fl Indicates if the aircraft is in the air (air) or on the ground (grd). 
spec. (R3) A domaincontrib. (SU) A domaincontrib. (SP) = requirement (R2). 
Therefore the validation step is to demonstrate that the specification (R3) in com- 
bination with the domain contributions from SU and SP leads to the requirement 
(R2). Inspection of R2, R3 and the domain contributions confirmed the validity step 
informally. The next task was to develop a formal model and use formal analysis to 
confirm this validity step. 
5.5.4 Development of the POSE/Alloy Model 
The Alloy formal model was derived directly from the POSE problem PE, Ui and 
the first task was to define the outs and invec phenomena as Alloy variables. These 
are defined as in Table 5.4. 
The phenomena balan (indicating whether the balance algorithm has been applied 
to the SJ package) is an implicit modelling parameter that is not an input to the 
SU. It is included in outv because it facilitates the model validation task. It is not 
required in the implementation because its effect is manifested in the pulses value 
- in fact its value can be derived from analysing the pulses value. 
As noted earlier, the SJ sequence does not release all the stores at once, as 
this could result in a collision hazard, rather it releases stores in the step sequence 
Out -3 Mid -+ In with a delay between each step. This is captured by the require- 
ment R3i and the use of cut in the Alloy model. That is, the SJ is not an atomic 
action, but rather a sequence of three atomic actions in sequence. 
If a set of heavy stores were jettisoned from only one wing, the aircraft would 
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be subjected to a potentially lethal roll moment. To avoid this problem, jettison 
packages (including Ship) are subjected to a balance algorithm calculation, which 
can remove items from the SJ package to ensure that the aircraft remains within safe 
roll moment limits. This is captured as requirement Rag. Store on Station (SoS) 
indications are used to signify if a store is present or not, these are used by the 
balance algorithm to make its calculations. However, it is recognised that these SoS 
indications could fail in such a way as to fool the balance algorithm. In particular, 
this might result in the balance algorithm inhibiting a jettison of a store when in 
fact jettisoning the store could result in a more benign residual roll moment. To 
counter this problem, the Pilot is allowed to SJ a single store, irrespective of the 
Balance algorithm. This is captured as requirement Rah. 
The requirements specification Alloy model of the SM was developed directly 
from the POSE model, using the same interface and phenomena as used in PEA;,,. 
It is shown in full in Appendix E. The functionality of this Alloy model was based 
on the information collected in support of the POSE problem transformation step 
development from SPS1 through to SPS4 (it includes the domain description in- 
formation and the existing Z specifications). In Alloy terms [52], the SM module 
makes use of an extension to the standard Alloy Natural numbers utility file. The 
extension just involves defining terms for Two to Ten, in addition to the Zero and 
One already provided. The full Alloy specification is outlined in [52], so the following 
presents the main points of the model relevant to our case study. 
The signature (set) type definitions are based on an abstract set, with distinct 
single subsets. A typical definition for the type SJMode is shown below: 
abstract sig SJMode {} 
one sig off, ship, stat extends SJMode 
{} 
where off and ship correspond directly to there respective Si mode switch settings 
and stat corresponds to station mode. Similar definitions were defined for (a) SSet 
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{son, soff} to represent the SJ button and whether a valid jettison release pulse is 
allowed, (b) StatsSel {s0, sl, s2, s3, s4} where each sn covers a particular SJ 
switch station selection set, (c) InAir {air, grd} to represent the In Air indication, 
(d) SPu1 {p0, p10, p01, p2} to represent the jettison release pulse patterns, and 
(e) BAL {nob, no_bal, is-ball to represent if the SJ package is required to satisfy 
the balance algorithm. Where nob represents not applicable, no_bal represents 
balance algorithm not applied and is_bal means the balance algorithm is applied 
to the SJ package. These types are used to define the overall state of the SM as 
follows: 
sig SMState { ntime : Natural, 
mode SJMode, relp : SSet 
eels StatSel, pulses : Spul, 
Si SSet, balan : BAL, 
2 
fl : InAir, cnt : Natural } {} 
In SMState ntime represents the system simulation time reference and is mod- 
elled as a natural number, and cnt is a local time counter used for timing the SJ 
release sequence. Effectively, the other state components on the LHS are inputs from 
the SP and were defined using the SP! invec phenomena from the POSE model. The 
other RHS state components are outputs to the SU defined using the SM! outv phe- 
nomena. The relp = son means it is valid to provide SJ pulses, and pulses defines 
the pattern of pulses to be output at this time (note p0 means no pulses output). 
The initial conditions are defined by the predicate init [1, which places the system 
in a known safe state. This is an important aspect of any system development and 
it also satisfies the initialisation concern identified by Jackson [53]. 
pred init (sm: SMState) {sm. mode=off && sm. sels=so && sm. sj=soff && sm. f1=grd && 
sm. ntime=Zero && sm. relp=soff && sm. pulses=p0 && sm. balan-nob && sm. cnt-Zero} 
The trace model used is based on that used in Chapter 2 of [52] and involves using 
a linear ordering to order the traces with init as the first trace. In the following the 
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InVec() represents the input vector to the SM and Stim() represents the simulation 
time increment predicate. The trace timing simulation covers five slots from Zero 
through to Four. This can be extended as required. 
fact traces { 
fait Cams/first 0] 
all sm: SMState-sms/last [] I let sm'. sms/nert[sm] 
(InVec[sm. ntime. Zaro, m, stat. sel, s0, s, soff, t, grd] 
(InVec[sm. ntime, One, m, stat, sel, sO, s, soff, f, air] 
(InVec[sm. ntime. Tvo. m, stat, sel, sl, s, soff, f. air] 
(InVec[sm. ntime, Three, m, stat, sel, sl, s, soff, f, air] 
I some m: SJMode, eel: StatSel, a: SSet, f: InAir 
t2 Stim[sm, sm']tt SMfun[sm, am', m, ssl, s, f]) or // i 
ü Stim[sm, sm']tt SMfun[sm, sm', m, sel, s, f]) or 2 
tt Stim[am, sm']tk SMfun[am, sm', m, sel, s, f]) or 3 
ts Stim[sm, sm']kk SMfun[sm, sm', m, sel, s, f]) or // 4 
(nat/gte[sm. ntime, Four] kk m- off kk sel 1 80 ft 8, soff kk f- air kk SMfun(sm, em', m, ssl, e, f]) } 
The behaviour of the SM is defined by the predicate SMfun. This sets the valid 
SJ pulse indicator (BM'. relp=son), checks balance (balance (sm')) and outputs Si 
pulses in sequence (pulTab (sm')) if a valid SJ button press is detected or the SJ 
sequence is still valid and continues. Otherwise, it resets the SM state to a safe 
value. 
prod SMfun [sm, sm' : SMState, m: SJMode, sel : StatSel, s: SSet, f: InAir] { 
(sa'. mode -a tt sm'. sj -sU am' -fl If tt sm'. se1s 1 801) 
AZ 
(((m. mode ý stat kk sm. sels !- s0 kk m. sj * soff U m. f1 - air kk 
 . stat tt sal . m. sels tt s- son kk i- air) 
ý> m'. relp - son kk m'. cnt - One ü pulTab[m'] kk balance[m']) kk 
(( sa. aode - stat tt sa. sels !- s0 tt am. sj ý son tt am. l1 - air kk m. relp - son tt 
a. stat tt sel = sm. sels Zt a- son üf air) 
ý> m'. relp - son tt m'. cat - incnt[em. cnt] tt pnlTab[sm'] u balance 
(em']) tt 
( not(s - stat tt eel !- s0 !t sal . am. gels ua- son 
Zi f- air) 
"> sn'. relp - soff !Z sm'. ent - Zero U ='-pulses - p0 
" sm'. balan - nob ) 
} 
The function incnt () increments cnt, except if cnt is Three when it resets it to 
one. The predicate pulTab () is used to define the Si pulse sequence timing, with 
gig. cnt=One corresponding to SJ from the 
Out stations, Two from Mid and so on. 
By varying the content of the s1 to s4 definitions, the complete range of Si package 
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selections can be covered - the full definition of PulTab () is given in the Alloy code 
in Appendix E. 
prod pulTab Ism : SMState] { 
/* si -- Port Out & Starboard In selected for SJ */ 
(sm. sels = st && sm. cnt = One => sm-pulses = p01) && 
(sm. sels = sl && sm. cnt = Two => sm. pulses = p0) && 
(sm. sels = sl && sm. cnt = Three => sm. pulses - p10) && 
/* similar definitions for S2, S3 and S4 */ 
/* sO -- No stores selected for SJ 
(sm. sels = sO => sm-pulses = p0) } 
The balance algorithm is covered by the predicate balance(), where if there are 
one or zero SJ pulses, then no balance (no_bal) otherwise balance is required. 
pred balance[sm : SMState] { sm. relp = son && 
((sm. pulses = p10 or am-pulses = p01 or sm. pulses = p0) _> sm. balan = no_bal 
else sm. balan = is_bal )} 
5.5.5 Model Validation and PSA 
Having produced the formal Alloy model of the specification (R3) - the full model 
shown in Appendix E- the next step is to validate that this model does satisfy R3. 
That is, we need to validate that the Alloy model adequately represents the spec- 
ification R3. This was achieved by performing a variety of simulation runs, where 
each run used a different combination of InVec O values to explore the behaviour 
of the model over its range of inputs. The results validated that the Alloy model 
satisfied the specification given by R3. 
The next task was to validate that the validated specification R3 (represented by 
the Alloy model) in combination with the useful behaviours (domain contributions) 
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from the SU and SP satisfied the requirement represented by R2. This being part 
of the process of validating that the machine specification R3 satisfies the original 
requirement R (as described in section 5.1.2). 
The useful behaviour relations (domain contributions) of the domains SU and 
SP are introduced into the Alloy model as Alloy facts (using Alloy "fact" construct 
and model structure respectively) since they represent indicative properties of the 
environment context. In contrast, the optative behaviour of the requirement, R2 
is introduced using predicates, and these predicates were proved using the Alloy 
"Assert" mechanism. The end result was validation that the specification (R3) 
satisfies its requirement (R2). 
After validating that the Alloy model adequately represented the specification, 
and then validating that this specification satisfied its requirement, there is now 
enough supporting validation evidence to make it reasonable to apply the PSA. The 
PSA task has two main components to cover the complex functionality aspects rep- 
resented by the Alloy model, and the more straightforward behaviour of the existing 
hardware components. The latter are addressed using the non-formal approach out- 
lined in section 5.2.1.1, and is not considered further in this case study work. The 
complex behaviour is addressed using the approach outlined in section 5.2.1.2 and 
this work concentrates on these issues. Simulation was used to investigate the be- 
haviour of the model looking for cases that violated one of the safety requirements. 
For example, consider the original requirement for Rg (see Appendix D): 
Rg The SMS shall implement a Balance Algorithm which can remove items from 
an SJ package to ensure aircraft roll moments are contained within safe limits. 
qualified by Rh which always allows a single SJ. From these can be derived a hazard 
"Multiple station SJ (Rh not active) but balance not applied (Rg issue)". 
Simulation of the Alloy model using the at station selection set (refer to In- 
Vec() definition above) indicated that balan = no_bal for this set. However, si 
147 
is a multiple SJ-Port Out and Starboard In, so the release pulse sequence should 
be p01 ; p0 ; plO for cnt of One, Two and Three respectively-so balance should be 
applied. Simulating with other station selection sets indicated that balance was only 
applied when more than one pulse was required at a particular time (i. e. p2) and 
only for that time. The required behaviour is that balance should always be applied 
unless the SJ package consists of a single release (a single p10/p01 with two pOs). 
The problem occurs in the high level Z specification of the SM, which contains the 
term: 
(#releaseLocations >1= OSM E balanced) 
where # means the cardinality of the set and GSM means the bound values of 
SM. Now releaseLocations is the number of jettison pulses being applied-this 
is modelled in Alloy by the function balanceO, which specifies no balance only 
if there are zero (p0) or a single (p10/p01) pulse. The problem is that (as noted 
above) SJ is not an atomic action, but rather three: one each for Out, Mid and In. 
The functionality given above ensures each atomic action satisfies the balance, but 
does not ensure the entire SJ sequence does. Hence selection set si which results in 
the pulse sequence p01; p0; p10 meets the criteria for each of its atomic components, 
indicating that the model does not require it to be balanced, when it should be. The 
solution is to base the balance calculation on the SJ station selection and not the 
jettison pulses. Implementing this change, results in balance() being updated as 
follows: 
pred balance[sm : SMState] { sm. relp - son dA 
(sm. sels = s4 or sm. sels = s5) _> sm. balan - no_bal 
else sm. balan = is_bal } 
Simulating with this form resulted in the correct behaviour for si and the other 
selection set combinations. Aspects of this behaviour were then proved. 
Other safety issues were addressed in a similar fashion, and the modelling iden- 
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tified the further known anomaly and a not previously identified one. The latter 
concerned an inconsistency between two of the Customer supplied requirements doc- 
uments. In all these cases the implementation was checked and it was confirmed 
that it operated as intended. That is, the problem was with the requirements spec- 
ification. 
An alternative approach would have been to represent the hazard as a logical 
assertion and use the model to prove whether the model does or does not satisfy 
the condition. This is the second part of the formal safety approach described in 
section 5.2.1.2. 
5.6 Discussion 
The early work in the chapter has shown that the POSE PPT can be usefully 
applied to transform requirements to make them feasible and allow the specification 
S to be derived in direct support of property [NecessaryP] and also support for 
Spec. Join. This was supported with evidence from the case study work, where 
the DC case study (section 5.1.3) demonstrated the derivation and validation of the 
specification using non-formal techniques, whilst the SMS case study (section 5.5.3 
onwards) did the same for a formal model, this validation providing support for the 
property Validation and mitigation of issue [ValidI6]. The formal model provided 
stronger validation evidence, but there is always an extra step corresponding to the 
need to relate the formal model to reality. In the SMS case study this involved the 
need to confirm that the Alloy model did represent the specification represented by 
R3. 
In Chapter 4 the safety analysis was conducted on a more complex model involv- 
ing all the domains (e. g. compare PE and Figure 4.2 with PRed and Figure 5.2) 
and relating the events at the machine interface to corresponding events at the sys- 
tem boundary involved establishing informal relationships. The advantages of the 
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PPT-based approach of this chapter are that the analysis is easier because a simpler 
model is used, and the effect at the system boundary can be established by tracing 
through the relevant domain assumptions, which are established and validated as 
part of the PPT application. 
Application of the PPT transforms complex problem descriptions into simpler 
ones, therefore the PPT application provides support for the property Simplifica- 
tion. It provides other benefits, for example, the discussion about the DC case 
study in section 5.4 noted that an improved safety analysis and feasible require- 
ments can be achieved through application of the PPT. The information gathered 
about what a domain contributes to the overall system function so that it can be 
successfully removed is just the information necessary to complete the validation of 
a successful analysis. The PPT gathers this information in a systematic way that 
provides the traceability required by the safety standards and guidelines and thus 
provides some mitigation for issue [TraceI4]. The traceability aspects are further 
enhanced by the use of annotated problem transformation graphs as described in 
section 5.3. A problem transformation graph was used in section 5.5.2 to depict the 
progress of the application of the problem transformation steps in the SMS case 
study. 
Processes for improving the PSA using non-formal and formal techniques were 
introduced in section 5.2. These were used to support the PSA in both the DC and 
the SMS (section 5.5.5) case studies - providing mitigation for the effective safety 
analysis aspect of issue [Late13] . 
In both the DC and the SMS case studies the same model used for the de- 
velopment, the POSE software problem model, is also used for the safety analysis 
which provides evidence to support property [SameAl]. The case study work also 
introduced a check to ensure that the requirement was at an appropriate level of 
abstraction, providing support for the property Right Abstraction. This was used 
successfully in the SMS case study. 
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The SMS case study work agrees with the earlier case study that POSE is flexible 
in use, and integrates well with the overall development process - IPDP in this case. 
This ability to work with existing development processes is important, because it 
supports the evolution and improvement, rather than the replacement, of these 
processes. This is in line with the goal of improving the `normal' design, and avoids 
the damaging `radical' design cycle [131]. It also addresses the property [IntegA3] 
identified in section 3.4.5, and property Integrates from Table 2.3, of improving 
and integrating well with IPDP. 
The task of using the POSE/Alloy combination to improve the front-end of 
a safety critical development process asked two questions. The first, and easiest 
to address, was whether the POSE/Alloy combination could detect the anomalies. 
The SMS case study results demonstrate that both POSE and Alloy can be used in 
combination to detect the anomalies of interest, and thus provides direct support for 
property [IntegA3]. The second question is whether the POSE/Alloy combination 
would have detected these anomalies. This is more difficult to answer because it 
is a process question. A plausible answer can be gleaned from the development of 
the POSE model from SPS1 through to SPS4, and then the use of this model to 
produce the Alloy model described in section 5.5.4. This work shows that POSE and 
Alloy were used as recommended and found the anomalies of interest. This imparts a 
certain degree of confidence that the process used with the POSE/Alloy combination 
would be able to detect these and similar anomalies, and at an early phase in the 
development life cycle. Therefore technically the POSE/Alloy combination could 
and would be expected to provide the required process improvement for the safety 
critical development process. 
The development of the formal model in section 5.5.4, and the results obtained 
in section 5.5.5 of the SMS case study also demonstrate strong support for property 
[FormalA2]. 
In summary, completion of the DC case study and the results of the SMS case 
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study both provided strong evidence to support the properties [NecessaryP], Spec. 
Join, Validation, [Valid16], Simplification, [TraceI4], [SameAl], Right Ab- 
straction, [IntegA3], Integrates and [FormalA2], and some support for issue 
[Late13]. Also, the early problem transformation steps in the SMS case study 
provided further support for the issues [EnvirIl] and [Requ12], and for proper- 
ties Context, Architecture, Avoid Bias and Model Reality as discussed in 
Chapter 4 for the DC case study. 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
The chapter began with an introduction to the POSE PPT (Problem Progression 
Transformation), developed a process for applying it and then showed how it could be 
used to derive a specification S by transforming high level requirements into feasible 
requirements that apply directly to the machine to be developed. The completion of 
the DC case study and the results of the SMS case study provided examples of the 
successful use of the PPT to derive S and also to facilitate the safety analysis task 
which used the same POSE model - providing evidence to support the properties 
[NecessaryP] and [SameAl]. The SMS case study also showed that POSE could 
support a formal development process as required by the safety critical standards 
and also in support of property [FormalA2]. 
The traceability and backtracking (iteration) capabilities of POSE were devel- 
oped in section 5.3 and shown to be effective at managing the backtracking required 
in the DC case study, providing evidence to support [TraceI4]. The case studies 
also demonstrated the usefulness of the safety process improvements investigated in 
section 5.2. 
In summary, this chapter has developed some of the POSE capabilities such that 
there is now evidence that this expanded POSE is capable of addressing many of the 
properties and issues identified earlier - these results are summarised in Table 5.5 
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as shown below. As before the top portion of Table 5.5 refers to the capabilities 
identified in section 2.5, the lower portion to the issues and properties summarised 
in section 3.4.5. The meaning of "E", "ee" and "e" is as defined in section 4.6. 
Property/Issue Previous Work Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Context [41,87] e ee 
Architecture [41,87] e ee 
Spec. Join [39,83] - e 
Avoid Bias [39] e ee 
Model Reality - e ee 
Validation - e ee 
Simplification [41,87] e ee 
Tool Support [35,87] - - 
Right Abstraction [41,87] e ee 
Integrates [88] e ee 
NecessaryP [41,83] - e 
SameAl [88] e ee 
FormalA2 [41,88] - e 
IntegA3 - e ee 
Envirll [87,88] e ee 
Requ12 [87,88] e ee 
Late13 [85,88] - e 
Tracel4 [85,88] - e 
Incoml5 - - - 
Valid16 [88] - e 
Table 5.5: Evidence Status for POSE after Chapter 5 
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The contribution of this thesis so far to the knowledge concerning POSE and its 
use is summarised in Table 5.6. The "Reference" column refers to section numbers 
unless otherwise stated. 
Property Contribution Description Reference 
[NecessaryP] Demonstrated support by POSE PPT process 5.1.2,5.1.3, 
5.5.3,5.5.5 
Spec. Join Demonstrated support by POSE PPT process 5.1.2,5.5.3,5.5.5 
Validation SMS case study supports property 5.1.3,5.5.5 
[Valid16] DC and SMC case study support 5.1.3,5.5.5 
[Latel3] DC and SMC case study support 5.2.2,5.5.5 
Simplification Demonstrated support by POSE PPT process 5.1.2,5.5.2,5.5.5 
[TraceI4] Showed trace&iteration mitigation 5.3 
[SameAl] Showed PSA uses same model as Development 5.1.3,5.5.5 
Right Abstraction SMS case study supports property 5.1.3,5.5.1 
[IntegA3] SMS case study supports property 5.5.1 
Integrates SMS case study supports property 5.5.1 
[FormalA2] SMS case study support 5.5.4,5.5.5 
Envirll SMS case study initial steps 5.5.1 
[Requ12] SMC case study initial steps 5.5.1 
Architecture SMS case study initial steps 5.5.1 
Context SMS case study supports property 5.5.1 
Avoid Bias SMS case study supports property 5.5.1 
Model Reality SMS case study supports property 5.5.1 
Table 5.6: Thesis Contribution Summary after Chapter 5 
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Chapter 6 
Further Process Improvement 
Using POSE 
The aim of this chapter is consider how POSE can address the three items currently 
outstanding as indicated by Table 5.5. The first task is to demonstrate how POSE 
can improve support for the early application of preliminary safety analysis to pro- 
vide mitigation for [Latel3]. The second task is to investigate what support POSE 
can provide for the issue [Incoml5] and the third is to consider Tool Support. The 
investigation will be conducted through the use of an Audio Warning System case 
study, which, as we will see, will also provide additional evidence for the properties 
and issues already addressed in earlier chapters, and further demonstrate the use 
of POSE in support of a formal process that is suitable for a safety critical system 
development. 
6.1 A POSE Safety Pattern Identified: [Late13] 
Inspection of the DC case study of sections 4.2 - 4.3 and the SMS case study 
of section 5.5 shows a definite recurring sequence of problem transformation steps 
emerging for covering the early requirements engineering stages of a system develop- 
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ment. This sequence of events was also identified in other case study work conducted 
by the author at the Company, but not reported here. For example, the first problem 
transformation step in both the DC case study (PS1 on page 91) and the SMS case 
study (SPS1 on page 244) was concerned with understanding the system problem, 
the environment and the requirement. Further, the second problem transformation 
step (PS2 for the DC and SPS2 for the SMS) was concerned with identifying an 
appropriate solution architecture and expanding the problem context to include it. 
The subsequent problem transformation steps (e. g., PS3 to PS6 for the DC case 
study) were concerned with applying the PPT to simplify the problem to facilitate 
both the PSA and the derivation of the machine specification of the machine to be 
designed. This sequence of problem transformation steps can be captured by the 
following activities: 
1. Initial Problem Understanding: used to capture increasing knowledge 
and detail in the context (i. e., the environment into which the solution will be 
introduced) and requirement of the problem. 
2. Solution Interpretation and Expansion: the choice and subsequent struc- 
turing of the solution according to a candidate solution architecture. Domain 
knowledge and experience are used to investigate potential solution architec- 
tures (logical and/or physical), and the most promising candidate is selected 
to transform the problem. This involves an expansion step which requires the 
introduction of architectural features that are known to have a high likelihood 
of success. 
3. Problem Simplification: the removal of domains by repeated application 
of the PPT with the goal of simplifying the problem structure to focus on the 
machine domain to be designed. This simplification facilitates the specification 
derivation and validation, and the safety analysis tasks. 
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Figure 6.1: The POSE Safety Pattern 
4. PSA Feasibility Check: the application of safety analysis techniques to the 
POSE model resulting from the simplification task to ensure a feasible solution 
architecture has been chosen. 
These activities can be put together in what we define as the POSE safety pattern 
(Pattern, for short), which is captured by the UML activity diagram of Figure 6.1. 
The choice point (labelled 4) uses the outcome of the PSA to determine whether: 
9 PSA OK: the current architecture is viable as the basis of a solution; or 
" PSA Not OK: backtracking and (re-)development of the problem (Activity 1) 
and/or another candidate architecture (Activity 2) is required. 
The Pattern is iterative, ending when the PSA of a validated specification that 
satisfies its safety requirements is achieved. 
The Pattern has evolved through its development but has retained the same 
basic form. The earliest form was presented in [87] and included an additional 
requirements interpretation task prior to the PSA. After further development of the 
POSE transformations the POSE safety pattern was modified by the removal of 
this additional task and the inclusion of a PSA activity that combined the problem 
simplification and the safety analysis tasks - this was the form used in [88]. The 
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combined PSA task that mixed the PPT with the PSA activity was not really 
satisfactory and this resulted in a further modification to the Pattern to its current 
form. This modification has the virtue that the POSE transformations and the PSA 
are distinct. That is, in the current pattern shown in Figure 6.1, Activities refer 
to POSE problem transformation steps, whilst the decision diamond represents the 
PSA. 
Validation is an essential aspect of the POSE transformation process, and it is 
instantiated in the POSE safety pattern through the notions of justification and 
claim used in the problem transformation step representation (e. g. see PS1 on page 
91). However, it is not explicitly represented in Figure 6.1. Validation after each 
step is implicit in the diagram. Ongoing work [37] has developed the process pattern 
further to explicitly include the validation tasks for particular problem contexts. 
However, the form shown in Figure 6.1 is apposite for this work to support the 
safety process development. 
The mechanics of how to use the POSE safety pattern are represented by the 
diagram in Figure 6.1 and defined by the Agenda-based method description [171 
(refer to section 2.3.6) shown in Table 6.1. The Validation fields in Table 6.1 are 
based on using IPDP, but the Description and Result fields are general. Inspection of 
these fields show they represent required features of any safety development process 
required to satisfy the safety standards and guidelines such as DS 00-56, IEC 61508 
and DO-178B. Therefore the POSE safety pattern Agenda description can be readily 
adapted for use with other safety critical design approaches, with just the Validation 
fields requiring tailoring to cover the specific artefacts resulting from the actual 
development process used. 
The POSE safety pattern was tried out on some small case study examples (not 
reported here) and "re-played" on the Decoy Controller and SMS case studies - refer 
also to Appendix H. The results obtained validated its effectiveness. The informa- 
tion from the IPDP sub-system theory of operation task in the Dem/Val phase is 
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No. Description Result Validation 
Set up Initial Problem Understand basic system context, - Requirements confirmed by Customer 
Understanding step. the environment domains, - Model checked by domain experts 
requirements, their phenomena and - Justification for the transforms 
(Ref: PSI & SPS1) inter-relationships between them. - Step Claims discharged 
Set up Solution Experience and domain knowledge - chosen architecture satisfies 
Interpretation & used to identify a possible functional requirements 
Expansion step. solution architecture. Problem - Justification for additional 
2. expanded using this architecture. expansion discharged 
(Ref: PS2 & SPS2) - Specific Claims satisfied, e. g. 
validate Problem is sound. 
Problem Simplification Domains far from the Machine are - PPT process followed & Justification 
by successive removed in turn using the PPT. - Specific Claims to support model are 
application of the PPT Requirements correspondingly satisfied & valid representation. 
problem trans. step. re-written to compensate. Model - Must be able to derive S from W, S I- R 
(Ref: PS3-6 & SPS3-4) focuses on Machine and its Spec. 
PSA of reduced model Model is feasible if ety - Results checked by independent 
to test for feasibility. requirements are satisfied. safety expert. 
Otherwise iterate back to Step 1 - Results confirmed/accepted as 4' (Ref: PS6 & Section 4.5.7) or Step 2 as appropriate. part of IPDP SDR 
Table 6.1: POSE Safety Pattern Agenda Description 
used in the POSE safety pattern Activity 2 task to expand the architecture. The 
simplification (Activity 3) just uses information from the earlier steps. The latter 
did require clarification of some of the IPDP Dem/Val tasks to ensure that the ap- 
propriate information was always made available 
(ambiguity in the task description 
was removed). Therefore the PSA check 
(Activity 4) can be performed as part of 
the SDR work at the end of Dem/Val as desired. This fully supports the mitigation 
of [LateI3] by allowing the safety analysis 
(PSA) to be performed before EMD in 
the life cycle. It also demonstrates that the POSE safety pattern integrates well 
with IPDP in support of Integrates and 
[IntegA3J. 
6.2 Remaining Issue and Property 
The aim of this section is to consider what mitigation/support is or could be given 
to the outstanding issue of task incompleteness 
[Incoml5] and the property of Tool 
Support. 
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6.2.1 Support for [Incoml5] 
The problem transformation steps we have defined collect together basic POSE 
transformations into meaningful units that achieve an identifiable development task, 
such as problem simplification using the PPT. The POSE safety pattern organises 
the steps into a repeatable process pattern that covers the tasks necessary to com- 
plete the early life cycle phases of a safety development. Following the pattern/step 
combination ensures that all the necessary tasks are preformed in the appropriate 
order, and this provides some mitigation for issue [IncomIS]. 
6.2.2 Tool Support 
A proof-of-concept tool has been developed to support POSE development written 
in Prolog as reported in [38], but this is rather primitive and it has not been used as 
part of this work. Instead, the SMS case study has demonstrated that POSE works 
well with Alloy to produce satisfactory results, and that the Alloy formal model 
was derived directly from the POSE problem model and its associated information. 
This will be investigated further in the FAS case study considered next. Therefore, 
although POSE does not provide any tool support directly, this is mitigated by the 
ability of using POSE models within other tools, like Alloy. 
6.3 Audio Warning System Case Study 
The case study concerns the design of a Failure Annunciation System (FAS) that is 
part of the warning system on a military aircraft. The FAS provides audio warnings 
to the pilot if certain critical monitored systems have failed. The case study assumes 
that aircraft level and system level safety analyses have been completed and have 
allocated safety requirements to the FAS - these being H1 and H2 which are defined 
as follows: 
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H1 : Inadvertent indication of the Catastrophic message. 
H2 : Failure to indicate the Catastrophic message. 
where the catastrophic message reports a major system failure such that the pilot 
is required to prepare for ejection. 
These two hazards do not have the same nature: hazard H1 is particularly 
problematic because of the action the pilot has to take if the Catastrophic message 
is played. As a result, it is classified as safety critical, and assigned a target failure 
probability of 10-7fpfh (failures per flight hour). In contrast, hazard H2, the failure 
to indicate a Catastrophic message, is mitigated by other, diverse, aircraft warning 
systems. Hence H2 is classified only as safety related, and assigned a target failure 
probability of 10_5 fpfh. The importance of HCI is increasingly recognised, but the 
ergonomic aspects are handled at the (higher) aircraft level and factored into the 
safety requirements. That is, at this level the pilot is assumed not to impact any 
allocated safety budget and to behave as trained for the purposes of operating the 
system to be developed. 
6.3.1 POSE Safety Pattern: Activity 1 
The POSE safety pattern, developed in section 6.1 and shown in Figure 6.1, was 
applied to the case study. The first activity in applying the pattern is Initial Prob- 
lem Understanding and the tasks associated with this activity are represented in 
the problem transformation step WPS1 detailed in Appendix F. 1. This captures 
understanding the environment context, the requirements and setting up the initial 
software problem via the AStruct as detailed in section 4.1.3. This work uses infor- 
mation from the IPDP CE and early Dem/Val phases. As with the DC case study 
the goal was to use the original requirements unmodified as far as possible to show 
that POSE can work with real problems, although some clarifications were incor- 
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Figure 6.2: The Warning System 
(refer to section 5.1.3) to facilitate the PPT application and formal validation work 
that follows. The Step WPS1 transforms the problem from P,,. Il into P1,,; n.,, which 
has the form: 
Plnitial : 
CiS(stat_cat)cat, SYS(stat_sys)'b', Pilot (sel_audio)audioý 
Speakeraudio essage - Ratl_audio message, FAScmat, sys etat_cat, stat_sys 
This model can also be represented as a PF problem diagram as shown in Figure 6.2. 
Appendix F. 1 gives the details of the step, which indicates that all the required 
justifications, claims and obligations are discharged to provide the validation evi- 
dence to support the model represented by PI-itti-1. 
6.3.2 POSE Safety Pattern: Activity 2 
The second Pattern activity of Solution Interpretation and Expansion involves ex- 
panding the FAS to include a candidate solution system architecture and thus sup- 
ports the property Architecture from Table 2.3. The activities associated with 
this task are represented in the WPS2 Step shown below and based on the PS2 Step 
from section 4.3. It uses information obtained from the IPDP sub-system Theory 
of Operation task in the Dem/Val phase. 
WPS2: Application of SOLUTION INTERPRETATION AND 
EXPANSION to problem Ptnit+al 
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JUSTIFICATION J2: The expanded FAS solution system architecture consists of four 
types of domain. The domain components in this architecture have been prototyped 
to show they can handle the required functionality, and the intent is to use these 
components in the actual design to reduce cost and risk. The initial design for the FAS 
is to make use of these off-the-shelf components for Failure Detection (the FD domain), 
for Audio Output Selection (the AO Selector domain) and for Audio Output Decoding 
(the AO Decoder domain), combining them together with a (still to be designed) Failure 
Annunciator Controller (FA) domain. 
The FD receives status information from (a) the CS system via the discrete cat signal, 
and (b) the other SYS systems via sys. These are decoded by FD and sent to the FA 
via its status signal. The FD prioritises the failure data to send to the FA - cat is the 
highest priority. 
The combined role of the AO Selector (A OS) and AO Decoder (A OD) is to output the 
audio signal of the message selected by the FA. The AOS is an FPGA-based device 
[49], containing a library of digital audio messages stored in PROM (Programmable 
Read-Only Memory). The AOD decodes the selected digital message and turns it into 
an audio wave for the speaker. If no failures are reported by the FD, then the FA 
sends no message request to the AOS, otherwise the FA sends out the highest priority 
message request. 
The justification for this (architecture) solution expansion transformation, J2, is that 
this system architecture has been successfully prototyped and has also been used on a 
number of other similar developments. Therefore it is known to be capable of satisfying 
the functional requirements. 
PHENOMENA: The new phenomena introduced by the architecture are: 
m. essdig The selected message in digital form. 
status Combined status indication of the health of the CS and other SYS systems. 
sel The identifier of the message selected 
for playing to the Pilot. 
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Figure 6.3: The Expanded Warning System 
Given the initial representation of the problem Plniciot, the POSE expansion transfor- 
mation results in the software problem becoming PEA, as shown below. 
PE, xp 
CS(stat_cat)-t, SYS(stat_sys)°Ye, Pilot (sel_audio)Qudio, Speakern1E8sQye, 
A OSmesadig essage atatua ae! 
sed , AODmmesadig , FDýt,, ya, 
FAatatus I- Rlact-audio atat_cat, atat_aga 
The system architecture and resulting system design is shown in PF problem diagram 
form in Figure 6.3. 
The transformed requirement RI is similar to R apart from the changes introduced 
by 
expanding the domains from FAS to FA, FD, AOS, and AOD. This only results in a 
change to Rla, where FAS is replaced by FA. 
Rla When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the system 
to play the correct audio message to the pilot. 
Rlb Message levels shall be comfortably heard by the Pilot. 
R1c If more than one system has failed messages shall be selected for play in the order: 
stat_cat fail , stat_sys fail. 
Rld If no system failures are detected, then no message shall be played. 
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RS For hazards Hl and H2 defined above, their respective safety targets (10-7fpfh 
and 10-5fpfh) shall be satisfied. 
CLAIM: Justification for selection of the solution architecture 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This system architecture has been successfully prototyped 
and has also been used on a number of other similar developments. Therefore it is known 
to be capable of satisfying the functional requirements. 
CLAIM: The choice of candidate solution architecture exhibits sound safety engineer- 
ing judgement 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The system architecture is chosen to maximise integrity 
by partitioning the functionality into simple, distinct blocks. The goal is to isolate any 
problems to specific blocks which will allow local mitigation. This strategy has proven 
successful on previous designs. 
CLAIM: The Speaker is reliable 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The Speaker is an integral part of the Pilot's headphones. 
These headphones have been in-service for many years and are known to be adequately 
reliable and give satisfactory performance. 
CLAIM: The chosen solution architecture does not prevent the satisfaction of R. This 
claim is not yet supported - deferred until PSA after PPT. 
6.3.3 POSE Safety Pattern: Activity 3 
The third pattern activity is Problem Simplification using the PPT. The goal of this 
activity is to simplify PEA to facilitate the safety analysis (PSA) task and allow the 
derivation of the specification. Domains adjacent to the requirement are removed 
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first, following the process introduced in section 5.1.2 - in this case the first domain 
to be removed will be the Pilot. The step WPS3, is detailed in Appendix F. 2 and 
is based on the PS3 Step from section 5.1.3. 
The first application of the PPT transforms the software problem from PEzp into 
PRedl as follows. 
, PRed1 : 
CS(stat_cat)", SYS(stat_sys)sys, Speaker (audiO)message 
AOS+esedig AODmeesage FDstatus FAset ý R2audio sel ý messdig , cat, sys+ status stat_cat, stat_sys 
At the same time the requirement is transformed from R1 into R2. 
The simplification goal requires additional applications of the PPT to remove 
domains from the model. For brevity, these are not listed here, but are recorded in 
Appendix F. As the PPTs are applied, the requirements progress from R2 through 
to R6. As noted at the beginning of section 6.3, the Pilot does not impact the 
allocated safety budget. However, this is not the case for the AOD and CS domains 
removed in the problem simplification sequence, and appropriate amounts of the 
budget have to be allocated for them as described in Appendix F. These affects on 
the safety budget are reflected in R6S. Inspection shows that the domain removals 
from Appendix F are all examples of Environment Constraint requirements. These 
domain removals remove the Speaker, AOD, SYS and CS domains and result in the 
reduced software problem P shown below. 
PRed : AOS(messdig),, 
j, FD(ca. t, sys)atatw, FA", iätw R6ýy'9 










Figure 6.4: The Warning System After PPT Application 
port for the property Simplification from Table 2.3. The requirement associated 
with this software problem, R6, is presented below. 
R6a When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the 
system to generate the correct digital message stream sequence, messdig, at 
the output of AOS. 
R6b Null 
R6c If more than one system has failed messages shall be selected for play in the 
order: cat fail, sys fail. 
R6d If no system failures are detected, then no digital message stream shall be 
generated. 
R6S For hazards H1 & H2 defined above, their respective safety targets (10-7fpfh 
& 10-5fpfh) shall be satisfied. (Note some of H1 budget used for CS; some of 
H2 budget used for AOD and CS, but SYS has no impact ). 
The reduced Warning System is shown in PF problem diagram form in Figure 6.4. 
To derive an Alloy model from PR d requires reconciliation of the requirements 
and domain phenomena, i. e., the relationship between them needs to be established. 
This could be achieved by applying the PPT to remove the AOS and FD domains 
to allow the specification to be derived, but as in the SMS case study the preferred 
way forward (as the model is useful for the PSA) is to just apply the REQUIREMENTS 
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INTERPRETATION transformation to extract the relationship between the phenom- 
ena. This can be captured as the PrePSA problem transformation step below, which 
forms the last part of the Pattern Problem Simplification task. 
The PrePSA Step manages the transformation of PReJJ into PEq,,,,,, which can 
be 
used to directly derive the specification of the FA and forms the basis of the 
PSA 
work. 
PrePSA: Application of REQUIREMENT INTERPRETATION to 
problem PRed to form PEquiv 
CONCERNS: Reconciliation of the requirements and domain phenomena. 
The require- 
ments R6 (associated with PRM) refer to cat, sys and messdig, whilst the 
FA relates 
to status and sel. Therefore there is a need to apply REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION 
to identify the relationship between these phenomena, as in section 5.5.3. 
JUSTIFICATION J: Inspection of the useful behaviour relation for the AOS and 
FD 
domains indicate the logical equivalence of sel to messdig and status to cat and sys. 
This is justified by identifying the useful behaviour relations (domain contributions) of 
the AOS and FD domains. The FD domain is a reference-type, so its effect the health 
status information of cat, sys is represented by status which combines the health status 
information in priority order. The AOS domain is a constrain-type, so its effect the 
digital message output stream messdig is caused by the input phenomena sel as 
follows. 
The AOS consists of a PROM which contains all the warning messages as strings of 
consecutive digital bytes, as shown in Figure 6.5(a). The input phenomena sel 
indexes 
into the PROM to select the message to be played. The bytes from this selected message 
are then output in sequence as the digital message stream messdig. Therefore status 
relates to cat and sys, whilst sel relates to messdig. This means that the requirements 
R6 can be updated to R7 as follows: 
R7a When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the system 
168 
to select the correct message to be output. 
R7b Null 
R7c If more than one system has failed messages shall be selected for play in the 
correct priority order by status - catastrophic failures have the highest 
priority. 
R7d If no system failures are detected, then no digital message shall be selected for 
output. 
R7S For hazards 111 and H2 defined above, their respective safety targets (10-7fpfh 
and 10-5fpfh) shall be satisfied. (Note some of H1 budget used for CS; some of 
H2 budget used for AOD and CS, but SYS has no impact ). 
These updates allow the problem to be transformed from PRM into PEquiv as follows. 
PEquiy : AOS(sel),, ý, FD(status)status, F, Astaý, E- R7; 
ýt,,, 
CLAIM: The software problem PEquiv allows the specification of FA to be derived. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The requirement R7 uses the same phenomena as the 
domains, i. e., R7 is the specification. This allows the specification of FA to be derived 
as shown in the Alloy model development of section 
6.3.4. 
CLAIM: The requirements model is a valid representation of the system 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: Informally, R7a and the AOS contribution mean that sei 
and the AOS useful behaviour result in messdig, whilst R7c and the FD contribution 
mean that status and the FD useful behaviour result 
in cat, sys. This will be formally 
















Figure 6.5: (a) Original AOS (b) Modified AOS' 
6.3.4 POSE Safety Pattern: Activity 4 
The PSA process developed in section 5.2 was applied to the FAS case study to 
check the feasibility of the design. The safety analysis used mathematical proof on 
Alloy models for the functional behaviour and a combination of FFA, HAZOPS and 
functional FTA to investigate the (hardware) random failure aspects. 
6.3.4.1 Model Development 
The first part of the PSA was to check and validate the functional behaviour of the 
system, and the simplified POSE problem, PR1, was used to form an Alloy model 
of it. The model form used was a development of the style used on the SMS model 
of section 5.5.4, and is therefore based on the models given in Chapter 6 of [52]. In 
this case, the domains are modelled as individual abstract data types and the Alloy 
model forms a template which can be re-used to directly encode subsequent POSE 
requirements models. Note again that the same model used in the development 
(PRm) is used as the basis for the safety analysis. 
Producing the formal requirements model in Alloy has two main benefits: the 
requirements model can be simulated to show that it has the desired behaviour, and 
the individual requirements (e. g., R6a, R6c) can be encoded as predicates which 
can then be proved against the requirements model using Alloy's check predicate 
facility. The first step is to build the requirements model as discussed above, and 
this model is shown in full in Figure 6.6. 
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In the following text a reference to "#" identifies the part of Figure 6.6 being 
discussed. Time is modelled as a simple linear ordering using the supplied utility 
ordering. The interface phenomena (e. g., sel and status) are modelled as types. 
For example status defined at #1 in Figure 6.6, consists of catnon meaning only 
the CS system has failed, sysnon meaning only a SYS has failed, catsys meaning 
both the CS and SYS indicate failures and non meaning no failures detected. The 
sel (#2) and mess (#3) phenomena can be modelled similarly. The domains are 
defined as data types shown in #4 in Figure 6.6. The behaviour of these domains is 
defined using predicates which define the changes from the current time (t) to the 
next time (t'). These behaviour predicates are shown at #5 in Figure 6.6, where 
FA is represented by FABehave, FD by FDBehave and AOS by AOSBehave. 
The function extract[] (#7) defines how the FA interprets the status information 
from the FD. The function decode(] (#8) translates the message selection given by 
sel into the appropriate message. There are two models for the FD behaviour. The 
first as shown in Figure 6.6 is the generic one as used in [52]. This model is good for 
the proof work, but is problematic for the simulation work since the user has little 
control over which trace behaviour is selected. To overcome this limitation a second 
model was introduced which allows control over the time range when phenomena 
were selected - this is an evolution of the time model used in the SMS case study 
of section 5.5.4. This second model uses the function trange(t, lower, upper] to set 
phenomena values over times ranging from lower to upper, and is shown below. 
prod FDBehave (t. t' : Time) 
{ trange[t, 0.1] '> FDSame[t, t'] 
else trange[t, 2,4] "> (FD. status. t' - catnon 
else trange[t, 5,6] -> (FD. status. t' I non 
) 
else trange[t. 7,9] -> (FD-status-t' I sysnon ) 
else trange[t, 10,11] -> (FD. status. t' - non ) 
else trange[t. 12,13] -> (FD. status. t' - catsys ) 
else trange[t, 14,15] "> (FD. etatus. t' - non ) 
else trange[t, 16,24] -> (FD. status. t' - catnon 
else trange[t, 25,261 "> (FD. status. t' . non 
else FDSame[t, t'] } 
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The function trange[] (#6 in Figure 6.6) uses the fact that time is modelled as 
a linear ordering, so the function prevsJ can be used to effectively "count" the 
previous time instants. This allows the range of values to be set up as required, e. g. 
trange(t, 2,4J => FD. status. t' = catnon is true if t is in the range from 2 to 4, and 
sets FD. status. t' to catnon over this range. 
The trace behaviour (#9) is defined using the function init(J and the fact traces{} 
and follows the model presented in [52]. The function initQ places the system in 
a known safe state (satisfies the initialisation concern). The simulation is run by 
invoking the predicate showl (#10) which runs through this trace behaviour. 
6.3.4.2 Model Validation 
The SMS case study formal modelling work showed that the simulation was quicker 
to set up but the exhaustive testing was time consuming. In contrast the proof 
took longer to set up but gave stronger results more quickly. This suggested using 
the simulation to set up the model, and then use proof to complete the validation 
and to check any safety properties. In addition, any problem areas identified by 
analysis of the safety requirements could be investigated using simulation. This was 
the approach adopted on this FAS case study. 
The model was developed to support the PSA, so it is based on P and its 
associated phenomena (and also the PF diagram shown in Figure 6.4). The problem 
PEqu;,, was used to derive the specification (R7) of the machine to be designed, FA, 
and this was checked using simulation runs. The rest of the model (including AOS 
and FD) was then checked also using simulation runs. At this point there was 
enough confidence in the behaviour of the model developed in section 6.3.4.1 to 
begin proof validation. 
The first proof task was to demonstrate that the model of FA satisfied its speci- 
fication R7. This required the sub-parts of R7 to be encoded into Alloy as "Assert" 
statements. These were carefully reviewed to ensure they were accurate (to ensure 
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//##* Problem PRed: Unmodified AOS g General FD ##* 
open util/ordering[Time) as Ti 
sig Time {} 
ft i## Define Phenomena #1# 
sig OK {} 
one sig yes, noo extends OK {} 
sig Status {} // Covers FD input cat, sys or no message 
one sig catnon, sysnon , catsys, non extends status {} //#1 
aig Sol {} 
one aig ml, m2, m3, ni extends Sol {} //02 
sig Mess {} // Covers AOS output messdig 
one sig meal, mes2, mes3, noni extends Mess {} //*3 
// US Define Domains sss 
one sig FA { sel : Sol -> Time } {} 
one sig FD {status : Status -> Time} {} 
one sig AOS {men : Hess -> Time} 0 
s4 
// s#* DEFINE OPERATIONS *** #6 
prod FABehave(t, t': Time) { FA. sel. t' - extract(FD. status. t] } 
prod FDBehave (t, t': Time) {FD. atatus. t' - catnon or 
FD. status. t' - catsys or 
FD. status. t' = sysnon or FD. status. t' - non} 
prod AOSBehave (t, t': Time) { AOS. mes. t' - decode[FA. ael. t] } 
prod trange [t: Time, ts, ti: Intl {*preva[t] >- is si //*6 
*preve [t] -< tft 
fun eztract[st: Status) : Sol {(st-catnon or st-catsys) //i7 
"> mi else at = sysnon "> m2 also ail 
fun decode[s: Sell : Mesa {a- 21 "> meal //*8 
else a- m2 -> mes2 else noni} 
// *# Define the Trace Model *# *9 
prod snit [t : Time] {FD. etatue. t - non I. t FA-e0-1. t , ni kk AOS. mee. t - noni} 
fact traces t init[Ti/first[]] 
all t: Time - Ti/last[] I let t' - Ti/next[t] I 
FDBehave[t, t'] A! FABehave[t, t'] U AOSBehaveCt, t'] } 
// . **** PROPERTIES SO*" 010 
prod showl() {} 
rum shovl for 16 but 5 int //Set bit width to cover 
assert R6a {all tl, t2 : Time I 
(ti in prevs[t2] #t FD. status. tl 
(ti in preys (t2] Rt FD. status. tl 
(ti in prevs[t2] tt FD. status. tl 
(ti in prevs[t2] U FD. status. tl 
} 
check R6a for 16 but 5 int 
-16 to +16 
tt ti - prav[prsv[t27] I> AOS. aes. t2 - meal) AA - catnon 
ý catsys AZ ti - prev[prev[t2]] ý> AOS. mes. t2 - mesl) u 
ý sysnon tt tl - prev[prev[t2]] ý> AOS. mes. t2 - mes2) tt 
ý non !t ti - prev[prev[t2]] 1> AOS. mes. t2 - noni) 
Figure 6.6: Audio Warning System: Original AOS 
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the model represented reality). The "Assert" statement to represent R7a is shown 
below. 
assert R7a {all tl, t2 : Time I 
(tl in prevs[t2] kk FA. sel. tl - mi kk ti - prev[t2] -> AOS. mes. t2 - mesl) kk 
(ti in prevs[t2] kk FA. sel. ti . m2 kk ti - prev[t2] -> AOS. mes. t2 - mes2) kk 
(ti in prevs[t2] kk FA. sel. tl . ni kk t1 - prev[t2] -> AOS. mee. t2 - noni) 
} 
check R7a for 16 but 6 int 
The first term in R7a states that if t1 is one time unit before t2, and if FA. sel is 
ml at time t1 then the message, AOS. mes, that is sent at time t2 must be mesl. 
Now, FA. sel. tl=ml means that the FD has reported a cat failure to the FA at time 
U. From R6a, this requires the FA to select the correct message for output (via 
AOS). Inspection of the Alloy model at #7 indicates that ml corresponds to cat 
being detected, and this in turn corresponds to mesl being sent to the AOS (via 
#8). Therefore, the model selects mesa in response to a cat failure being reported 
(catnon or catsys), it selects mes2 if sys (sysnon) is reported and it selects nothing 
(noni) if no failures (ni) are reported. This agrees with the requirement R7a and 
was validated by the proof of assert R7a. 
A similar "Assert" was developed for R7c involving combinations of FD- status. 0 
and FA. sel. t2, and this was also validated by proof. These two proofs also covered 
R7d. 
The second proof task was to validate that the PSA model represented by PP-d 
satisfied its requirement, R6. This covers the validation that the specification, R7, 
and the useful behaviours of the domains AOS and FD satisfy the requirement R6. 
The Alloy "Assert" statement to cover R6a is shown below. 
assert R6a {all tl, t2 : Time I 
(ti in prevs[t2] tt FD. status. tl = catnon &a t1 = prev[prev[t2]] AOS. mes. t2 = most) kk 
(ti in prevs[t2] kk FO. status. tl = catsys kk tt = prev[prev[t2]]  > AOS. mes. t2 = most) At 
(tl in prevs[t2] kk FD. status. tl = sysnoa tR ti = prov[prov(t2]]  > AOS. mo8. t2 = mes2) kk 
(tl in prevs[t2] At FD. status. ti = non ü tl = prev[prev[t2]] _> AOS. mes. t2 = nont) 
} 
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check R6a for 16 but 5 int 
The first term in R6a states that if tl is two time units before t2, and if FD-status is 
catnon at time t1 then the message, AOS. mes, that is sent at time t2 must be mesl. 
Now, FD. status. tl=catnon means that the CS has reported a cat failure to the FD 
at time tl. From R6a, this requires the FA to select the correct message for output 
(via AOS). Inspection of the Alloy model at #7 indicates that ml corresponds to 
cat being detected, and this in turn corresponds to mesl being sent to the AOS (via 
#8). Therefore, the model selects mesl in response to a cat failure being reported 
(catnon or catsys), it selects mes2 if sys (sysnon) is reported and it selects nothing 
(noni) if no failures (ni) are reported. This agrees with the requirement R6a and 
is validated by the proof of assert R6a. It is worth noting that R6a also validates 
requirement R6c concerning message priorities and requirement R6d concerning 
selecting no messages if no failures are detected. 
In summary, this work has validated that the machine specification represented 
by R7 satisfies its requirement represented by R6. 
The functional safety requirements of the system represented by problem PP 
are covered by the sub-parts R6a to R6d of R6; the non-functional safety aspects are 
represented by R6S. Therefore the validation proof of "Assert R6a" also validates 
that the functional safety aspects of the PSA are satisfied - so no specific safety 
property proof work was required. In addition, further simulation work was under- 
taken to check the behaviour using intermittent cat health problems to confirm the 
model behaved correctly in the presence of rapid input changes. The results were 
satisfactory, and supported the proof work. 
The second part of the PSA was to check the random failure characteristics of 
the proposed system. The FFA and HAZOPS were applied as described in the 
improved non-formal safety analysis of section 5.2.1.1. Functional FTA was then 
used to analyse if the events identified by the FFA and HAZOPS satisfy the targets 
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Table 6.2: AOS Safety Analysis Results 
Id. Failure Mode Haz. 
F1 Plays no messages - no Cat fail when required. H2 
F2 Plays Cat fail message too late. H2 
F3 Plays wrong message - inadvertent Cat fail. H1 
F4 Plays wrong message - no Cat fail when required. H2 
F5 Plays too loud - Pilot switches system off. H2 
F6 Plays too softly - Cat fail not heard. H2 
contained in R6S. For reasons of brevity we summarise only the main elements of 
the AOS analysis to demonstrate the process followed. The significant results from 
applying the FFA and HAZOPS analysis to the AOS are shown in Table 6.2, where 
each functional failure is associated with the hazard it excites. 
FTA, applied to the original AOS system architecture (refer back to Figure 6.5(a)), 
with F1 to F6 as the top events, was used to establish if the architecture can satisfy 
its targets. F3 is dominated by the known failure rate of the FPGA that would im- 
plement the AOS functionality. This indicates that the failure rate for F3 is 3x10-7 
fpfh 1 which, therefore, does not satisfy the target for Hl. Therefore the random 
failure part of the PSA has identified problems with the design. The result is that 
the FPGA AOS component will need to be re-thought in order to meet all safety 
requirements. 
The PSA as recorded above was completed after the Pattern Activity 3 Problem 
Simplification, which in turn was completed at the end of the IPDP Dem/Val phase 
when all the necessary information was available. This meant the PSA results were 
used to support the SDR. 
1The manufacturers specification for the FPGA indicates a gate failure rate of 3x10' per 
hour 
of operation. A pessimistic view is adopted that a single gate failure will cause the effect of concern, 
F3. 
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6.3.5 POSE Safety Pattern: Backtracking 
The POSE development sequence so far is captured by Figure 6.7 as a problem 
transformation graph. This sequence is notable in that, from the PSA, PRed has no 
solution, so we must backtrack the development to the point at which the system 
architecture was introduced, and continue afresh. The architecture was introduced 
as part of WPS2 to form problem PEA. Therefore, from the diagram, it can be seen 
there is a need to backtrack to the end of WPS1, after problem Pj,, itta. 
Figure 6.7: The Audio Warning Problem 
The PSA problem concerns the expected reliability of the AOS FPGA and the 
fact that if it goes wrong then there is nothing the FA can do about it. A number 
of solution candidates were considered and the selected solution candidate involved 
including a derived requirement, DR, as follows: 
Each message will have a unique identifier and if the selected message 
identifier does not correspond to that of the currently playing message, 
then audio must be inhibited, audio otherwise being allowed. 
To implement this derived requirement it is necessary to update the functionality 
of the FA and the AOS domains, and that these domains share the appropriate 
information concerning messages, message identifiers and the need to mute messages. 
This is another example of a codesign problem as outlined in [41]. 
Inspection of Ppd shows that the available phenomena are messdig, sei, status, 
cat and sys. None of these are suitable carriers for the required information to 
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support the derived requirement. That is, the information required to implement the 
derived requirement is not shared between the pertinent domains - this is an example 
of the Unshared Information non-feasible requirement identified in section 2.4. 
Therefore to implement DR it is necessary to introduce additional shared phe- 
nomena between the FA and AOS domains and to appropriately update the func- 
tionality of these domains. This results in a modified FPGA AOS component that 
is developed to: include sending back the message identifier of the currently playing 
message to the FA in a status message; and add a mute input to the FA control that 
allows the FA to mute audio output if the message identifier does not tally with the 
required message to be played. The changes to the AO Selector (AOS') are shown 
in Figure 6.5(b). 
The information gained through WPS1 is re-used, the change occurs at the 
expansion stage in WPS2 where the additional phenomena id, mute and the derived 
requirement DR are introduced into the problem. These changes are captured by 
transforming WPS2 into WPS2'. The fact that much of WPS2 is re-used can be 
seen from inspection of the WPS2' step shown below. 
WPS2': Application of SOLUTION INTERPRETATION AND 
EXPANSION to problem PInitia1 
JUSTIFICATION J2: The justification description is same as that in WPS2 (refer to 
page 163) together with the description of the additional phenomena id, mute, and the 
derived requirement DR given above. 
The justification (J2) for the revised system architecture has two parts and is that: 
(a) this basic architecture structure has been successfully prototyped and has also been 
used on a number of other similar developments. Therefore it is known to be capable of 
satisfying the functional requirements. (b) "the original POSE development sequence 
was infeasible because it did not satisfy the safety requirements; the revised architec- 
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ture can satisfy both the functional and safety requirements". That is, the revised 
justification includes the original pruned part of the sequence and its shortcomings 
(the issue identified with F3 by the PSA of the original development sequence shown 
in Figure 6.7), as a rationale for selecting the revised architecture that now includes 
id, mute, and DR. 
PHENOMENA: The phenomena introduced by the architecture are as in WPS2 with 
the further addition of id and mute. 
Given the initial representation of the problem Pln; t=, 21, the POSE expansion transfor- 
mation results in the software problem becoming PEx,,, as shown below. 
PF'.,..,, . 
CS(stat_cat)'t, SYS(stat_sys)9Ys, Pilot (sel_audio)audio, SpeakermE8869e+ 
yýr AOS''messdig, id AQDmessage FDstatus F,, Asel, mute ý R1'sel_assdio, mute 
sel, mute + mesadig , cat, sys, status, id stat_cat, atat_sys, id 
The transformed requirements R1' are the same as R1 apart from the addition of DR. 
The claim/argument combinations same as WPS2 on page 163, apart from addition of 
the following claim. 
CLAIM: Requirements R1 with DR are consistent 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: Comparison of DR with R1 indicates potential issue 
with Rla concerning the playing of warning messages, others are OK. Defer until 
section 6.3.7. 
The revised WPS2' step, is essentially WPS2 with the changes associated with 
id, mute and DR added. This includes the additional claim/argument concerned 
with establishing the consistency of the revised requirements of R1 with DR, the 
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resolution of which is deferred until section 6.3.7. The addition and capture of this 
important claim/argument provides further evidence to mitigate [IncomI5]. 
The next task was to revisit the WPS3 step (refer to page 269). Inspection of 
the transformations involved with WPS3 (Pilot domain removal) reveal that the 
addition of id, mute and DR do not affect the transformation. That is, technically 
WPS3 and WPS3' are the same apart from DR added to R2 to form R2' and this 
R2', along with id and mute, added to the appropriate parts of PRd1 to form Piii,. 
This follows because although R2a is affected by the domain removal, it is only 
changed with respect to the original phenomena. The change does not involve the 
new phenomena id and mute, nor does it impact the behaviour defined by DR. 
A similar argument can be applied to the remaining domain removals which are 
not impacted by the addition of id, mute and DR. Therefore the POSE transfor- 
mation sequence outlined in section 6.3.3 and shown in Appendix F was repeated 
and the revised justifications map directly to J3 to J7. This resulted in the reduced, 
simplified, software problem of PRd given by: 
PRed FD(eat, SyS)statusý AOS(messdig)' `d FAael, mute ý Rfi mesadig, mute ael, muteý atatua, id cat, aya, id 
The corresponding PF problem diagram form is shown in Figure 6.8. 
FDlstatus Fn I cat, sys 





FAlasl, mute AOVý _, messdip, mute """ 
Figure 6.8: The Modified Audio Warning System, P1 
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PrePSA' will also have a similar form to PrePSA, but is affected by the phenom- 
ena id, mute and derived requirement DR. This resulted in PEqu;,, shown below. 
r )atat"° ý' `d 
PEquiv 
: FD(statusAUS(sed)ael, mute) FAael, me F- R7""""" atatua, id atatua, id 
6.3.6 PSA Applied to Modified Model 
As before the feasibility of P ;W checked by applying the PSA tasks to investigate 
the functional and random failure behaviour of the revised model. The functional 
behaviour was validated using an Alloy model derived directly from the POSE model 
structure and using the POSE domains and phenomena as its basis. This was similar 
to the earlier model, but included the behaviour of the additional mute and id 
phenomena. This model is shown in full in Appendix F. 7. The main changes occur 
in the definitions of the abstract data types for FA and AOS' as shown below. 
// Define the single FA State - sel and mute 
one sig FA { sei : Sol -> Time, mute : OX -> Time } {} 
// Define the single FD State domain - status 
one sig FD {status : Status -> Time} {} 
// Define the single AUS' State domain - messdig and id 
one gig AUS Cass : Ness -> Time, id : OK -> Time} G 
The behaviour of FA (FABehave) and AOS' (AOS'Behave) were modified to include 
the mute and id phenomena as shown below. 
// FABehave models the behaviour of the safety critical controller. 
prod FABehave(t, t' : Time) { FA. sel. t' - extract[FD. status. t] is 
FA. mute. t' - checkid[t, t'] } 
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// AOSBehave models the behaviour of the AOS' domain. If mute is 
// active then the message is set to noni (no message). 
pred AOSBehave (t, t' : Time) { AOS. mee. t' - (FA. mute. t ' noo  )' 
deCOde[FA. sel. tl elee noni) lt 
AOS. id. t' - setid[t, t'1} 
// Fun checkid confirms message id corresponds to selected message O11 
fun checkid(t, t' : Time): OK {AOS. id. t - yes .> noo else yes} 
The function checkid(l returns noo if the selected message agrees with the id 
returned from the AOS', and the audio is not muted. If the result is yes, then audio 
is muted as required. 
The analysis approach adopted the same strategy introduced in section 6.3.4.2 
which used simulation to set up the formal model, then proof to validate the spec- 
ification and the requirement, proof to validate any safety properties (none in this 
case, as the requirement covered the safety properties), with the option of further 
simulation to explore any specific problem behaviours such as rapidly changing in- 
puts. In this case, the behaviour of the system was simulated over a wide range of 
input combinations using the modified input value-time trace model (introduced on 
page 144) to control the simulation timing. The simulation explored the expected 
behaviour of the model, especially the operation associated with the mute and 
id 
phenomena. The results indicated that the requirements specification model be- 
haved as intended. Next the proof work on the requirements was undertaken, and 
the full results are considered in section 6.3.7. 
The second part of the PSA checked the random failure performance of the 
revised system. Note that DR also introduces additional failure modes. For examPle, 
mute failing on is a form of F6 (see Table 6.2). Table 6.3 shows the results of 
repeating the FFA/HAZOPS analysis, collating results and then performing the 
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('., lle+o. a PQ A ,,,, A /1[+/ 
Failure Mode Failure Prob. Haz. Id. 
Collated Failure Mode FTA Haz. 10-12 (10') H1 & H2 
Wrong message played, correct id 10` (10') H1 & H2 
Correct message, wrong or no id. 10' (10') H2 
No message played: mute fails/too soft 10' (10') H2 
Message played too loud 10' (10') H2 
FTA with the new system architecture. The Target - shown in brackets after the 
FTA calculation result - is the most severe probability applicable (e. g., the H1 target, 
10-7 fpfh, used for first two terms). 
The worst effect of "Message played too loud" is considered to be that the pilot 
switches the Audio Warning System, FAS, off to avoid the distraction - this equates 
to hazard H2, so the H2 target is used. Mitigation for this failure mode is provided by 
the Volume Limiter circuitry which is part of the AOD (refer to WPS5 on page 274). 
Inspection of the analysis results in Table 6.3 indicates that the modified AOS' 
architecture is adequate for this aspect of the safety targets, and therefore it is valid 
to use it to continue with the development. 
A similar analysis was applied to the FD domain and satisfactory results were 
obtained. Therefore, the modified Audio Warning System architecture can be argued 
not to prevent satisfaction of both the functional and safety target requirements, 
and hence is a suitable basis for the remainder of the development process, that is, 
designing the FA. However, this is only valid if the requirements are shown to be 
consistent. 
6.3.7 PSA Requirements Validation 
The next step was to try to formally prove that the revised model satisfied its 
specification given by R7', its requirement given by R6' (including its functional 
safety requirement) and also to cover the consistency of the requirement. The check 
for R6'a produced a counter example (i. e., the proof failed). The fact that the failure 
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was expected follows from inspection of DR, and R6'a shown below: 
R6'a When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the 
system to generate the correct digital message stream sequence, messdig, at 
the output of AOS'. 
R6'a requires the correct operation of the selection mechanism, whilst DR ensures 
safe operation by muting audio if there is a discrepancy between the selection and 
the message output functions. Therefore, when the R6'a predicate is applied to 
the modified system architecture it produces a counterexample at the point where a 
message should be output but the mute is in operation due to an identified problem 
with the message id. The resolution requires R6'a to take due account of the derived 
requirement DR. This can be achieved by modifying R6'a to become: 
R6'aM When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the 
system to generate the correct digital message stream sequence, messdig, at 
the output of AOS', except when a discrepancy is identified with the message 
identifier. 
With this modification R6'aM and DR are consistent. This is demonstrated by 
proving that the modified predicate corresponding to R6'aM does not produce a 
counterexample. For example, the assert R6aM fragment shown below covers the 
"positive" behaviour showing that if there is no problem with the message identifier 
id, then mute is off (noo) and the systems outputs the correct message. 
assert R6a1 {all tl, t2, t3 : Time I (t3 - prev[t2] kk 
FA. mute. tl = noo U FA. mute. t3 - noo St FA. mute. t2 - noo kk 
ti in prevs[t2] kk FD. status. ti - catnon kk 
ti - prev[prev[t2]] -> AOS. mes. t2 - meal) 
kk 
*** Similar terms for catsys, sysnon and non 0#0 } 
The proof work was extended to the other aspects of the requirements to demon 
strate that the requirements model satisfied them, and that they were consistent- 
184 
This validated that the functional requirements R6'a, R6'c, R6'd and DR of R6' 
were satisfied, demonstrating that the revised model satisfies it functional behaviour 
requirements. 
After this PSA application it has been demonstrated that the specification (R7') 
satisfies its requirements, including its safety requirements, and the requirements 
are known to be consistent. 
6.4 Discussion 
The POSE safety pattern was identified and introduced to manage the early phases 
of a safety development process in section 6.1. The Audio Warning System case 
study of section 6.3 demonstrated the successful use of the pattern on a realistic 
example, and also showed that it was capable of supporting the PSA as part of 
the IPDP SDR in section 6.3.4. The PSA at SDR supports the goal of achieving 
an appropriately early safety analysis which provides strong evidence to mitigate 
[Late13]. Further, the pattern diagram of Figure 6.1 and its associated Agenda 
description of Table 6.1 were found to be useful ways of representing what needs to 
be done to successfully apply the POSE safety pattern. 
The FAS case study PSA work reported in section 6.3.4, section 6.3.6 and sec- 
tion 6.3.7 also demonstrated the successful use of the safety analysis approach in- 
troduced in section 5.2 - providing further mitigation for [Late13] with respect to 
its aspects concerned with effective analysis. 
The formal modelling work discussed in section 6.3.4 and section 6.3.6 further 
demonstrated that POSE integrates well with Alloy. In particular the Alloy formal 
model can be derived directly from the POSE software problem using a systematic 
process. The validation followed the sequence of validating the specification, then 
the requirement and then considering the functional safety requirements. In the case 
study these were included in the requirement, but the formal model could be used 
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to investigate and prove formal safety properties. Further, this work also showed 
the advantages of using a four-part process in applying the formal modelling: 
1. use simulation to develop the model and gain confidence it has the required 
behaviour; 
2. perform formal proof to validate the model; 
3. use the model to prove safety properties (if necessary) 
4. investigate any specific problem areas using simulation. 
This process is efficient because the more expensive proof work is only undertaken 
once simulation has provided confidence in the efficacy of the model. The work 
also showed how the Alloy model could be derived directly from the POSE problem 
model structure using a systematic, repeatable process. In fact this process has been 
used subsequently at the Company to develop a large number of Alloy models to 
provide formal validation evidence in support of a number of POSE safety pattern 
applications. The results obtained from applying this formal analysis shows that 
POSE and Alloy are a good, effective combination for performing this early life cycle 
phase work since they: provide an effective, successful safety analysis supporting the 
mitigation of [Late13]; use the same model as the development, supporting property 
[SameAl]; use a formal process satisfying property [FormalA2] and provide strong 
validation evidence in mitigation of [Valid16] and the property Validation. 
The FAS case study also demonstrated how the POSE problem transformation 
graph (e. g., see Figure 6.7) can be used to represent the sequence of problem trans- 
formation steps involved in transforming a complex problem into a simpler one for 
analysis, and how this can be used to assist with backtracking, providing support 
for property [TraceI4]. This simplification using the PPT reported in section 6.3.3 
and section 6.3.5 provides support for property Simplification. 
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The case study did not demonstrate tool support for POSE, but it did provide 
further evidence that POSE integrates well with Alloy to provide a powerful devel- 
opment toolset, providing further evidence for property Tool Support. The case 
study also demonstrated that the POSE safety pattern integrates well within IPDP 
(see section 6.3.1 and section 6.3.2) in support of property [IntegA3] and property 
Integrates. 
Following the POSE safety pattern means that Activity 1, based on the Initial 
Problem step, is completed before starting Activity 2 (Solution Interpretation and 
Expansion step), which ensures that a comprehensive understanding of the problem 
space (environment context and requirement) is obtained before starting to develop 
a solution architecture. The approach used for the FAS case study in section 6.3.1 
was similar to the approach used for the DC case study which is detailed in sec- 
tion 4.1.2.1, section 4.1.3.1, section 4.1.3.2 and section 4.2. This provides strong 
evidence for the mitigation of the first two issues of understanding the environment 
context ([Envirl l]) and requirements acquisition ([Requ12] ). It also strongly sup- 
ports property Context. 
The FAS case study in section 6.3.1 used the same approach as the DC case 
study reported in section 4.1.2.2, section 4.1.3.2, and section 4.1.3.3. Therefore, 
it also provides evidence to support the property Avoid Bias. Similarly, the FAS 
case study in section 6.3.1 used the same approach as the DC case study reported in 
section 4.1.2.2 and section 4.1.3.1, thus also providing support for property Model 
Reality. The FAS case study in section 6.3.2 covering Activity 2 of the pattern, 
used the same approach as the DC case study reported in section 4.3 and this 
supports the Architecture property. 
The case study work also provided support for the mitigation of [IncomI5l con- 
cerning task incompleteness with respect to the use of the POSE safety pattern 
and Problem Transformation steps. The FAS case study formal validation work, 
reported in section 6.3.4.2 and section 6.3.7, directly supports the mitigation of [Re- 
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qu12] concerning sound, consistent and complete requirements as well as [Va1id16] 
and property Validation. In addition, the derivation of a validated formal spec- 
ification provides support for property Spec. Join. Care was taken in the FAS 
case study work to ensure that the requirements were at an appropriate level of 
abstraction (section 6.3.1) and the successful PSA and validation work reported in 
sections 6.3.4-6.3.7 provide support for property Right Abstraction. 
The successful application of the POSE safety pattern in conjunction with the 
formal safety analysis and validation provide strong evidence concerning the feasi- 
bility of the requirements model and specification that results from the work. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
The primary goal of this chapter was to introduce the POSE safety pattern and 
through the FAS case study demonstrate how it can be used to derive a specification 
that is capable of satisfying its requirement - including the safety requirements 
allocated to it. The case study also demonstrated that the POSE safety pattern 
could be used as part of the IPDP to mitigate the issue [Latel3]. In addition 
this chapter discussed mitigation and support for the other two outstanding items 
- as shown in the Chapter 5 column of Table 6.4 - namely [Incoml5] and Tool 
Support. 
As in previous chapters, the top portion of Table 6.4 refers to the capabilities 
identified in Table 2.3. The FAS case study work has provided supporting evidence 
for the Context, Architecture, Avoid Bias, Model Reality, Validation, Integrates, 
Spec. Join, Simplification and Right Abstraction properties identified in Table 2.3. 
The case study also shows that POSE works well with Alloy, providing some indirect 
supporting evidence for Tool Support. The meaning of "e", "ee", "E" etc. is as 
defined in section 4.6. 
The lower portion of Table 6.4 demonstrates that the case studies (DC, SMS and 
188 
Property/Issue Previous Work Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 
Context [41,87] e ee E 
Architecture [41,87] e ee E 
Spec. Join [39,83] - e ee 
Avoid Bias [39] e ee E 
Model Reality - e ee E 
Validation - e ee E 
Simplification [41,87] e ee E 
Tool Support [35,87] - - e 
Right Abstraction [41,87] e ee E 
Integrates [88] e ee E 
NecessaryP [41,83] - e ee 
SameAl [88] e ee E 
FormalA2 [41,88] - e ee 
IntegA3 - e ee E 
Envirll [87,88] e ee E 
Requ12 [87,88] e ee E 
Late13 [85,88] - e ee 
Trace14 [85,88] - e ee 
Incoml5 - - - e 
Valid16 [88] - e ee 
Table 6.4: Evidence Status for POSE after Chapter 6 
FAS) have provided evidence to satisfy the properties [NecessaryP], [SameAl], 
[FormalA2] and [IntegA3] identified in section 3.4.5. Further, these case studies 
have also provided evidence to mitigate the issues [Envirll], [Requ12], [Latel3], 
[TraceI4], [Incoml5] and [Valid16] also from section 3.4.5. 
In conclusion the FAS case study demonstrates that the POSE safety pattern, 
incorporating the other POSE extensions described in this chapter and in Chapter 5, 
can support a formal development process that is suitable for safety critical system 
development. 
The contribution of this thesis to the knowledge concerning POSE and its use 
is summarised in Table 6.5. The "Reference" column refers to section numbers 
unless otherwise stated, and pattern refers to the POSE safety pattern introduced 
in section 6.1. 
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Property Contribution Description Reference 
POSE Safety 
Pattern 
Pattern developed by this work provides a 
structure that supports safety development 
6.1 
6.3 
[Latel3] Pattern supports mitigation of issue 6.1,6.3.4 
[Valid16] Pattern mitigates validation to issue 6.3.4,6.3.7 
[Envirll] Pattern Activityl mitigates issue 6.3.1 
[Requ12] Pattern Activityl mitigates issue 6.3.1 
Context Pattern Activityl supports property 6.3.1 
Avoid Bias Pattern Activityl supports property 6.3.1 
Model Reality Pattern Activityl supports property 6.3.1 
Validation Pattern Activityl supports property 6.3.1 
Architecture Pattern Activity2 supports property 6.3.2 
[NecessaryP] Pattern Activity3/4 supports property 6.3.3,6.3.4, 
6.3.6,6.3.7 
Spec. Join Pattern Activity3/4 supports property 6.3.3,6.3.4, 
6.3.6,6.3.7 
Simplification Pattern Activity3 supports property 6.3.3,6.3.5 
[SameAl] Pattern Activity4 supports property 6.3.4 
[FormalA2] Pattern Activity4 supports property 6.3.4,6.3.6,6.3.7 
[TraceI4] Pattern Backtracking mitigates issue. 6.3.5 
[IncomI5] Pattern activities mitigate issue. 6.2.1,6.3.2,6.3.5 
[IntegA3] The FAS analysis provides evidence 6.4 
Right Abstraction The FAS analysis provides evidence 6.4 
Integrates The FAS analysis provides evidence 6.4 
Tool Support The FAS analysis provides evidence 6.2.2,6.4 
Table 6.5: Thesis Contribution Summary: Chapter 6 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The aim and objectives of this work were discussed in section 1.2 and concern the 
following. The overall aim of this work is to show that the early phases of a devel- 
opment process suitable for embedded safety systems development can be enhanced 
such that it allows a requirement model to be produced early in the development 
process, a specification to be derived from this model, and the safety feasibility of 
this model to be evaluated. The end result is a model that is known to be able 
to satisfy its safety requirements and thus forms a good basis for the rest of the 
development. 
The overall aim was addressed by evaluating POSE, and the extensions intro- 
duced by this work, against two objectives. The first involved considering whether 
the extended POSE could address the ten SSSD approach properties identified in 
the literature review of Chapter 2 and summarised in Table 2.3. This first objective 
is discussed in section 7.1. 
The second objective was to demonstrate that the extended POSE could be 
used to improve the early phases of an existing safety development process (IPDP) 
by evaluating it against a further four properties and six issues summarised in sec- 
tion 3.4.5. These latter properties and issues were targeted at improving the existing 
IPDP which is used to develop the type of embedded avionics safety systems that 
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are of interest to this work. This second objective is considered in section 7.2, with 
additional supporting evidence from an industrial case study discussed in section 7.3. 
The overall conclusion of this work is given in section 7.6. 
7.1 Investigation of the ten SSSD Approach Prop- 
erties 
The final section 2.5 of Chapter 2 defined ten desirable properties (see Table 2.3) 
that an SSSD approach targeted at the early phases of the development of real-time 
safety systems should possess. The extent to which POSE satisfied these properties 
was evaluated in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 using existing published work, 
analysis and case study evidence as appropriate. How POSE addressed each of these 
ten properties will now be summarised in turn. In the following, step will be used 
to indicate the problem transformation step concept introduced in section 4.1.4.2, 
pattern will be used to indicate the POSE safety pattern introduced in section 6.1 
and the SSSD approaches are those reviewed in section 2.3. 
7.1.1 The property Context 
The property Context is concerned with ensuring that an approach is capable of 
acquiring information that supports a comprehensive understanding of the system 
environment context which can adequately support the system development activ- 
ities. This property is related to the concept of understanding the problem before 
attempting the solution and is therefore a fundamental aspect of the problem ori- 
ented approaches like POSE. It was identified from the Parnas 4-variable based 
SSSD approaches (Parnas Table, SCR, SpecTRM, AMBERS, PFS), and is also an 
important part of AdLS, and KAOS. It also has much support in the published 
literature [54,82,121,127]. 
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The concept of "context" is a key component of POSE and one way this is 
indicated is by the existence of a CONTEXT INTERPRETATION transformation, and 
which is carried through into its use in the Initial Problem step and as Activity 1 
in the pattern. The first part of the DC case study (section 4.1.2.1) was concerned 
with collecting information about the environment context and this information 
was used in the application of the CONTEXT INTERPRETATION transformation in 
section 4.1.3.1 to introduce the context into the initial problem as part of the Initial 
Problem step detailed in section 4.2. The Initial Problem step was also used in the 
SMS (section 5.5.1) and FAS (section 6.3.1) case studies, so these provide further 
evidence to support the property. Further, the successful application of the PPT 
relies on an accurate understanding of the useful behaviour relation of the domain 
to be progressed (part of the problem context), since this becomes the assumption 
which is used as part of the validation of the PPT step. 
In conclusion, the property of Context is addressed by POSE and the use of the 
pattern, and there is significant evidence in the thesis to demonstrate that POSE 
supports this property as indicated by Table 7.1. 
7.1.2 The property Architecture 
The property Architecture is the capability of an approach to structure the de- 
velopment model so as to resolve architectural issues. All of the reviewed SSSD 
approaches support this property and there is also support for it in the published 
literature [82]. 
The existence of SOLUTION INTERPRETATION and SOLUTION EXPANSION trans- 
formations highlight the importance of this property to POSE. This is consolidated 
in the Solution Interpretation and Expansion step (Activity 2 of the pattern) which 
allows candidate solution architectures to 
be evaluated - refer to section 4.3. 
The Solution Interpretation and Expansion step was used in all of the case studies 
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to introduce candidate system architectures: the DC in section 4.3, the SMS in 
section 5.5.1, and the FAS in section 6.3.2. Further, this step was used again in the 
DC and FAS case studies to introduce modified architectures to solve the identified 
problems (DC in section 5.3 and the FAS in section 6.3.5). 
In conclusion, the property Architecture is addressed in POSE and the use of 
the POSE safety pattern, and there is significant evidence in the thesis from the 
three case studies to demonstrate that POSE supports this property as indicated by 
Table 7.1. 
7.1.3 The property Spec. Join 
The property Spec. Join covers the ability of an approach to span both the problem 
space and the solution space. That is, the approach satisfies the property if it 
can develop the specification from the requirements in the problem space and then 
develop the solution from the specification in the solution space. This property is 
supported by all the SSSD approaches and in the published literature [121]. 
The POSE transformations CONTEXT INTERPRETATION and REQUIREMENT IN- 
TERPRETATION show the POSE capabilities in the problem space, whilst SOLUTION 
INTERPRETATION demonstrates some of the POSE capabilities in the solution space. 
The PPT work in section 5.1.2 showed that POSE can be used to derive a validated 
specification from requirements in context. This was demonstrated for a non-formal 
development in the DC case study of section 5.1.3 and section 5.4, and for for- 
mal developments in the SMS and FAS cases studies of sections 5.5.3-5.5.5 and 
section 6.3.3 respectively, and also in the rework of the FAS in sections 6.3.5--6.3.7. 
As noted in section 2.6, the main focus of this work has been the early phases of 
the development process, hence it was classed as "ee" in Table 6.4. However, when 
the results of this work are considered together with the published POSE literature 
that shows how a POSE derived specification can be used to develop a solution (e. g., 
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[41,39]), we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that POSE 
supports this property. Therefore it is classed as "E" - significant evidence - in 
Table 7.1. 
7.1.4 The property Avoid Bias 
The property Avoid Bias relates to the avoidance of structures in the problem 
development that result in unnecessary and/or inappropriate constraints on the 
solution. The importance of this property is highlighted in the published literature 
[133,16], and as detailed in section 2.5.2, avoiding solution bias is a characteristic of 
the PO approaches, which stress the importance of fully understanding the problem 
before designing a solution, and of expressing requirements solely in terms of the 
context phenomena. 
The detailed presentation concerning REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION in sec- 
tion 4.1.2.2 and section 4.1.3.2, and introducing the solution in section 4.1.3.3 on 
the DC case study provide evidence to show that POSE supports this property. 
Further evidence is provided by the SMS case study in section 5.5.1 and the FAS 
case study discussion (section 6.4) which refers to section 6.3.1. The conclusion is 
that there is good evidence to show that POSE supports this property as indicated 
by Table 7.1. 
7.1.5 The property Model Reality 
The property Model Reality is the ability of the approach to represent the problem 
in terms of the phenomena, relations and concepts that exist in the real world. All 
the SSSD approaches support this property to some degree, it is supported in the 
literature [133,16], and the concept of designating descriptions and phenomena in 
the real world is an important aspect of POSE 
(section 2.5.2). 
For the DC case study the REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION work detailed in 
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section 4.1.2.2 and the context mapping discussed in section 4.1.3.1 provide evidence 
to support this property. Further evidence is provided by the SMS case study 
in section 5.5.1 and the FAS case study discussion (section 6.4) which refers to 
section 6.3.1. The conclusion is that there is good evidence to show that POSE 
supports this property. 
7.1.6 The property Validation 
The property Validation is concerned with the ability of the approach to ensure that 
the right system is being produced by applying analysis to the models as they are de- 
veloped. All the SSSD approaches support this property, and some (e. g. SpecTRM, 
SCR, KAOS, AMBERS, PFS offer tool support for simulation and proof. There is 
also much support in the published literature including [122,16]. Validation is an 
important aspect of POSE through its notion of transformation justification. The 
PPT work in section 5.1.2 shows how problem progression can be validated using 
the useful behaviour relation of the domain to be progressed. The DC case study 
demonstrated this for a non-formal development in section 5.1.3, whilst the SMS 
case study provided evidence for a formal validation in section 5.5.5. The FAS 
case study provides further support for validation using a formal development in 
section 6.3.4.2 and section 6.3.7. Further, one of the purposes of the POSE safety 
pattern introduced in section 6.1 was to allow an early effective safety analysis that 
determined whether the system model was capable of satisfying its safety require- 
ments and would thus be a viable basis for the rest of the development. This safety 
validation was demonstrated on the FAS case study, and also in the PSA work re- 
ported for the DC and SMS case studies. The conclusion is that there is strong 
evidence to show that POSE (particularly in combination with Alloy) supports this 
property as indicated by Table 7.1. 
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7.1.7 The property Simplification 
The property Simplification is the ability of the approach to manage complexity 
by structuring the problem, so that large complex problems can be broken down 
into smaller problems that are easier to solve. The SSSD approaches recognise the 
importance of this property, although only KAOS, AdLS and to a lesser extent 
AMBERS offer process support. There is also much published literature including 
[69,16). 
The DC case study in section 5.4 and the SMS case study in section 5.5.2 provide 
evidence that POSE supports this property. Problem Simplification is Activity 3 in 
the POSE safety pattern used in the FAS case study and this involves application 
of the PPT to make the problem of deriving a specification easier to solve (refer 
to section 6.3.3 and section 6.3.5). In conclusion, the case study results provide 
sufficient evidence to show that POSE supports the property Simplification as 
indicated by Table 7.1. 
7.1.8 The property Tool Support 
The property Tool Support relates to the efficiency, error-avoidance and repeata- 
bility advantages that can accrue if the approach has adequate tool support. Most 
of the SSSD approaches offer tool support and the desirability of tool support is 
noted in the published literature, e. g., 
[96,45,90]. As noted in the discussion in 
section 6.2.2, although POSE does not provide any tool support directly, this is mit- 
igated by the ability of using POSE models within other tools, like Alloy. The FAS 
case study provided further evidence to support this view. In conclusion, although 
POSE would benefit from its own tool support, the ability of its models to be used 
within other tools means it is feasible to use it as part of the development process. 
This is an area that would benefit from further work, for example the development 
of the proof-of-concept tool mentioned in section 
6.2.2 would be a useful improve- 
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ment - this will be discussed further in Chapter 8- hence this property is "e" in 
Table 7.1. 
7.1.9 The property Right Abstraction 
The property Right Abstraction is the ability of the approach to operate at 
the level of detail appropriate to the problem at hand. For example the approach 
should be able to describe the range from high level requirements through to detailed 
specifications. The importance of this property is noted in the published literature, 
e. g., [82,711. 
Application of PSA to the POSE models in the case studies provide some evi- 
dence that POSE supports this property. Further support was provided by the DC 
case study in section 5.1.3 and the SMS case study in section 5.5.1. The discussion 
in section 6.4 indicates how support for this property is provided by the FAS case 
study. In conclusion, the case studies provide sufficient evidence that POSE does 
support this property as indicated by Table 7.1. 
7.1.10 The property Integrates 
The property Integrates is concerned with the ability of the approach to work and 
integrate with an existing development process. The DC case study work reported 
in section 4.5.2 indicated that the POSE transformations could be integrated with 
the IPDP, but that further supporting evidence was required. The discussion in 
section 5.6 noted that the SMS case study provided evidence to support the view 
that POSE can integrate well with IPDP. Further evidence of good integration is 
provided by the FAS case study discussion in section 6.4. The conclusion is that 
POSE integrates well with the IPDP as indicated by Table 7.1. 
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7.2 Discussion of the IPDP Issues and Properties 
Chapter 3 described a successful process (IPDP) used to develop a variety of safety 
critical and safety related embedded real-time systems. Although IPDP has been 
successful, a number of issues with it and possible improvements to it have been 
identified through its use. These were identified in the chapter as six issues and four 
properties. The extent to which POSE can mitigate these issues and support these 
properties will now be discussed for each of them. 
7.2.1 Mitigation for Issue [Envirll] 
The first of the six IPDP issues, [Envirll], concerns the risk that insufficient un- 
derstanding of the system context increases the risk of later rework: 
[Envirll]: Incomplete understanding of the system context increases 
risk of rework. 
In the past this has allowed ambiguity and lack of detail in the descriptions to 
result in misinterpretations of the design concept and further, an adequate safety 
analysis requires that the system environment is sufficiently understood. This issue 
is closely related to the property Context discussed in section 7.1.1, which details 
how understanding the environment context is a fundamental concept in POSE. 
From an IPDP perspective the context understanding work corresponds to the 
CE phase. For example, in the DC case study the initial understanding work (sec- 
tion 4.1.2.1 and Appendix A. 2) occurs at the beginning of the CE phase and this is 
refined and developed as the various CE phase tasks are completed leading to the 
use of the CONTEXT INTERPRETATION transformation to introduce context into the 
problem to form PD,,,. (section 4.1.3.1). 
Towards the end of the CE phase work 
further understanding of the domains resulted in a series of additional CONTEXT 
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INTERPRETATION transformations that transformed the problem into PD,,,, - these 
were validated by review. A similar process was followed in the SMS case study 
(section 5.5.1, discussed in section 5.6) and in the FAS case study (section 6.3.1 Ac- 
tivity 1 of the POSE safety pattern, discussed in section 6.4). In conclusion, POSE 
and the POSE safety pattern provide significant mitigation concerning this issue as 
indicated by Table 7.1. 
7.2.2 Mitigation for Issue [Requ12] 
The second of the six IPDP issues, [Requ12], concerns the risk of rework associated 
with not adequately understanding and acquiring the requirements: 
[Requ12]: Incomplete requirements increases risk of rework. 
This increases the risk that the right system is not being produced and it has 
been observed following IPDP that the detailing of the requirements allocations 
and transformations do not always produce requirements that are feasible, nor are 
they necessarily sound, consistent or complete. 
The issue [Requ12] is concerned with understanding the customer requirement. 
For example, in the DC case study the work begins in the IPDP CE phase (see 
section 4.1.2.2 and Appendix A. 2) where the requirement is elicited and developed 
in conjunction with the customer. As system understanding increases the require- 
ment is developed accordingly. In the case study a REQUIREMENT INTERPRETA- 
TION transformation was used to introduce the initial requirement, RDC, into the 
problem. This was developed into Rdc through a series of further REQUIREMENT IN- 
TERPRETATION transformations as detailed in section 4.1.3.2 as the tasks in the CE 
phase were progressed and the Dem/Val phase started (refer to Appendix A. 3). The 
Initial Problem work in the SMS case study (section 5.5.1, discussed in section 5.6) 
and the FAS case study (section 6.3.1 Activity 1 of the POSE safety pattern, dis- 
cussed in section 6.4) provide further supporting evidence. In conclusion, POSE 
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and the POSE safety pattern provide significant mitigation concerning this issue as 
indicated by Table 7.1. 
7.2.3 Mitigation for Issue [Late13] 
The risk of rework caused by performing the safety analysis relatively late in the 
development life cycle was captured as the third IPDP issue: 
[Late13]: Late effective safety analysis increases risk of rework. 
Developing the capability to perform an effective safety analysis earlier in the (IPDP) 
development process was one of the major drivers for this work. An effective analysis 
requires an accurate understanding of the context, the requirement and an appro- 
priate model to analyse (see section 3.2.3, section 3.3.4 and section 2.2.2). The work 
in section 5.2 indicated how an improved PSA could be achieved for non-formal 
(section 5.2.1.1) and formal (section 5.2.1.2) developments using the POSE problem 
model available after problem progression (PRe). The DC case study demonstrated 
the process for a non-formal development in section 5.2.2, whilst the SMS case study 
demonstrated the process for a formal development using POSE and Alloy in sec- 
tion 5.5.5. The FAS case study demonstrated how a formal PSA could be conducted 
as a result of following the POSE safety pattern 
in section 6.3.4 and in sections 6.3.6- 
6.3.7. The work demonstrated that an effective safety analysis can be achieved as 
long as PR,. c is available. 
In the original DC development (Appendix A. 3) FFA was applied during the 
Dem/Val phase, but this missed an issue - HAZOPS was not applied until Prelimi- 
nary Design in the EMD phase. In section 4.4 
PSA was applied using FFA and FTA, 
whilst in section 5.2.2 a combination of FFA, 
HAZOPS and FTA were used. The 
latter required that the context (domains and phenomena) and requirement infor- 
mation was available to support a HAZOPS. 
The information collected to support 
the development from Pn,. 11 through to PR, a ensured that the required information 
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was available. The work in section 6.1 noted that by structuring the IPDP tasks 
through the use of the POSE safety pattern then it could be ensured that the nec- 
essary information to support a comprehensive PSA (i. e., one using the techniques 
introduced in section 5.2) could be made available at the end of the Dem/Val phase, 
prior to the SDR. This work demonstrates that an effective safety analysis can be 
applied at an earlier part of the IPDP (end of Dem/Val, prior to SDR) than was 
achieved with the existing IPDP (after SDR). 
The results of the revised DC case study in Appendix H provides further evi- 
dence to corroborate that this property has been satisfied - this additional evidence 
progresses the "ee" in Table 6.4 to "E" in Table 7.1. The conclusion is that POSE 
and the POSE safety pattern provide significant, evidence to mitigate this issue. 
7.2.4 Mitigation for Issue [TraceI4] 
The fourth IPDP issue, [TraceI4], concerns traceability incompleteness and can be 
split into two main themes: traceability of requirements through the design, and the 
ability to trace back through a design to establish what information can be re-used 
and what needs to be developed, including the ability to know where to trace back 
to. 
[TraceI4] : Traceability incompleteness increases risk of rework. 
The ability to support iteration is also considered a form of traceability issue by this 
work. 
The work in Section 5.3 introduced an enhanced problem transformation trace 
graph as a graphical representation of the relationship between the software prob- 
lem descriptions and their associated requirements transformations - an example is 
shown in Figure 5.4. This graphical form allows the path of the requirements trans- 
formations to be traced from the original high level system requirements through to 
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the detailed requirements that directly support the specification derivation, based 
on the software problem transformation sequence. 
The work on the DC case study in section 5.3 provides strong evidence that both 
aspects of the issue [Tracel4] are mitigated by the POSE transformations and use 
of the pattern. The graph was also used in the SMS case study (section 5.5.2) to 
represent the development and simplification (problem progression) sequence from 
Pj, a; t; aj to PRC. The graph in 
Figure 6.7 performed a similar role on the FAS case 
study, except it was also used to assist with the backtracking (see section 6.3.5). 
In conclusion, the POSE and POSE safety pattern provides good evidence to mit- 
igate this issue although more development work of these traceability techniques is 
required to realise their full potential - this will be discussed further in Chapter 8- 
hence this issue is "ee" in Table 7.1. 
7.2.5 Mitigation for Issue [Incoml5] 
The fifth IPDP issue concerns the problems associated with not completing all of 
the work items associated with a task and was captured as: 
[IncomI5] : Task incompleteness increases risk of rework. 
Task incompleteness includes the problems associated with tailoring out (removing) 
tasks from the schedule. 
The FAS case study in section 6.3 demonstrated that the POSE safety pattern 
organised the development tasks such that a successful PSA could be applied before 
the end of the Dem/Val phase. The pattern activities ensure that, at a high level, all 
the necessary tasks to support the formation and feasibility/validation checking of a 
problem model are undertaken and in the correct sequence. Further, each activity is 
associated with a problem transformation step which ensures that all the necessary 
tasks associated with that activity are completed. For example, PSI on page 91 
includes the justifications for the transformation sequence (J1 = Ja A Js A Jc ), and the 
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necessary concerns/claims/evidence that the interpretations are well-founded, the 
system architecture is feasible, sound judgement followed and important equipment 
has the necessary reliability. 
Inspection of the problem transformation steps shows each is associated with a 
set of concern/claim/evidence elements that validate a particular concern associ- 
ated with the use of that step, and this mechanism could be developed further to 
ensure that the necessary tasks to support a transformation step are included in the 
structure used for that step. In conclusion this thesis work has demonstrated that 
the POSE safety pattern and the problem transformation steps it uses provide some 
evidence to mitigate this issue, but that further opportunities exist to improve this 
mitigation further - these will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8- hence this 
issue is "e" in Table 7.1. 
7.2.6 Mitigation for Issue [Validl6] 
Validation is a key part of the development process and is captured as the sixth 
IPDP issue as: 
[Valid16]: Validation incompleteness increases the risk of rework. 
Validation includes validating that the requirement (as it is interpreted through the 
development) meets the customer's expectations, i. e., that the right system is being 
developed. 
The PPT for safety systems introduced in section 5.1.2 and the SMS case study 
provide mitigation for this issue. Further, the Validation property considered in 
section 7.1.6 shows how POSE supports validation in a general sense, but validation 
is also an important feature of IPDP and features prominently in all the phases. 
The POSE safety pattern organises the POSE problem transformation steps so they 
integrate with their associated IPDP tasks to ensure that an effective PSA and 
a specification can be derived prior to SDR. This is discussed in section 6.1 and 
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demonstrated in the FAS case study in section 6.3 - particularly the validation work 
in section 6.3.4.2 and section 6.3.7. The work in section 6.3.7 demonstrates that the 
problem model satisfies its requirements, satisfies its safety requirements and the 
requirements are shown to be consistent. In addition, the revised DC case study 
in Appendix H provides further evidence to mitigate this issue. This additional 
evidence progresses the "ee" in Table 6.4 to "E" in Table 7.1. In conclusion, this 
thesis work has shown that POSE and the POSE safety pattern provide significant 
mitigation for this issue. 
7.2.7 Support for [NecessaryP] 
The necessary property identified in Chapter 3, [NecessaryP], requires that: 
[NecessaryP] : The approach used must be capable of deriving design 
specification. 
which is a necessary feature of any approach to be used in the early phases of embed- 
ded system development. The POSE PPT developed in section 5.1.2 demonstrated 
how problem progression could be applied to remove domains to simplify a problem 
under certain conditions: that causal relations among phenomena are identified and 
used to establish assumptions in the derived requirements; that only domains whose 
phenomena are adjacent to the requirement are the subject of progression. The 
first criterion is reasonable for the real-time embedded avionics systems that are the 
subject of this work, and the second follows from the application of the POSE safety 
pattern which ensures progression (Activity 3) follows after Activity 2. The output 
of Activity 2 is a model (called PEA in the case studies) in which the requirement 
is well understood, interpreted, validated and at the right level of abstraction, thus 
forming an appropriate candidate requirement for the initial progression. The PPT 
then removes the domains in turn, each time re-interpreting the requirement into 
an appropriate form and capturing the useful behaviour relation of the progressed 
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domain as an assumption. This allows the new requirement to be validated against 
the original requirement through the assumption. 
The work in section 5.1.3 demonstrated the use of the PPT to simplify a non- 
formal development problem, where the validation was completed using an informal 
review process. In the SMS case study of section 5.5 the PPT was applied in a 
formal development, and the final step was formally evaluated (i. e., that the derived 
specification satisfied the requirement of the problem model PRCd) in section 5.5.5. 
A formal approach based on simulation and proof was used in the FAS case study 
to validate that the specification derived from the repeated application of the PPT 
(Activity 3 of the POSE safety pattern) satisfied its requirement - refer to sec- 
tions 6.3.3-6.3.4 and also sections 6.3.5-6.3.7 for the rework. In addition, the revised 
DC case study in Appendix H provides further evidence to support this property. 
This additional evidence progresses the "ee" in Table 6.4 to "E" in Table 7.1. In 
conclusion this thesis work has provided significant evidence to demonstrate that 
POSE and the POSE safety pattern support this property. 
7.2.8 Support for [SameAl] 
The desirable property that promotes efficient analysis identified in Chapter 3, 
[SameAl], requires that: 
[SameAl]: The safety analysis uses the same model as the rest of the 
development. 
In the DC case study the PSA was applied to the PE, model in section 4.4 and 
to the PRd model in section 5.2.2. In both cases the PSA model was the same as 
the development model. The SMS case study in section 5.5.5 and the FAS case 
study in section 6.3.4 and sections 6.3.6-6.3.7 provide further evidence to support 
this property. In conclusion this thesis work has provided significant evidence to 
demonstrate that POSE supports this property as indicated by Table 7.1. 
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7.2.9 Support for [FormalA2] 
The desirable property that promotes effective analysis identified in Chapter 3, [For- 
malA2], requires that: 
[FormalA2]: The approach used should support formal development 
processes. 
The SMS case study in section 5.5 and the FAS case study in section 6.3 both 
provided strong evidence that POSE works well with the Alloy formal system, such 
that POSE problem models could be directly encoded into Alloy to allow formal 
validation and proof to be applied. That is, the thesis work showed a good synergy 
between the POSE problem model and the Alloy formal system, and this included 
the following features of note: 
1. an Alloy model formed directly from the structure of the POSE problem model 
(using domain and phenomena knowledge). 
2. a timing model for use with the Alloy simulation was developed to allow fine 
control over the setting of phenomena values. 
3. a four part analysis approach was developed based on: 
" the use of simulation to develop the model and gain confidence it has the 
intended operational behaviour; 
" the development of formal versions of the requirements and proof that 
the model satisfies them - the latter also validates consistency; 
" the development of safety properties (if required) and proof that the 
model satisfies them; 
" the use of simulation to explore problem situations, e. g., rapidly changing 
inputs. 
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In addition, the revised DC case study in Appendix H provides further evidence 
to support this property. In conclusion this thesis work has provided significant ev- 
idence to demonstrate that POSE in conjunction with Alloy supports this property. 
However, more work is required to evaluate how POSE operates with other formal 
techniques and this will be discussed further in Chapter 8 -- hence this property 
remains "ee" in Table 7.1. 
7.2.10 Support for [IntegA3] 
The desirable property that promotes an efficient development identified in Chap- 
ter 3, [SameAll, requires that: 
[IntegA3]: The approach used should integrate with IPDP. 
This property is directly related to the property Integrates covered in section 7.1.10, 
and the analysis presented there applies here. From an IPDP perspective, Table 4.3 
provides strong evidence that POSE integrates well with IPDP. This is confirmed in 
the Chapter 6 work on the POSE safety pattern and how it integrates with the IPDP 
(see section 6.1), and in the FAS case study which shows the successful application 
of the pattern. Finally, further evidence to support this property is provided by the 
industrial case study discussed in more detail below. In conclusion this thesis work 
has provided significant evidence to demonstrate that POSE supports this property 
as indicated by Table 7.1. 
7.3 Industrial Case Studies 
The development of the POSE safety pattern, summarised in section 6.1, and the 
successful use of it on the case study in section 6.3 provided enough confidence to 
use it in the form of the POSE/Alloy combination at the front end of a number 
of real development tasks. The first two examples were modules from the same 
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safety related LRU, the third was a full safety critical LRU system development 
of a stores management system (SMS). Further, the fact that this actual SMS was 
similar in structure to the SMS case study investigated in section 5.5 provided 
additional confidence for using the pattern. The goal in applying the pattern was to 
provide additional complementary evidence to support the normal IPDP activities 
and in particular to provide early evidence that the proposed design was capable of 
satisfying the safety properties identified for it. The pattern was applied during the 
IPDP Dem/Val phase and the safety analysis work was completed prior to SDR - 
thus satisfying the early safety analysis issue represented by [Late131. 
The first trial of the POSE safety pattern involved modelling two safety related 
modules of a communications control and routing function in a fast jet aircraft - these 
being the control module and the warning tones module (WTM). The POSE/Alloy 
modelling of the control module identified some requirements issues which were 
subsequently resolved. The modelling of the WTM identified a shortfall in the 
safety analysis task which was addressed. The WTM consisted of 41 requirements 
(excluding BIT), of which 27 of these were functional requirements. The POSE 
safety pattern was applied to these functional requirements and this produced an 
initial POSE safety problem description to which problem simplification was applied 
to allow the specification of the WTM to be derived directly. The latter was used 
to form an Alloy model which had a total of nine phenomena and the four-part 
process described in section 6.4 was applied. The POSE modelling of the WTM 
from first read of the requirements document through to being ready to begin the 
Alloy modelling process took one day of effort. Setting up and validating the Alloy 
simulation model took a further day of effort and this was followed by just under 
two days of effort to perform the proof and safety analysis tasks - about four days 
in all. The control module had a few more requirements, more phenomena (14) 
and a more complicated behaviour, but this was still fully analysed in just over a 
week (five days) of effort. The usual IPDP effort for this work was one to two days 
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to perform an in-depth manual review of the document, but this standard IPDP 
approach did not identify the issues. 
The third trial of the POSE safety pattern "in the real" was the full modelling 
of a SMS development - this was a much larger enterprise being based on a 26 page 
Z model and involving 30 phenomena. Due to the complexity of the behaviour, 
the Alloy modelling was partitioned into a number of major functional areas to 
avoid memory resource problems with the simulation work. The modelling work 
identified nine issues with the requirements and their interpretation, which were 
resolved before development progressed. The POSE/Alloy modelling effort took 
two weeks and this was run in conjunction with the normal (IPDP) development 
process. The normal process effort for this phase would have been two to three days 
- but this did not identify the nine anomalies! 
One of the complications in performing this work was overcoming the limitations 
imposed by the Alloy tool. The Alloy modelling was applied by successively adding 
functionality until the full behaviour was covered, but this increased complexity 
often resulted in the tool running out of memory resources as the number of tokens 
in the model increased. Strategies for addressing this problem included abstraction 
(e. g. combining phenomena with similar functionality to reduce the number of 
inputs) and slicing - where the overall functionality was broken down into its major 
functions, and these major function "slices" were modelled individually. As noted 
above, the latter was used on the SMS task. 
Unfortunately due to security and confidentiality reasons little of the detail con- 
cerning these industrial case studies can be recorded here, apart from the fact that in 
all three cases the application of the pattern prompted a series of questions concern- 
ing the interpretation and clarification of: the requirements, the proposed system 
architecture and the safety analysis. The answer to these questions improved the 
early modelling work, the key point being that to produce the simulation model 
required that much of the ambiguity in the textual requirements had to be resolved. 
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This improved the quality of the requirements and the integrity of the design based 
upon them, by ensuring (and validating) that the requirements modelled reality 
and avoided any implementation bias - thus addressing the properties Model Real- 
ity, Validation and Avoid Bias from Table 2.3. 
The industrial case studies also provided further strong evidence that POSE, 
through the use of the pattern, integrates well with the IPDP - thus satisfying the 
properties [IntegA3] (see section 3.4.5) and Integrates (from Table 2.3). The use 
of the pattern on the industrial case studies was carefully monitored to identify 
any task incompleteness issues. No such issues were identified and the conclusion 
was that the pattern, and the problem transformation step structure used in the 
pattern were very good at ensuring that all the necessary tasks were identified. 
Additional review items were added to the IPDP SDR review checklist to ensure 
that these identified tasks were successfully discharged. This work provided further 
direct supporting evidence for mitigating the issue [Incompl5]. 
Finally, this section has discussed the use of the pattern on actual industrial case 
study developments - where POSE was used in parallel to the actual development, 
but did provide safety analysis and evidence to support the early phases of the 
development. This demonstrated that POSE could be scaled up to support real 
development activities and that it did complement and improve the existing IPDP. 
7.4 Development Process Context 
Many developments have a target technology or group of technologies as an over- 
all approach since using well understood technologies can significantly reduce the 
overall project risks and is consistent with the normal design ideas discussed in 
section 1.1. This is the case at the author's Company, where the goal with the 
avionics developments is to use a hardware architecture consisting of processor and 
input/output card assemblies as the target technologies. The design function then 
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revolves around modifying the functionality to achieve the requirements, with the 
benefit that the underlying card assembly technology is well understood and known 
to be capable of success - significantly reducing unknowns and de-risking many as- 
pects of the project. Therefore such projects include elements of bottom-up as well 
as top-down in the development process. 
One of the advantages of using the POSE safety pattern is that it fits well with 
this approach of targeting known hardware architecture technologies through its use 
of the target machine specification, which defines the specification for the generic 
computing element which maps to the hardware processor card in the design. The 
POSE safety pattern aims to capture essential elements of the requirements and 
context, define the machine specification and validate that the high level system 
architecture represented by the POSE model is capable of satisfying its safety obli- 
gations. However it is used within the context of a top-down and bottom-up design 
approach. Further, although the derivation of the machine specification, S, from the 
requirement, R, using the entailment sequent W, S I- R is top-down, the validation 
from S to R is bottom-up. Basically the POSE safety pattern application is the first 
phase of a top-down/bottom-up process that seeks to map the users requirements 
into a well understood target hardware architecture technology. 
Further, the safety analysis associated with the application of the POSE safety 
pattern is essentially a de-risking exercise to validate that it is feasible to and hence 
worth continuing with the design process. As the development progresses more 
design decisions and target technology will be included into the design which will 
require further safety analysis to validate that it remains capable of satisfying its 
safety obligations. 
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7.5 Summary of Research Contribution 
The aim of this section is to consolidate and summarise my research contribution on 
using POSE in the early stages of a safety critical system development as detailed 
in this document. My research covers the three areas of: theory development, 
developing the means of application, and providing initial or partial validation of 
the approach. In more detail, my contribution has three main parts: 
" developing and extending the theory of Problem Orientation; 
" applying the extended theory in a safety critical engineering setting; 
" providing partial validation for the extended theory within that setting. 
Together these discharge my overall research aim (refer to section 1.2), which can 
be summarised as: 
"Improving the safety process by providing the means of applying safety 
analysis to the early stages of a development. " 
The validation is only initial or partial as more extensive case studies and trials are 
required before full validation of the approach is feasible. However, I would argue 
that the partial validation achieved is commensurate with the work associated with 
the thesis development. The latter consisting of the case studies and some industrial 
use (as reported in section 7.3) - hence it is termed part-validation in the remainder 
of this section and in Appendix I which provides 
further details on my contribution. 
7.5.1 Develop and extend the Theory 
POSE, as it was, was of mainly theoretical interest lacking evidence of its applica- 
bility and use on realistic examples that might validate its practical use. Firstly, it 
lacked any guidance as to which transformation to apply next. This made it un- 
suitable for real engineering. My first contribution was to extend the theory with 
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knowledge of how to sequence the transformations applied. This was the topic that 
was first published in FASE07 [87] and developed in subsequent papers. 
Secondly, at that time, there was a theoretical presentation of problem pro- 
gression along the lines suggested by Professor Jackson, but from an engineering 
perspective the details were sketchy. My second contribution was to provide de- 
tailed guidance as to how to use problem progressions for safety critical engineering 
- published in the FASE07 [87] paper for informal presentation, and developed in 
detail in the IWAAPF08 [83] paper. 
7.5.2 Demonstrate the applicability of the extended Theory 
When I started, other than for some toy examples, POSE was not extensively tested 
through application. My third contribution to knowledge is given by the develop- 
ment of case studies to test POSE's applicability and the applicability of the ex- 
tensions to POSE that I provided (of course, the process was iterative, and theory 
extension and application went hand in hand). 
There were three main case studies; all realistic, taken from practice and used in 
the published papers. All were retrospective but demonstrated that POSE could 
be 
applied in an engineering context and could find the issues of interest - as discussed 
in this thesis for the SMS case study. 
" FASE07 [87] - DC Case Study in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
" HASE07 [35] - DC Case Study in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
" SAFECOMP07 [86] -SMS Case Study in Chapter 5. 
" IET07 [85] - FAS Case Study in Chapter 6. 
" IWAAPF08 [83] - FAS Case Study in Chapter 6. 
" SSSO8 [88] -FAS Case Study in Chapter 6. 
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My fourth contribution to knowledge concerned applicability with respect to 
the Research Aim and included the development of safety analysis technique im- 
provements and the derivation of formal models based on the capabilities provided 
by extended POSE. This work also included developments to support the formal 
modelling work. 
7.5.3 Partial Validation of the extended theory in an engi- 
neering setting 
My fifth contribution to knowledge is the improvement of current engineering prac- 
tice. We have shown how the engineering extended POSE forms a good fit for IPDP, 
and we have assessed it as improving aspects of IPDP. As IPDP is typical of pro- 
cesses within the industry we consider that there is some evidence that such support 
can assist processes based on similar safety standards and regulatory frameworks. 
In a nutshell, the work has taken a promising theory and extended it to produce 
an approach suitable for improving the early phases of a safety development process. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this work was to demonstrate that POSE, with the extensions intro- 
duced in this work, could satisfy two main objectives. The first was that it could 
address the ten SSSD approach properties identified in section 2.5 and thus be used 
as an SSSD approach that is appropriate for safety system development. The sec- 
ond objective was that it could be used to improve the early phases of a typical 
safety development process by mitigating or overcoming issues identified with the 
requirements engineering aspects of the IPDP. The required enhancements to the 
IPDP were identified in section 3.4.5 in terms of six issues to be mitigated and four 
properties to be supported. The discussion points in section 7.1 provide sufficient 
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evidence to show that POSE and the POSE safety pattern address the ten SSSD 
approach properties and thus satisfy the first objective. The discussion points in 
section 7.2, with further supporting evidence from section 7.3, demonstrate that 
POSE and the POSE safety pattern adequately mitigate the issues and support the 
properties such that they do improve the early phases of the IPDP, and thus satisfy 
the second objective. The case study work also demonstrated that POSE could be 
used for non-formal and formal safety system developments. 
The work reported in [32] (see section 2.3.3) to provide enhancements to the 
Parnas 4-Variable model are compatible with the POSE approach presented in this 
document. In particular the "outside" enhancements described in [32] map well to 
the development of the POSE model, which also distinguishes the embedded system 
represented by the specification S, the environment context represented by W and 
the platform represented by the requirement R through the sequent W, SFR and 
handles the indirection issue through the non-feasible requirements mechanism. 
Inspection of the case study work shows that the POSE and Alloy combination 
were used successfully in the early phases of the development life cycle, which is 
consistent with when the "lightweight" PSSA identified in section 2.3.8 should be 
applied. Therefore, the work presented here could be integrated as the front-end of 
the FLM/FI approach outlined in [77]. 
The contribution that this work makes is summarised at the end of each of Chap- 
ter 4 (Table 4.5), Chapter 5 (Table 5.6) and Chapter 6 (Table 6.5), and is presented 
in more detail in section 7.5 and Appendix I. The contribution has three main 
parts: developing and extending the theory of Problem Orientation; applying the 
extended theory in a safety critical engineering setting; providing partial validation 
for the extended theory within that setting. The summaxy of the work presented 
in section 7.5, with further detail in Appendix I, is that POSE, as extended by the 
research work reported in this thesis, does satisfy the research objectives as listed 
in section 1.2 and thus satisfies the overall goal of: 
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"Improving the safety process by providing the means of applying safety 
analysis to the early stages of a development. " 
Property/Issue Previous Work Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter T 
Context [41,87] e ee E E 
Architecture [41,87] e ee E E 
Spec. Join [39,83] - e ee E 
Avoid Bias [39], [Ind-Case] e ee E E 
Model Reality [Ind-Case] e ee E E 
Validation [Ind-Case] e ee E E 
Simplification [41,87] e ee E E 
Tool Support [35,87] - - e e 
Right Abstraction [41,87] e ee E E 
Integrates [88], [Ind-Case] e ee E E 
NecessaryP [41,83] - e ee E 
SameAl [88] e ee E E 
FormalA2 [41,88] - e ee ee 
IntegA3 [Ind-Case] e ee E E 
Envirll [87,88] e ee E E 
Requ12 [87,88] e ee E E 
Latel3 [85,88] - e ee E 
Tracel4 [85,88] - e ee ee 
Incoml5 [Ind-Case] - - e e 
Valid16 [88] - e ee E 
Table 7.1: Final Evidence Status for POSE 
Table 7.1 provides the final evidence status for POSE, it extends Table 6.4 by 
including additional evidence from the industrial case studies reported in section 7.3 
(shown as [Ind-Case] under the "Previous Work" column), and the revised DC case 
study in Appendix H- where the entries for Simplification, NecessaryP and 
Late13 are further corroborated, as described in section 7.1 and section 7.2. This 
additional support is incorporated into Table 7.1. 
In conclusion, this work has demonstrated that POSE and the POSE safety 
pattern can be used in the early phases of a safety system development to produce 
a validated specification that can be subjected to a comprehensive safety analysis 
to show that it satisfies its identified safety properties, and thus forms a viable basis 
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The conclusion presented in Chapter 7 was that this work has demonstrated that 
POSE and the POSE safety pattern can be successfully used as an SSSD approach for 
developing safety systems and can also be used in conjunction with an existing safety 
development process to achieve improvements in the early development phases. The 
research work has identified a number of areas that would benefit from further 
investigation and these will now be discussed. 
The first area concerns the direct development of the Alloy formal model from 
the POSE requirements model that is formed by following the pattern. Alloy was 
selected for this work because it had the required capabilities, is easily available 
and has an active user community. However it is not the only candidate; as noted 
earlier in this work, the B-tool [111] has many positive characteristics, not the least 
being that it is being used in industry to address real safety problems. Further Z 
[116] is still being used actively for safety development work. Z has the advantage 
that it relates well to the Praxis SPARK toolset [7] (used with the IPDP) and is 
also well known to the high integrity development software engineers who use the 
IPDP. Therefore an important area of future work is to investigate the use of the 
pattern with other formal techniques used by the safety community to establish if 
a similar level of synergy can be achieved as that obtained from the POSE/Alloy 
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combination. A particularly important aspect is whether it is as easy to develop the 
formal models from the POSE requirements model. 
Related to this is the important area of tool support. A prototype POSE tool has 
been developed to support the POSE transformations and facilitate the development 
of a POSE requirements model. This could be further developed in a number of 
important areas to provide: facilities to support the correct use of the pattern could 
be built into the tool - including the step templates; checks to ensure that the 
necessary validation text has been entered for each of the problem transformation 
steps' could be included; facilities to produce Alloy code templates to facilitate 
the derivation of the Alloy model from the POSE requirements model could be 
developed. The output of the latter would be a text file containing the phenomena 
and predicate names - the analyst would then add the behavioural information. 
Experience of using the POSE safety pattern when feasibility issues are identified, 
indicates that the location of where to iterate back to follows easily from inspection 
of the problem transformation graph and that much of the original work can be re- 
used. This notion was explored in the Warning System FAS case study in Chapter 6, 
where it was shown that even in the problem transformation steps that needed to 
be updated (WPS2 and PrePSA) the changes were quite localised and most of 
the rest of the activities in the step could be read across from the original. The 
remaining steps could be re-used directly with only the additional phenomena and 
derived requirement needing to be added. Further work is required to demonstrate 
that these benefits are general, however the initial indications from this case study 
and other work are that this is a fruitful area for further research. Therefore in 
summary, when re-work is required the POSE safety pattern structure allows much 
of the original design and validation work to be re-used so that only the modified 
areas require re-work and the problem transformation step structure identifies these 
'This is likely only to be a syntactic check that text has been entered; but a useful check 
nevertheless. 
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areas clearly. This allows change to be enacted with minimal impact, making this 
iteration efficient. 
The discussion in section 7.2.5 noted how the POSE safety pattern and the prob- 
lem transformation steps it uses provide a structure that can be used to ensure that 
all the necessary tasks are started and in the correct sequence. That discussion also 
noted that the concern/claim/evidence mechanism can be used at a more detailed 
level to ensure that the necessary tasks to support a transformation step are in- 
cluded in the structure used for that step. Moreover, it was noted that each type 
of problem transformation step (e. g., an Initial Problem step or a PPT step) was 
associated with certain concerns and that the set of concerns was different for dif- 
ferent step types. For example, the PS1, SPS1 and WPS1 are all Initial Problem 
transformation steps and they have similar concerns. In contrast, PS1 and PS2 are 
different types of step and they have different concerns. This information could be 
used to produce problem transformation step templates for each of the steps used in 
the POSE safety pattern - namely the Initial Problem, Solution Interpretation and 
Expansion, PPT and PrePSA (used at end of Activity 3) steps. The concerns for 
each type of step would be included in its template, thus providing a further mech- 
anism for ensuring that all the necessary tasks are completed. Therefore exploring 
the development of problem transformation step templates would be a useful area 
for future work. 
The safety standards (refer to section 2.2) require a safety case to present the 
safety argument that the system being developed is safe for entry into service. In 
Europe, and increasingly further afield [34], GSN is the preferred way for presenting 
this safety argument (refer to section 2.2.1). Further, the standards expect the 
safety and development life-cycles to be appropriately integrated (e. g., [125]). The 
Assurance Based Development (ABD) approach [117,34] is a means of achieving 
this integration through the context of the safety argument, and the expectation is 
that the full benefits of using the POSE safety pattern will be achieved by following 
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ABD or a similar approach. 
A major advantage of integrating the safety case generation with the system 
development is that issues can be identified and mitigated as they arise [34], min- 
imising the impact on the development schedule. Finding problems later in the life 
cycle is always more expensive and problematic. Further, this integrated approach is 
both more efficient and effective [34], since it avoids the waste of producing evidence 
that does not support an argument (hence it is not needed), and in conjunction with 
the use of the concept of SALs (Safety Assurance Levels) [132], it provides sufficient 
evidence to support the safety argumentation. 
Determining system context accurately and completely is a major element of 
ABD [117], and this aspect conforms to Activity 1: Initial Problem Understanding 
of the POSE safety pattern. Evaluating candidate architectures is also an important 
part of ABD [34], which identifies seven criteria for determining the suitability of 
an architecture - including feasibility. This area is covered by Activity 2: Solution 
Interpretation and Expansion of the pattern, with the feasibility being checked by 
the pattern PSA. Further, ABD and the POSE safety pattern are complimentary in 
that they both allow the major effort to be focussed on the key safety areas. One of 
the problems with applying formal techniques is there is little incentive to use them 
if their benefits (in supporting the safety argument) are not clear [34]. However, 
as noted earlier, the Alloy formal model follows directly from the POSE problem 
model and has the defined goal of providing evidence to support the feasibility of 
this POSE problem model. Therefore in this context formal methods are efficient 
to use and effective, because their benefit is to provide direct evidence with respect 
to the feasibility of a candidate design. 
A further advantage of ABD is that it is known to work well with problem 
oriented approaches, the successful synthesis of an assurance case with Problem 
Frames being reported in [117], noting that the techniques were complementary as 
each enhances the other by addressing weaknesses and shortfalls. Further, their 
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synthesis is accomplished with the artefacts that must be created in the normal 
course of system development, i. e., no new additional artefacts are required. Hence 
the process is efficient as well as effective. Initial work with POSE indicates that 
using the ABD approach with the safety argument in GSN and the pattern used 
to drive the development could provide an effective, integrated and efficient safety 
process and would benefit from further research and development. 
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Appendix A 
IPDP applied to the DC Case 
Study 
A. 1 Problem Description and Scope 
The goal of the first case study is to demonstrate the tasks and activities involved 
in applying the Company's IPDP to a typical safety critical development. This case 
study is based on the development of a Decoy Controller (DC), which is part of the 
defensive aids suite (DAS) on an aircraft. Only the initial phases of the IPDP up 
to the end of PDR (refer to Figure 3.1) are covered as these phases form the focus 
for this work. As the case study was developed following IPDP, so the first set of 
activities were concerned with the IPDP CE phase. 
UK military applications make use of DS 00-56, but a similar hierarchy of safety 
analyses takes place for other safety standards and guidelines (e. g. ARP4761 [1091). 
For aircraft applications typically the Company provides a Line Replaceable Unit 
(LRU). The LRU is a system component that slots into one of the major sub- 
systems on the aircraft. For example, the Decoy Controller (DC) LRU introduced 
in section 4.1.1 below is part of the Defensive Aids Suite (DAS) sub-system on the 
aircraft. The aircraft manufacturer (and the Company's customer) is responsible 
for 
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the aircraft level safety analysis (equivalent to the Aircraft FHA in ARP4761) and 
for the major sub-system safety analysis (equivalent to the System FHA). These 
FHA analyses identify and allocate the safety targets that the individual LRUs 
that form the sub-system must satisfy. For example, for the DAS sub-system, the 
customer identifies the safety targets H1 and H2 that the DC LRU must satisfy. 
These targets are flowed down to the Company as the safety requirement that the 
DC must comply with. Thus the early safety analysis tasks undertaken in IPDP 
that form the major focus of this work, correspond to the PSSA phase of ARP4761. 
A. 2 CE Phase for the DC Case Study 
The first activity in CE involves gaining an understanding of the system context, 
which includes understanding the system environment, identifying what the main 
components of the system environment are, what they do and how they interact with 
each other. The requirement of the proposed system is then elicited and the safety 
requirement analysed with respect to the system context. All this information is then 
collated, which allows a candidate conceptual design to be formed. The conceptual 
design for the DC consists of the block diagram shown in Figure A. 1 together with 
the ensuing descriptive text, informed by the requirement (also presented below). 
Figure A. 1: Decoy Controller (DC) Block Diagram 
The role of the Decoy Controller (DC) is to control the release of decoy flares 
providing defence against incoming missile attack. 
The DC interfaces with the De- 
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fence System (DS) computer, which is responsible for controlling and orchestrating 
all the defensive aids on the aircraft. The DS and other domains (see Figure A. 1) 
already exist, and the task is to design the DC. 
The conceptual design was discussed with the Customer and the initial functional 
requirement was revised and agreed accordingly. 
The Customer FHA work (at the aircraft and major sub-system level) identified 
two safety hazards which were allocated to the DC, concerned with the inadvertent 
firing of the decoy flares, as follows: 
H1 Inadvertent firing of decoy flare on ground. Safety Target: safety critical, 10-7 
fpfh'; and 
H2 Inadvertent firing of decoy flare in air. Safety Target: safety critical, 10-7 fpfh. 
Further preliminary safety analysis work was conducted using the conceptual 
model and the hazards H1 and H2 as a basis. The model was explored to ascertain 
if any other hazards or safety issues might be relevant. This involved using the 
domain knowledge of experienced engineers, comparison with similar systems and 
a brainstorming session which was used to bring this knowledge and experience 
together. The conclusion of this work was that H1 and H2 were the pertinent 
hazards for this system as represented by the conceptual model. It should be noted 
that the conceptual model is high level and abstract. It is sufficient for generating 
a hazard list, but not detailed enough to discharge the obligations raised by the 
remaining IPDP preliminary hazard analysis tasks. These require the more detailed 
models generated by the later phases of the IPDP. This means that there is always 
a risk that further safety issues may be identified later in the life cycle, with all the 
attendant cost and schedule impact that this might have. Theses hazards were then 
collected together to form the DC system safety requirement RS. As a result of this 
work the customer requirement RDC for the DC can be expressed as follows: 
1fpfh is `failures per flight hour. ' 
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RA The DS shall command which flare is selected for release by using a field in 
the con message it transmits. 
RB The DS shall command the DC to issue a fire command in its con message. 
This shall be the only way in which a flare can be released. 
RC The DC shall cause a flare to be released by issuing a fire command to the DU, 
which will fire the selected flare. 
RD The DC shall only issue a fire command if its interlocks are satisfied, i. e. 
aircraft is in air, the SP safety pin has been removed and the Pilot has issued 
an allow a release command. 
RS The DC shall mitigate Hi & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
Therefore, the overall requirement is RDC = RA A RB A RC A RD A RS 
A complete statement of R should also include requirements that cover space, 
weight, environmental performance, interfaces and so on, but these are beyond the 
scope of this work. The SRR validated the high level system and safety requirement 
detailed above as being suitable for the next phase of the development - Dem/Val. 
A. 3 Dem/Val Phase for the DC Case Study 
The initial part of the Dem/Val phase involves analysis and modelling to gain a 
better understanding of the system and its environment. This includes more detailed 
analysis of the requirement and an analysis of the safety requirement. A summary 
of this work for the DC case study now 
follows. The hazards Hl and H2 have 
both systematic (safety related) and probabilistic components. The initial safety 
analysis work identified that to counter these 
hazards the architectural design of 
the defensive aids system should contain a number of safety interlocks in the DC 
to provide safety protection. These are: an input 
from the pilot indicating whether 
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the release should be allowed; an input indicating whether the aircraft is in the 
air; and an input indicating whether the safety pin, present when the aircraft is on 
the ground, is in place. The expected behaviour is that flare dispensing should be 
inhibited if any of the following conditions hold: a) the pilot disallows flares; b) the 
aircraft is not in the air; or c) the safety pin has not been removed. It transpires 
that the interlocks b) and c) provide extra assurance for hazard H1 but not for 
H2. Therefore, the safety task is to demonstrate that H2 can be satisfied using just 
interlock a), with the knowledge that if H2 can be satisfied, then so can H1. Note, 
flare selection and timing are not safety related, it is only applying an inadvertent 
fire command to any flare that is regarded as a safety issue. 
The analysis and modelling work, reported in the previous paragraph, is collated 
to produce a system theory of operation document that is also descriptive text. 
This is validated with the customer before embarking on the next set of tasks which 
involve more detailed architectural analysis and the development of the sub-system 
theory of operation. The functional part of the sub-system theory of operation task 
is presented below for the DC system. 
Sys The Decoy Controller (DC) system consists of the DC, the Pilot selection 
switch (Pilot), the Dispenser Unit (DU), the Aircraft Status (AS), the Safety 
Pin status (SPS) and the Defence System (DS) as shown in Figure A. 1. 
Pilot The DC receives an input from the Pilot, which is a boolean switch selection. 
When the pilot selects the switch to on (Pilot = on) this means that the 
dispensing of flares is allowed by the DU under the control of the DC. If 
the pilot selects the switch to off (Pilot = off) then the DC will inhibit the 
dispensing of flares by the DU. 
AS The DC receives an input from the Aircraft Status which is a boolean input 
that defines if the aircraft is in the air (AS = on) or the aircraft is on the 
ground (AS = off). 
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SP The DC receives an input concerning the status of the Safety Pin which is a 
boolean input. If the Safety Pin is in place (SP = on) then it is not possible 
for DU to dispense flares. The Safety Pin has to be removed (SP = off) before 
the DU can dispense flares. 
DS The DC receives an input message con from the DS which contains the flare 
selection and whether to release the flare or not. The message is sent at a 
rate of 20 messages per second. The DS is responsible for controlling and 
orchestrating all the defensive aids on the aircraft. 
DU The DU receives a fire and a sel input from the DC. The sel input selects 
which flare type to release. The fire input commands the DU to release a flare 
if active (i. e. fire discrete set to on). 
DC The DC will stop the DU from dispensing flares by setting the fire discrete 
to off whenever its inputs Pilot = off or AS = off or SP = on. The DC will 
select which flare is to be dispensed by setting the sel input to the DU, the 
value of sel is derived from the con message received from the DS. The DC 
will command the DU to release a flare by setting its fire discrete to on as 
long as the other inputs to the DC support this. 
This sub-system theory of operation and analysis work was used as the basis 
for producing the Equipment Specifications (ES), the final Interface Requirements 
Specification (IRS) and the initial allocation of requirements (ASR) to software 
and/or hardware. The requirement was refined from RDC to Rdc by this work. 
The requirement Rdc is presented below. 
Ra The DS shall command which flare is selected using a field in its con message 
issued to the DC. The DC shall obtain the selected flare information from this 
field in the con message, and use it in its sel message to the DU to control 
the flare selection in the DU. 
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Rb The DS shall command the DC to issue a fire command in its con message. 
This shall be the only way in which a flare can be released. 
Rc The DC shall cause a flare to be released by issuing a fire command to the DU, 
which will fire the selected flare. 
Rd The DC shall only issue a fire command if its interlocks are satisfied, i. e. aircraft 
is in air (AS = on), SP safety pin has been removed (SP = off) and Pilot has 
issued an allow a release command (Pilot = on). 
RS The DC shall mitigate Hl & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
Therefore, the overall requirement is Rdc = Ra A Rb A Rc A Rd A RS. 
One of the IPDP safety tasks requires that a safety analysis is applied to the 
combination of the sub-system theory of operation and the system block diagram 
shown in Figure A. 1. The results of this analysis being recorded in the Preliminary 
Hazard Analysis Report (PHAR) - which has a document structure that was in- 
troduced to improve the safety management in IPDP. The abstract nature of the 
specification (and missing timing details etc. ) indicate that an FFA is the most 
appropriate form of analysis to use in this case (design instability and not enough 
information to support a HAZOPS). The main FFA guide words [90] are as follows: 
" Function not provided when required; 
" Function provided when not intended; 
" Function provided incorrectly. 
These were applied to each of the descriptive blocks in turn. For example, consider 
the descriptive text for the DS given above. This description has three parts as 
shown below: 




: FFA of the DS to D, 
FFA Guide Word Potential Failure Mode 
Select: Function not provided Wrong flare type selected for release 
Select: Function when not intended Wrong flare type selected for release 
Select: Function incorrect Wrong flare type selected for release 
Fire: Function not provided Flare not released when required 
Fire: Function when not intended Flare release too early or late 
Fire: Function incorrect Flare released inadvertently 
Rate: Function not provided No flare release possible 
Rate: Function when not intended Flare release too early or late 
Rate: Function incorrect Flare release too early or late 
and whether to release the flare or not. 
. The message is sent at a rate of 20 messages per second. 
Applying the guide words to these three terms (Select, Fire and Rate) yields Ta- 
ble A. 1. 
The FFA from Table A. 1 identified that a function incorrect on the Fire message 
could result in "Flare released inadvertently" which corresponds to the identified 
hazards H1 and H2. The function incorrect could be caused by a systematic prob- 
lem in the DS or by errors occurring during the transmission of the con message. 
The interface between the DS and the DC was not fully explored during the initial 
IPDP work and this resulted in only a simple parity check mechanism being pro- 
posed for the serial link. However, serial link integrity issues identified on another 
Company project resulted in a specific serial link safety investigation being applied 
to the DC system. This investigated the behaviour of the DS, its environment and 
the serial link in more depth, and identified that a much stronger cyclic redundancy 
check (CRC) algorithm was required to obtain the desired level of integrity. This 
information was associated with the DS environment, but had been omitted from 
the FFA work. It was also noted that a HAZOPS (due to the serial link expertise 
contained in the HAZOPS team) rather than a 
FFA (produced by a single safety 
engineer) would have identified the serial 
link issue earlier. 
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All these artefacts produced during the Dem/Val phase were checked as part 
of the IPDP SDR checkpoint gate review. This included confirmation that each 
requirement had an appropriate verification method assigned to it, and checking 
that any issues identified by the safety analysis had been investigated and resolved. 
A related issue is that IPDP allows projects to "tailor out" (i. e. remove) tasks 
that are not thought to be directly relevant. In the past over-zealous (and opti- 
mistic! ) project managers have tailored out some of the safety analysis tasks. The 
rationale for this was the misunderstanding that there were already other safety 
tasks, without realising that each IPDP safety task has a specific purpose. This was 
another factor in creating the PHAR to manage the early safety analysis activities 
and provide a framework to ensure that all the necessary analysis work was under- 
taken. As noted above, this does ensure that the necessary safety analysis work is 
undertaken, but it does not ensure its technical quality, completeness or consistency. 
A. 4 EMD: Preliminary Design Phase for the DC 
Case Study 
The activities and tasks associated with the EMD Preliminary Design Phase, and 
how it makes use of the validated outputs from the SDR (namely the ES, ISR and 
ASR documents) are described in section 3.4. The DC system was put through this 
process and as an example of the work involved, the detailed architectural analysis 
work is summarised below. 
The architectural analysis identified an expansion of the DC into the three sub- 
components shown in Fig. A. 2. The DC system architecture consists of three com- 
ponents, the Safety Controller (SC), the Decoy Micro-controller (DM, shown further 
expanded in Fig. A. 2(b)) and the Interlock Input (II), as shown in Fig. A. 2(a). This 
choice of architecture was selected because it was based on an existing prototype 
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Figure A. 2: (a) DC Architecture and (b) DM Internal Architecture 
that was known to be capable of satisfying the functional requirement. Further, it 
is typical of industrial safety design strategies that attempt to minimise the num- 
ber and extent of the safety related functions by localising them to simple, distinct 
blocks. 
Briefly, component II collects together the interlock inputs and passes their 
status to SC (int). Component DM is a microcontroller used to decode messages 
from the Defence System (con), and when appropriate to issue the fire command 
request to the SC (via fire? ). The Message Buffer (MB, in Fig. A. 2(b)) holds the 
received control message con from the DS. The micro-controller uP decodes this 
message to extract: a) the fire command request status (fire? ) sent to the SC, 
and b) the selected flare type (sel) sent to the DU. The SC, the component to be 
designed, is intended as a simple block that handles the safety critical elements of 
the interlocking. SC is, therefore, expected to relate an active fire? request to the 
DU (through phenomenon fire) if the interlocks are satisfied. 
The introduction of the DC system architecture affects the high level Customer 
requirement Rdc and this needs to be refined such that terms in DC are replaced by 
terms in DM, SC and II as appropriate. This is a non-trivial transformation and 
is carefully checked by independent expert review. The result is a new requirement 
statement 
R'= RIa & Rlb & RIc & Rld & RIS 
in which R'a is Ra with DC replaced by DM; similarly for R'c and R'd, mutandis 
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mutatis. The most significant change occurs for R'b (changes in bold): 
R'b The DS shall command the DM to issue a fire? command in its con message. 
The DM will request the SC to send the fire command. This shall 
be the only way in which a flare can be released. 
During Preliminary Design a HAZOPS is conducted to confirm the system model 
is a suitable basis for further development in terms of its ability to satisfy the 
identified safety requirement placed on it. At this point the required supporting 
design information is available and the design is more stable - so HAZOPS is cost- 
effective to apply at this time. 
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Appendix B 
More PPTs Applied to the DC 
Case Study 
B. 1 PPT Applied to the AS Domain 
PS4: Application of the PPT for AS Domain Removal to problem 
P1 to form PRed2 
JUSTIFICATION J: The AS domain removal is based on the process given in section 
5.1.2. The AS domain is adjacent to the requirement R1. The AS domain control 
phenomena air maps directly to its output behaviour phenomena which is also air. 
Therefore air will appear in the reference part of the requirement phenomena both 
before and after the transformation. The requirement R1 is as detailed in step PS3 on 
page 115. Inspection of RI indicates that only Rid involves a reference to air. 
Consider the transformation from Rld into R2d which involves the phenomena air as 
noted above. 
Rld : aircraft is in air (air = yes). 
R2d : II observes input air = yes. 
AS Domain Description : The in-air indicator is obtained from the weight on wheels 
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and landing gear up indications: if the landing gear is up and there is no weight on the 
wheels then the aircraft is assumed to be in the air. The landing gear is detected as 
being up by a number of sensor switches. The switches use a multi-pole arrangement 
of appropriately selected "Normally open/Normally closed" contacts. This imbues an 
error detection capability that is used to achieve very good failure rates, well within the 
required margins. The setting of the in-air indicator is determined by the AS domain 
and is output using the phenomena air, where air = yes means the aircraft is in the 
air, whilst air = no means the aircraft is on the ground. 
The A2 = Assumption(air, air) is given by the AS Domain Description. Inspection 
of R2d in conjunction with the AS Domain Description shows they imply Rld as 
required. 
Therefore the PPT application transforms the problem from PR dl into PRed2, and RI 
is transformed into R2 as follows: 
R2a The DS shall command which flare is selected using a field in its con message 
issued to the DM. The DM shall obtain the selected flare information from this 
field in the con message, and use it in its sel message to the DU to control the 
flare selection in the DU. 
R2b The DS shall command the DM to issue a fire? command in its con message. 
The DM will request the SC to send the fire command. This shall be the only 
way in which a flare can be released. 
R2c The SC shall cause a flare to be released by issuing a fire command to the DU, 
which will fire the selected flare. 
R2d The SC shall only issue a fire command if its interlocks, represented by int, are 
satisfied, i. e. II observes input air = yes, SP safety pin has been removed 
(out = yes) and II observes pilot input of ok = yes. 
RS The DC shall mitigate H1 & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
The constraint being relied upon is that air = yes means the aircraft is in the air - see 
claim below. 
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The domain AS is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The software problem is transformed to PRed2: 
PRet2 








A Al A A2 
CONCERNS: The control input phenomena air is the same as the domain behaviour 
output phenomena for this reference-type problem progression. This can be a symptom 
of over-specification. 
CLAIM: The AS intention with respect to interlocking flare release is represented by 
the phenomena air, so no over-specification requirement issue arises. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This is covered by the AS Domain Description and the 
validation as described above. 
CLAIM: The in-air status of the aircraft is represented by the phenomena air. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This is covered by the AS Domain Description. 
PHENOMENA: None 
II 
Note that often the useful behaviour assumptions are omitted from the Problem 
description, but they are always a necessary part of the reduction process. 
B. 2 PPT Applied to the SP Domain 
PS5: Application of the PPT for SP Domain Removal to problem 
PRzd2 to form P3 
JUSTIFICATION J: The SP domain removal is based on the process given in section 
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5.1.2. The SP domain is adjacent to the requirement R2. The SP domain control 
phenomena out maps directly to its output behaviour phenomena which is also out. 
Therefore out will appear in the reference part of the requirement phenomena both 
before and after the transformation. The requirement R2 is as detailed in step PS4 on 
page 235. Inspection of R2 indicates that only R2d involves a reference to out. 
Consider the transformation from R2d into R3d which involves the phenomena out 
as noted above. 
R2d : SP safety pin has been removed (out = yes). 
R3d : II observes input out = yes. 
SP Domain Description : The safety pin status is obtained from sensor switches. The 
switches use a multi-pole arrangement of appropriately selected "Normally open/Normally 
closed" contacts. This imbues an error detection capability that is used to achieve very 
good failure rates, well within the required margins. The setting of the safety pin star 
tus is determined by the SP domain and is output using the phenomena out, where 
out = yes means the safety pin has been removed, whilst out = no means the safety 
pin is present (and inhibiting flare release). 
The A3 = Assumption(out, out) is given by the SP Domain Description. Inspection of 
R3d in conjunction with the SP Domain Description shows they imply R2d as required. 
Therefore the PPT application transforms the problem from PRed2 into PRed3, and R2 
is transformed into R3 as follows: 
R3a The DS shall command which flare is selected using a field in its con message 
issued to the DM. The DM shall obtain the selected flare information from this 
field in the con message, and use it in its sel message to the DU to control the 
flare selection in the DU. 
Rib The DS shall command the DM to issue a fire? command in its con message- 
The DM will request the SC to send the fire command. This shall be the only 
way in which a flare can be released. 
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Ric The SC shall cause a flare to be released by issuing a fire command to the DU, 
which will fire the selected flare. 
R3d The SC shall only issue a fire command if its interlocks, represented by int, are 
satisfied, i. e. II observes input air = yes, II observes input out = yes and II 
observes pilot input of ok = yes. 
RS The DC shall mitigate Hi & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-1 fpfh). 
The constraint being relied upon is that out = yes means the safety pin has been 
removed - see claim below. 
The domain SP is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The software problem is transformed to Pxxd3: 
PRed 3: 
DS(con)`o", DU(fire, sel)fir, e8e, 
M 
ok)ok, air, outý 
DM""n'fire?, 'sCintfsre? I- R3fiý; o II(t, aiT, ok 
A Al A A2 A A3 
CONCERNS: The control input phenomena out is the same as the domain behaviour 
output phenomena for this reference-type problem progression. This can be a symptom 
of over-specification. 
CLAIM: The SP intention with respect to interlocking flare release is represented by 
the phenomena out, so no over-specification requirement issue arises. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This is covered by the SP Domain Description and the 
validation as described above. 
CLAIM: The safety pin status is represented by the phenomena out. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This is covered by the SP Domain Description. 
PHENOMENA: None 
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B. 3 PPT Applied to the DS Domain 
PS6: Application of the PPT for DS Domain Removal to problem 
PRed3 to form PRed 
JUSTIFICATION J: The DS domain removal is based on the process given in section 
5.1.2. The DS domain is adjacent to the requirement R3. The DS domain control 
phenomena con maps directly to its output behaviour phenomena which is also con. 
Therefore con will appear in the reference part of the requirement phenomena both 
before and after the transformation. The requirement R3 is as detailed in step PS5 
on page 237. Inspection of R3 indicates that both R3a and R3b involve references to 
con. 
Consider the transformation from R3a into R4a which involves the phenomena con as 
noted above. 
R3a : The DS shall command which flare is selected using a field in its con message. 
R4a : The DM shall decide which flare to select by observing a field in the con message 
it receives. 
A similar arrangement can be constructed for flaxe release for covering the transforma- 
tion from Rib into R4b. 
DS Domain Description : The DS monitors many systems (e. g. early warning radar, 
GPS/INS positioning) to determine any threats to the aircraft. These systems are not 
pertinent to this problem so are abstracted through the statement: 
The DS is the defensive aids suite controller function which selects the flare 
type for release and if and when a flare is released in response to any threats 
it determines from its monitoring functions. The DS achieves this by for- 
matting the flare selection and fire commands into its con message which it 
transmits to the DM. 
The A4 = Assumption(con, con) is given by the DS Domain Description. Inspection 
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of R4a in conjunction with the DS Domain Description shows they imply R3a as 
required. 
The DM knows the structure of the con message it receives from the DS, so it can 
decode the con message to determine the flare selection (sei) and fire (fire) components. 
Therefore the PPT application transforms the problem from PRed3 into PRed, and R3 
is transformed into R4 as follows: 
R. 4a The DM shall decide which flare to select by observing a field in the 
con message it receives. The DM shall obtain the selected flare information 
from this field in the con message, and use it in its sel message to the DU to 
control the flare selection in the DU. 
R4b The DM shall observe the con message it receives and issue a fire? 
command if commanded. The DM will request the SC to send the fire 
command. This shall be the only way in which a flare can be released. 
Roc The SC shall cause a flare to be released by issuing a fire command to the DU, 
which will fire the selected flare. 
R4d The SC shall only issue a fire command if its interlocks, represented by int, are 
satisfied, i. e. II observes input air = yes, 
II observes input out = yes and II 
observes pilot input of ok = yes. 
R. 8 The DC shall mitigate Hl & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
The domain DS is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The REQUIREMENTS INTERPRETATION transformation associated with the PPT estab- 
lishes that con is equivalent to (fire?, sei), this 
information is used in the software 
problem Pte: 
DU(fire, sel)fin,, ý, II(ok)ök air, out, 
rRed : 
DM'_^n'fiTe?, SCintýn? I- R4jný8out, air, ok 
A Al A A2 A A3 A A4 
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CLAIM: The flare selection and flare fire commands are represented by the phenomena 
con. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This is covered by the DS Domain Description. 
The following directly support the analysis tasks: 
Notel: R4a and R4b relate the requirement phenomena con to the causal chain 
phenomena fire? and sel. 
Note2: R4d relates the requirement phenomena air, out and ok to the causal chain 
phenomena int. 
CLAIM: The chosen solution architecture does not prevent the satisfaction of R. This 
claim does not hold. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: PSA (FFA, HAZOPS and FTA) was again applied to 
each architectural component in turn. The results are presented in section 5.2.2 and 





High Integrity IPDP Safety 
Process 
The existing successful Z-based safety critical development process has the following 
characteristics. Briefly, system safety properties are formally captured in Z and 
transcribed (rather than refined) into a detailed Z design specification, against which 
formal code proof using SPARK [7] is performed. An important validation step is 
the proof of conformance of the Z design specification against the formal Z safety 
properties. This process provides a formal path from the high level safety properties 
down to the code that implements them. However, validation occurs well into the 
design process and it has uncovered anomalies with the Z safety properties. That is, 
this safety critical development approach has uncovered anomalies in the Z safety 
properties rather late in the IPDP than is optimal. The anomalies uncovered ranged 
from a misinterpretation of the actual physical sequence (a modelling error), through 
to contradictory requirements. One of the aims of this case study is to show that, 
using the POSE/Alloy combination, those anomalies could have been identified and 
resolved earlier in the development life cycle. The ultimate goal of this work is to 
enhance and evolve what is already a successful safety critical development process, 
not to change to some novel process of unknown pedigree. 
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Appendix D 
POSE Steps for the SMS Case 
Study 
One of the major initial tasks in IPDP CE phase is to fully understand the 
problem context. The initial requirement is introduced into the problem during the 
CE phase, and developed through into the early part of Dem/Val. The initial system 
architecture is introduced during Dem/Val. The information collected through this 
work is collated into the step SPS1 shown below. 
SPS1: Application of Initial Problem understanding to problem 
Pneu 
JUSTIFICATION 
, J1: The justifications for the initial POSE transformations are as 
follows: 
[Domain Interpretation, Ja] The analysis of the information sources identified that the 
environment consisted of the SMS, the S&RE 1 and the Pilot and that their interactions 
were as discussed above in section 5.5.1. 
'S&RE: Suspension and Release Equipment. Holds the stores on the aircraft until a release or 
jettison is enacted. 
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[Requirement Interpretation, Jb ] The identified requirement was based on information 
provided by the customer and was validated through reviews, email correspondence 
and meetings. It is presented as R (Ra to Ri) below. 
[Solution Interpretation, JJ] This is a typical representation of an SMS. 
The domains and their relevant properties are summarised in Plnitial presented below, 
where the justification for this initial software problem is Jl = Ja A Jb A Jc. 
PHENOMENA: Phenomena and their control and sharing are as follows: The Pilot 
controls SJ in the SMS using three phenomena: (a) p_mode: a selection of SJ mode 
(Off, Ship or Station); (b) p_sel: a set of stations selected for jettison if Station mode 
selected; (c) p -jet: an 
SJ button that initiates jettison and must be held on for the 
duration of the jettison sequence. 
The SMS controls the S&RE using the phenomena jets, a vector of station positions 
to which jettison is to be applied. The SMS also takes in the aircraft in air status using 
the phenomena InAir. 
The referenced requirement phenomena, ref, are concerned with the Pilots intention 
to select the SJ mode (p_mode), the stations for SJ (p_sel) and requesting jettison 
(p jet). The requirement also references the InAir status. The constrained require- 
ment phenomena, cons, are concerned with selecting which S&RE stations are to be 
jettisoned (jet_stat). 
Where: cons = {jet_stat} and ref = {p_mode, p_sel, p -jet} 
The initial software problem is as follows: 
Plnitial : 
S&RE(jet_stat)jet", Pilot(p_mode, p_sel, p jet), "node, satat, aaj, 
SMS InAir jet" ý R, iet_etat ( )smode, astat, saj p_mode, p-sel, p-iet, InA{r 
A PF problem diagram representation of Prnit ,. i is shown in Figure D. 1. 
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The high level SMS requirement, R, is as follows: 
Ra The SMS shall ensure the safe release of stores from the S&RE when commanded 
by the Pilot using p_mode, p_sel and p -jet. 
Rb The SMS shall have a Selective Jettison (SJ) facility which shall allow the Pilot, 
using p_mode, to jettison all of the stores (Ship mode) or the jettison of selected 
stores (Station mode) from the S&RE. 
Rc The SMS shall allow the Pilot to select each of the six S&RE stations for SJ using 
p_sel. In Station SJ mode, a station must be selected before it can be jettisoned. 
Rd The SMS shall have an In Air lamp, which will be lit if the aircraft is in the air. 
SJ is only allowed if the aircraft is in the air. 
Re The SMS shall have a SJ button to allow the Pilot to initiate the jettison using 
p -jet, and it must remain pressed for the duration of the jettison sequence. 
The 
following must hold prior to initiating the SJ: 
1. SJ mode selected (Ship or Station). 
2. Aircraft is in the air. 
3. If Station mode, the appropriate stations are selected in the SMS. 
Rf The SMS shall control the selection and jettison of stores from the S&RE, by 
providing the conditioned power and drive signals to correctly drive and control 
the S&RE. 
Rg The SMS shall implement a Balance Algorithm which can remove items from an 
SJ Package to ensure aircraft roll moments are contained within safe limits. 
Rh It shall be possible to Si a store from a single station without regard to the aircraft 
balance algorithm calculation. 
Ri The SJ release sequence will be Out stores first, then Mid and then In. 
CLAIM: The interpretations are well-founded 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The choice of domains follows from the aircraft level safety 
analysis and the required choice of interlocks. The S&RE, is an existing component 
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of the avionics system, with well-known, validated properties. The Pilot is trained to 
follow protocols rigorously. The SMS is to be designed, but the Company are domain 
experts for this type of system. 
The customer functional requirement (Ra to R. i) was provided as an input to the 
developer team, and was validated with the customer. 
CLAIM: The architecture is feasible 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The selected overall system architecture has been used 
successfully on similar SMS safety systems. 
CLAIM: Sound judgement followed 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: Development based on IPDP used successfully on many 
previous developments and enhanced with POSE to mitigate some known IPDP issues. 
Therefore it follows normal and not radical design concepts as defined in [131]. 
CLAIM: The S&RE component sub-systems have sufficient reliability to allow the over- 
all system to satisfy its objectives 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The reliability claims are justifiable since the S&RE 
components are part of an established successful design, but are not included in detail 
for reasons of brevity. 
I 
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Figure D. 1: SMS Initial Problem, P1 
The next stage is to investigate candidate system architectures. The most 
promising candidate is shown in step SPS2 presented below. 
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SPS2: Application of SOLUTION INTERPRETATION AND 
EXPANSION to problem Plnttjat 
JUSTIFICATION J2: The expanded SMS solution architecture consists of three types 
of domain one of Safety Monitor (SM), six of Store Unit (SU) and one of Selective 
Jettison Panel (SP). 
The SP shown in Figure 5.7 indicates the aircraft has six release stations-corresponding 
to Outer, Middle and Inner positions on each of the Starboard and Port wings. The 
pilot (Pilot) controls store jettison via the SP, using (a) six selection switches, one 
for 
each station, (b) a three position SJ mode selection switch, (c) an InAir indicator lamp 
and (d) the SJ button which initiates the jettison. The InAir indicator is fed 
from 
another system (not developed further here). 
Each SU is connected to one of the six S&RE units and provides the conditioned power 
signal to release the store attached to the S&RE. Each SU is controlled by the SM. 
The SM is the control function for the SMS. It reads in the SP status for mode, selected 
stations, the SJ initiation button, and the InAir status. 
The justification for this (architecture) solution expansion transformation is that this 
system architecture has been successfully used on a number of other SMS developments 
and is known to be capable of satisfying the functional requirement. 
PHENOMENA: The new phenomena introduced by the architecture are: 
invec - Status of the SJ mode, station selection, InAir and SJ button inputs 
outv -A vector of discrete release/jettison control signals, one to each of the six SUs. 
The expanded software problem is as follows: 
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PExp : 
S&RE(jet_stat)jety+ Pilot(p_mode, p_sel, p jet)smode, sstat, ssj, 
SP(I7bAir)2"v' S, Ujetv S+Mouty ýR jetýtat 
smode, sstat, ssj ý outy+ invec p_mode, p-jel, p-jet, InA{r 
A PF problem diagram representation of PE, is shown in Figure D. 2. 
The transformed requirement R' is similar to R apart from the changes introduced by 
expanding the domains from SMS to SP, SM and SU. For example all references to 
the Pilot in R controlling the SMS are replaced with references to SP, as the SP is 
the means by which the Pilot interfaces to the stores management system. The biggest 
change is to R'f where SMS is replaced by references to SM and its control of the SUs. 
The updated requirement R' is as follows: 
R'a The SM shall ensure the safe release of stores from the S&RE when commanded 
by the Pilot using p_mode, p_sel and p -jet. 
R'b The SM shall have a Selective Jettison (SJ) facility which shall allow the Pilot, 
using p_mode, to jettison all of the stores (Ship mode) or the jettison of selected 
stores (Station mode) from the S&RE. 
R'c The SP shall allow the Pilot to select each of the six S&RE stations for SJ using 
p_sel. In Station SJ mode, a station must be selected before it can be jettisoned. 
R'd The SP shall have an In Air lamp, which will be lit if the aircraft is in the air. 
SJ is only allowed if the aircraft is in the air. 
We The SP shall have a SJ button to allow the Pilot to initiate the jettison using 
p -jet, and 
it must remain pressed for the duration of the jettison sequence. The 
following must hold prior to initiating the SJ: 
1. SJ mode selected (Ship or Station). 
2. Aircraft is in the air. 
3. If Station mode, the appropriate stations are selected on the SP. 
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R'f The SM shall control the selection and jettison of stores from the S&RE, by 
controlling the SUs to provide conditioned power and drive signals to correctly 
drive and control the S&REs. 
R'g The SM shall implement a Balance Algorithm which can remove items from an 
SJ package to ensure aircraft roll moments are contained within safe limits. 
R'h It shall be possible to SJ a store from a single station without regard to the 
aircraft balance algorithm calculation. 
R'i The SJ release sequence will be Out stores first, then Mid and then In. 
CLAIM: Justification for selection of the solution architecture 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This system architecture has been successfully used on 
a number of other SMS developments and is known to be capable of satisfying the 
functional requirement. 
CLAIM: The choice of candidate solution architecture exhibits sound safety engineer- 
ing judgement 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The architecture is chosen to maximise integrity. 
The 
jettison status information from the SP to the SM is transferred by the serial link 
message invec which includes a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) for error detection. 
The control information from the SM to the SUs is transferred as a vector of discrete 
signals outs (one for each station). 
CLAIM: SJ push-button switch on the SP is reliable 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The SJ push-button switch indication is obtained from a 
number of sensor switches. The switches use a multi-pole arrangement of appropriately 
selected "Normally open/Normally closed" contacts. This imbues an error detection 
capability that is used to achieve very good failure rates, well within the required 
margins. 
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Similar reliability claims can be made for the mode SJ mode switch and the station 
selection switches on the SP - not shown for brevity. 
CLAIM: The chosen solution architecture does not prevent the satisfaction of R. This 





Figure D. 2: SMS Expanded Problem, P, 
First application of the PPT to simplify PEp by removing the Pilot domain. 
SPS3: Application of the PPT for Pilot Domain Removal to 
problem PEw to form PRm1 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J: The Pilot domain removal is based on the process given in sec- 
tion 5.1.2. The Pilot domain is adjacent to the requirement R'. The Pilot domain is 
a reference-type. The Pilot domain effect is to control the 
jettison function using the 
mode, station selection and SJ button on the 
SP. In PF terms the Pilot is a biddable 
domain. That is, although the Pilot is trained to follow protocol rigorously, there is a 
chance a mistake could be made and any analysis 
has to take due account of this - this 
information is stored as part of the justification for the removal. 
Inspection of R' in SPS2 indicates that R'a, 
R'b, R'c, and We involve a reference 
to Pilot. These will be updated in Rl. 
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The Pilot effect is controlling the SP using the requirement phenomena p_mode, p_sel 
and pjet, in the causal chain these respectively relate directly to the phenomena 
smode, sstat, ssj. 
Consider the transformation from R'a involving "commanded by the Pilot". Com- 
manded by the Pilot corresponds to appropriately setting the phenomena p_mode, 
p_sel, and p -jet on the SP. This is achieved through the phenomena smode, sstat and 
ssj. Therefore Ria has the form shown below. 
Consider the transformation from R'b involving "Pilot using p_mode" to jettison all 
stores or selected stores. In the causal chain the p_mode effect is related to smode. 
Therefore the Rlb text is rewritten as "The SM shall have a Selective Jettison (SJ) 
facility which will allow the jettison of all stores (Ship mode) or the jettison of selected 
stores (Station mode) from the S&RE in accordance with smode". 
Consider the transformation from R'c involving "allow the Pilot to select each of the 
six S&RE stations for SJ". The Pilot selects stations through p_sel, in the causal chain 
this effect is related to sstat. Therefore in RIc the text is re-written as "allows each of 
the six S&RE stations to be selected for SJ in accordance with the sstat". 
Consider the transformation from R'e involving "to allow the Pilot to initiate the 
jettison". The Pilot initiates jettison through p -jet, 
in the causal chain this effect 
is related to ssj. Therefore in Rte the text is re-written as "that allows jettison to 
be initiated in accordance with ssj". In addition other terms in R'e are updated as 
appropriate to be in accordance with smode and sstat to form Rie. 
These requirement transformations do not require additional information not already 
in the interface nor do they refer to future events. However they do rely on information 
from the domain being removed being "saved" as part of the assumption that justifies 
the transformation. That is, we have that the Pilot useful behaviour relation (saved 
as part of the assumption) in conjunction with R' leads to R1. Therefore this is an 
example of an Environment Constraint requirement. 
Therefore the PPT application transforms the problem from PExp into Pltedi, and R' 
is transformed into Rl as follows (where items in bold denote the areas that have been 
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changed): 
Ria The SM shall ensure the safe release of stores from the S&RE when commanded 
by the appropriate settings of smode, sstat, and ssj. 
Rlb The SM shall have a Selective Jettison (SJ) facility which will allow the jettison 
of all stores (Ship mode) or the jettison of selected stores (Station mode) from 
the S&RE in accordance with smode. 
Ric The SP shall allows each of the six S&RE stations to be selected for SJ 
in accordance with the sstat. In Station SJ mode, a station must be selected 
before it can be jettisoned. 
Rld The SP shall have an In Air lamp, which will be lit if the aircraft is in the air. 
SJ is only allowed if the aircraft is in the air. 
Me The SP shall have a SJ button that allows jettison to be initiated in ac- 
cordance with ssj and it must remain pressed for the duration of the jettison 
sequence. The following must hold prior to initiating the Si: 
1. SJ mode selected (Ship or Station) in accordance with smode. 
2. Aircraft is in the air. 
3. If Station mode, the appropriate stations are selected on the SP in accor- 
dance with sstat. 
Rlf The SM shall control the selection and jettison of stores from the S&RE, by 
controlling the SUs to provide conditioned power and drive signals to correctly 
drive and control the S&REs. 
Rig The SM shall implement a Balance Algorithm which can remove items from an 
SJ package to ensure aircraft roll moments are contained within safe limits. 
Rlh It shall be possible to SJ a store from a single station without regard to the 
aircraft balance algorithm calculation. 
Rli The SJ release sequence will be Out stores first, then Mid and then In. 
253 
The constraint being relied upon is that the Pilot effects p_mode, p_sel and p -jet 
correspond directly to the phenomena smode, sstat and ssj respectively. This is the 
useful behaviour assumption for this domain removal transformation step. 
The domain Pilot is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The problem is transformed from PE, into PRed1 which is shown in POSE sequent 
form as follows: 
PRedl : 
S&RE(jet_stat)jetv+ SP(smode, sstat, ssj, InAir)invec, 
SUýetv SMoutv f_ R19et_atat 
outv+ invec amode, sstat, saj, InAtir 
Note that the usual convention is not to show the useful behaviour assumption explicitly 
with the software problem and this is adopted for PR, 41 and in the other domain 
removals that follow. 
CLAIM: The pilot's intention with respect to performing jettison is represented by the 
phenomena smode, sstat and ssj. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This is covered by the justification given above. 
PHENOMENA: None 
The removal of the S&RE domains is typified by the following problem trans- 
formation step. 
SPS4: Application of the PPT for S&RE Domain Removal to 
problem PRed1 to form PRed 
JUSTIFICATION J: The S&RE domains removal is based on the process given in 
section 5.1.2. The S&RE domains are adjacent to the requirement R1. The S&RE 
domains are constrain-type PPTs. The S&RE domains effect is to release the selected 
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stores. The phenomena jets is a vector quantity that causes this store release effect for 
each of the selected stations. This is achieved by providing the selected S&RE stations 
with conditioned drive power. 
The requirement R1 constrains the behaviour of the S&RE through the phenomena 
jet_stat. In the domain removal the requirement will be transformed from R1 to R2. 
Inspection of R1 in SPS3 indicates that Rla, Rib, R1c, and Rlf involve a reference 
to S&RE. These will be updated in R2. 
Consider the transformation from Rla involving "safe release of stores from the S&RE". 
In this PPT the S&RE effect of store release is replaced by the SU phenomena jetv 
that selects stores to receive the conditioned release drive signals. Therefore R2a has 
the form "safe selection of stores through the SU phenomena jets. ". 
Consider the transformation from Rib involving "will allow the jettison of all stores 
(Ship mode) or the jettison of selected stores (Station mode) from the S&RE in accor- 
dance with sm, ode". In this PPT the S&RE effect of store release is replaced by the 
SU phenomena jetv that selects stores to receive the conditioned release drive signals. 
Therefore R2b has the form "will select all stores for jettison in jetv (Ship mode) or 
select specific stores for jettison in jetv (Station mode) from the SU in accordance with 
smode. ". 
Consider the transformation from R1c involving "allows each of the six S&RE stations 
to be selected for SJ". In this PPT the S&RE effect of store release is replaced by the 
SU phenomena jetv that selects stores to receive the conditioned release drive signals. 
Therefore R2c has the form "allow each of the six station selection positions in jetv to 
be selected for SJ". 
Consider the transformation from Rlf involving "the selection and jettison of stores 
from the S&RE" and "to correctly drive and control the S&RE". In this PPT the 
S&RE effect of store release is replaced by the SU phenomena jetv that selects stores to 
receive the conditioned release drive signals. 
Therefore R2f has the form "the selection 
of stores for jettison in the jetv from the 
SU" and "through its output phenomena jetv" 
and adding the term "correctly" earlier in the phrase. 
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These requirement transformations do not require additional information not already 
in the interface nor do they refer to future events. However they do rely on infor- 
mation from the domain being removed being "saved" as part of the assumption that 
justifies the transformation. That is, we have that S&RE, R2 F- R1 which states that 
R2 requires assistance from the S&RE domain environment to satisfy the higher level 
requirement R1. Therefore this is an example of an Environment Constraint require- 
ment. 
Therefore the PPT application transforms the problem from PR&i into PRed, and Rl 
is transformed into R2 as follows (where items in bold denote the areas that have been 
changed) : 
R2a The SM shall ensure the safe selection of stores through the 
SU phe- 
nomena jetv when commanded by the appropriate settings of smode, sstat, and 
ssj. 
R2b The SM shall have a Selective Jettison (SJ) facility which will select all stores 
for jettison in jetv (Ship mode) or select specific stores for jettison in 
jetv (Station mode) from the SU in accordance with smode. 
R2c The SP shall allow each of the six station selection positions in jetv to 
be selected for SJ in accordance with the sstat. In Station SJ mode, a station 
must be selected before it can be jettisoned. 
R2d The SP shall have an In Air lamp, which will be lit if the aircraft is in the air. 
SJ is only allowed if the aircraft is in the air. 
Rte The SP shall have a SJ button that allows jettison to be initiated in accordance 
with ssj and it must remain pressed for the duration of the jettison sequence. The 
following must hold prior to initiating the SJ: 
1. SJ mode selected (Ship or Station) in accordance with smode. 
2. Aircraft is in the air. 
3. If Station mode, the appropriate stations are selected on the SP in accordance 
with sstat. 
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R2f The SM shall control the selection of stores for jettison in the jets from 
the SU, by controlling the SUs to correctly provide conditioned power and 
drive signals through its output phenomena jetv. 
R2g The SM shall implement a Balance Algorithm which can remove items from an 
SJ package to ensure aircraft roll moments are contained within safe limits. 
R2h It shall be possible to SJ a store from a single station without regard to the 
aircraft balance algorithm calculation. 
R2i The SJ release sequence will be Out stores first, then Mid and then In. 
The software problem model after removing the S&RE domains is given by: 
PRm : SP(smode, sstat, ssj, InAir)"', SU(jetv)out,,, SM{nvt,, ' f- R2ýt, ý&3,,, tot, so, t+utsr 
The useful behaviour assumption associated with this domain removal is based on 
the relationship between the S&RE effect of store release that is replaced by the SU 
phenomena jets that selects stores to receive the conditioned release drive signals. 
As noted in SPS3, this presentation follows the convention of not showing the useful 
behaviour assumption with the software problem model - given by Pp 
Reliability and other concerns and associated claim/evidence to mitigate are not pre- 
sented in detail. 
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Appendix E 
POSE/Alloy Model of the SMS 
Case Study 
module examples/DPM/smsystem3 
// Second (improved) version of model, with Balance determined by overall sequence as required 
open util/ordering(SMStatel as ems 
open Alloy_Files/Alloy4/NatNumbers as mat 
// Define the SM System Objects 
abstract sig SJMode {} 
one sig off, ship, stat extends SJMode {} 
abstract sig StatSel {} 
one sig s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7 extends StatSel {} 
abstract sig SSet {} 
one sig son, soft extends SSet {} 
abstract sig InAir {} 
one sig air, grd extends InAir {} 
abstract sig SPu1 {} 
one sig p0, p01, p10, p2 extends SPu1 {} 
abstract sig BAL * 
one sig nob, no_bal, is_bal extends BAL {} 
// Define the SM State 
Big SMState { 
ntime Natural, 
mode : SJMode, 
sels StatSel, 
sj SSet, 
fl : InAir, 
relp SSet 
pulses : Spul, 
balan : BAL, 
cut : Natural } {} 
// Set up the ordering of SMStats 
prod snit (am : SMState) {sm. mode - off t1: sm. sels - sO tt sm. sj " soff tt m. il " and lt 
sm. ntime . Zero U sm. relp - soff ü sm-pulses I p0 tt sm. balan - nob !t em. cnt - Zero} 
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fact cnt3 { all sm : SMState I sm. cnt = Zero or sm. cnt - One or sm. cnt - Two or sm. cnt - 
Three} 
fact traces { 
init[sms/first[]] 
all sm : SMState - sms/last[] 1 let sm' - sme/next[sm] I some m: SJMode, Bel : 
StatSel, 
s: SSet, f: InAir I( Stim[sm, sm'] kA SMfun[em, sm', M. Bel, s f] 
)} 
If #### DEFINE OPERATIONS ##### 
If System Time Clock 
pred Stim(sm, sm' : SMState) {sm'. ntime - nat/inc[sm. ntimel} 
// Input Vector 
pred InVec(smtim, systim Natural, inmod, mode : SJMode, insel, eel : StatSel, inej, sj 
SSet, 
infl, fl : InAir ) {smtim . systim kk inmod - mode kk insel - eel kk inej I sj 
kk infl - fl} 
// Operation SM Function 
prod SMfun [sm, em' : SMState, m: SJMode, eel : StatSel, e: SSet, 1 InAir7 
t 
(sm' mode -m sA sm'. sj -s At sm'. fl -fü sm'. sels - eel) tt 
// ### If valid start of SJ sequence ....... 
(( sm. mode - st at 6k sm. sels I- so to em. sj - soff to sm. fl - air 
U sm. relp - soff tx 
m- stat t# eel - sm. sels Ak s= son üf- air) 
am'. relp - son tk am'. cnt - One kt pulTab[am'] U balance[am'] 
else 
// ### If valid continuation of SJ sequence ......... 
(( sm. mode = stat tt sm. sels 1= s0 fk sm. sj - son U sm. fl - air kk sm. relp 
m= stat U sel - sm. sele Us= son Uf- air) 
sm'. relp - son kt sm'. cnt = incnt[sm. cnt] U pulTab[sm'l kk balsnce[sm'] 
else 
/// ### Otherwise, reset to safe state. 
sm'. relp = soff kk sm'. cat - Zero kk am' -Pulses = p0 
tU sm'. balan - nob ) 
)} 
If Function for incrementing the pulse sequence count indicator 
fun incnt(n : Natural] : Natural { nat/gte[n, Three] -> One else nat/inc[h] 
} 
// Operation Station pulses sequences 
prod pulTab [sm : SMState] { 
son st 
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/* al -- Port Out & Starboard In selected for SJ */ 
(sm. sels = si &k sm. cnt = One => sm. pulses = p01) U 
(sm. sels = Si && sm. cnt = Two sm. pulses - p0) ät 
(sm. sels = sl Ok sm. cnt - Three => sm. pulses - plo) 1k 
/* s2 -- Port Out, Starboard Out ! Port Mid selected for SJ */ 
(sm. sels - s2 && sm. cnt - One -> sm. pulses - p2) kk 
(sm. sels - s2 9k sm. cat - Two -> sm. pulsea - p01) kk 
(sm. sels - s2 kk sm. cnt - Three -> sm. pulees - p0) kk 
/* s3 -- Starboard Out, Starboard Mid, Port In t Starboard In selected for SJ 
(sm. sels - s3 kk sm. cnt - One "> sm. pulses - plO) kk 
(sm. sels - s3 && sm. cnt - Two -> sm. puleee - p10) kk 
(sm. sels - s3 ik sm. cnt - Three -> sm. pulaes " p2) kk 
/* s4 -- Starboard Mid only selected for SJ º/ 
(sm. sels - s4 U sm. cnt - One sm. pulses - p0) ft 
(sm. sels - s4 tt sm. cnt - Two sm. pulses - p10) U 
(sm. sels - s4 U sm. cnt - Three -> sm. pulses - p0) U 
/* s5 -- Port Out only selected for SJ */ 
(sm. sels - 05 kk sm. cnt - One sm. pulses - p01) kk 
(sm. sels - s5 kk sm. cnt - Two sm. pulses - p0) kt 
(em. sels - s5 ü sm. cnt - Three -> sm. pulses - p0) kk 
/+ s6 -- Starboard Mid k Port Mid selected for SJ r/ 
(am. aels ý a6 kk sm. cnt ý One am. pulses ý p0) kk 
(sm. eels a6 ü sm. cnt ý Two sm. pulsea ý p2) kk 
(em. aela ý s6 ü am. cnt Three -> sm. pulses - p0) kk 
/* s7 -- Starboard Out, Mid k In selected for SJ +/ 
(em. sels - s7 kt sm. cnt - One sm. pulses - p10) tk 
(sm. eele - e7 ü am. cnt - Two sm. pulses - p10) tt 
(sm. sels - s7 ik sm. cnt - Three -> sm. pulsee - p10) kk 
/w 90 -- No stores selected for 3J e/ 
(sm. sels - 80 .> sm. pulsee - p0) } 
// t#k Operation Balance: Improved Based on Sequence 
prod balance [em : SMState] { em. relp - son tt 
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(sm. sels - s4 or sm. sels = s5) _> sm. balan - no bal 
else sm. balan - is_bal } 
// ### Operation Balance: Original Based on pulses ### 
//pred balance[sm : SMState] { sm. relp - son kk 
// ((sm. pulses - p01 or sm. pulses - p0 or sm. pulses - p10) -> 
// else sm. balan - is bal )} 
pred checkpl[sml, sm2, sm3 : SMState] { 
(sml. pulses - p01 eg (sm2. pulses - p01 or am3. pulses - p01)) 
or 
(sm2. pulses - p01 e& (sml. pulses a p01 or sm3. pulses - p01)) 
or 
(sm3. pulses I p01 k& (sml. pulses - p01 or sm2. pulses - p01)) 
sm. balan - no bal 
} 
pred checkpa[sml, sm2, em3 : SMState] { 
(sml. pulses - p2 or am2. pulaes - p2 or sm3. pulses - p2) 
or checkpl[sml, am2, sm3] } 
// *###* PROPERTIES *#### 
// Pass 
assert balanceConl { all sm SMState 
am. relp - son kk sm. sels - sl => sm. balan - is_bal } 
// Fail 
assert balanceCon2 { all am : SMState 
} sm. relp - son kk sm. sels - sl -> sm. balan - no_bal. 
// All pass: 
assert balanceCon3 { all sm : 8M3tate 
sm. relp - son At (sm. sels - s4 or sm. eels - sb) 
assert balanceCon4 { all am : SMState I 
sm. relp - son tt not(sm. sels a4 or sm. sels - ab) 
"> em. balan - ao_bal } 
-> am. balaa - ia_bal } 
assert balanceConS { all am ; SMState I (em. pulees m p2 => sm. balaa a is_bal) 
} 
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assert balanceCon6 { all am : SMState I all n: Natural I all s: StatSel I sm. sels -s tt 
nat/gte[n, One] äa nat/lte[n, Three] tt sm. cnt -n tt sm. relp - son U 
sm. pulaes - p2 -> sm. balan - is_bal } 
assert balanceCon7 { all smi, sm2, sm3 : SMState I 
(( sm3 = next[sm2] U sm2 - next[aml] t! c sml. cnt - One U em2. cnt - Two tt sm3. cnt - Three) 
kk 
sml. pulses - p10 U (sm2. pulses - pl0 or sm3. pulses - pl0) -> 
(sml. balan - is_bal dck sm2. balan - is_bal ü sm3. balan - is_bal) ) 
} 
assert balanceCon8 { all smi, sm2, sm3 : SMState I 
sm3 - next[sm2] kk sm2 - next[sm1] kk sml. cat - One, fk sm2. cnt " Two U sm3. cnt - Three) 
kk 
sm2. pulses - p10 kk (sml. pulaes - p10 or sm3. pulses p10) 
(sml. balan - is bal kk sm2. balan - is bal kk sm3. balan - is_bal) ) 
} 
assert ba3. anceCon9 { all smi, sm2, sm3 : SMState 
I 
(( sm3 - next[sm2] && sm2 - next[sm1] kk sml. cnt - One kk sm2. cnt ý Two tt sm3. cnt - Three) 
kk 
checkpl[aml, sm2, sm3] 
(aml. balan - is_bal ü sm2. balan - is_bal kk sm3. balan - is_be1) ) 
} 
assert balanceConlO ( all smi, sm2, am3 : SMState 
I 
(( am3 - next[sm2] tR sm2 - next (aal) ü aml. cat - One tk sm2. ent - Two tt =3. cat - Three) 
kt 
checkps[aml, sm2, sm3] 
(sml. balan - is_bal tt am2. balan - is_bai tt sm3. balan - is_bal) ) 
} 
check balanceConi for 52 
check balanceCon2 for 3 
check balanceCon3 for 52 
check balanceCon4 for 52 
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check balanceCon5 for 8 
check balanceCon6 for 6 
check balanceCon7 for 6 
check balanceCon8 for 6 
check balanceCon9 for 6 
check balanceConlO for 16 
prod shovl() U 
run showi for 52 
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Appendix F 
POSE Safety Pattern Applied to 
the Warning System Case Study 
This work is based on the POSE safety pattern shown in Figure 6.1, and follows the 
Agenda given in Table 6.1. 
F. 1 Initial Problem Understanding step for the 
FAS 
The first part of the POSE safety pattern is Activity 1 Initial Problem understand- 
ing which is based on the format used for PS1 (DC case study) and SPS1 (SMS 
case study). This work uses information gained from the IPDP CE (context and 
requirement) and early Dem/Val (for requirement and initial architecture) phases. 
WPS1: Application of Initial Problem Understanding to problem 
Pnull 
JUSTIFICATION J1: The justifications for the initial POSE transformations are: 
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In the FAS environment, the monitored systems typically include: inertial navigation; 
GPS navigation; aircraft data and environment data. Failure of these systems will not 
prove insurmountable to the pilot. The health status of these systems is input into the 
SYS domain. In contrast, a failure in the Catastrophic System, CS, (part of the flight 
control system) could result in the loss of the aircraft. Therefore the SYS and the CS 
domains provide health status information to the FAS. If the health status information 
indicates a problem, then the FAS plays an appropriate warning message to the pilot 
through the pilot's headphones. 
[Domain Interpretation, Ja] The analysis of the information sources identified that the 
significant environment components consisted of the FAS, the SYS, the CS, the Pilot 
and the pilot's headphones, Speaker. 
[Requirement Interpretation, Jb ] The identified requirement was based on information 
provided by the customer and validated through reviews, email correspondence and 
meetings. It is presented as R (Ra to Rd and RS) below. 
[Solution Interpretation, JJ] This high-level system architecture representation of the 
FAS was based on an existing, successful design. 
The domains and their relevant properties are summarised in PInitial presented below, 
where the justification for this initial software problem is Jl = Ja A Jb A Jc" 
PHENOMENA: Phenomena and their control and sharing are as follows: The FAS can 
be seen to monitor directly the status of the Catastrophic System (CS) using a discrete 
input cat. It also monitors the status of the other critical aircraft systems (SYS) and 
this is represented by the generic sys status message. The FAS issues warning audio 
messages to the pilot via the pilot's headphones 
The referenced requirement phenomena, ref , are concerned with monitoring the status 
of the system health signal, stat_cat, provided by the CS and the combined health status 
of the monitored systems, stat_sys, provided by SYS. The constrained requirement 
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Figure F. 1: The Warning System 
to the pilot. 
Where: cons = {sel_audio} and ref = {stat_cat, stat_sys} 
The initial software problem is as follows: 
Plnitial : 
CS(stat_cat)'t, SYS(stat_sys)"y°, Pilot(sel_mudio)a,, di., 
audio FAS'1Edsage ý Rse! _audio Speuke1 message, cat, sys stat_cat, stat-sys 
This model can be represented as a PF problem diagram as shown in Figure F. 1. 
The high level FAS requirement, R, is as follows: 
Ra When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FAS system shall play the 
correct audio message to the pilot. 
Rb Message levels shall be comfortably heard by the Pilot. 
Rc If more than one system has failed messages shall be selected for play in the order: 
stat_cat fail , stat_sys 
fail. 
Rd If no system failures are detected, then no message shall be played. 
RS For hazards H1 and H2 defined above, their respective safety targets (10-7fpfh 
and 10-5fpfh) shall be satisfied. 
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Note that a complete statement of R should also include requirements that cover space, 
weight, interfaces, maintenance and so on, but these are beyond the scope of this work. 
CLAIM: The interpretations are well-founded 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The choice of domains follows from the aircraft level safety 
analysis and the previous successful developments that used the CS and SYS domain 
structure. The pilot headphones, Speaker, is an existing component of the avionics 
system, with well-known, validated properties. The Pilot is trained to follow protocols 
rigorously. The FAS is to be designed, but the Company are domain experts for this 
type of system and have the success of a prototype to base the development on. 
The customer functional requirement (Ra to Rd) was provided as an input to the 
developer team, and was validated with the customer. 
CLAIM: The architecture is feasible 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The selected high-level system architecture has been used 
successfully on previous developments. 
CLAIM: Sound judgement followed 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: Development based on IPDP used successfully on many 
previous developments and enhanced with POSE to mitigate some known IPDP issues. 
Therefore it follows normal and not radical design concepts as defined in [131]. 
CLAIM: Domain components are reliable 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The CS, SYS and Speaker domains have the required re- 
liability, details omitted for reasons of brevity. The Pilot is a highly trained, competent 
individual. 
The second POSE safety pattern activity of Solution Interpretation and 
Ex- 
pansion involves expanding the FAS to include a candidate solution architecture. 
268 
The activities associated with this task are represented in the step WPS2 shown in 
section 6.3.2. 
F. 2 PPT Applied to the Pilot Domain 
Use the POSE PPT to remove a domain adjacent to the requirement - this is the 
Pilot domain. 
WPS3: Application of the PPT for Pilot Domain Removal to 
problem PEw to form Pp1 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J3: The Pilot domain removal is based on the process given in section 
5.1.2. The Pilot domain is adjacent to the requirement R1. The Pilot domain is 
constrain-type. The Pilot domain effect is hear the warning message audio played 
through the headphones, and (implicitly) understand it. However, although the Pilot is 
trained to follow protocol rigorously, there is a chance a mistake could be made with 
respect to hearing the message (albeit unlikely) and any analysis has to take due account 
of this - this information is stored as part of the assumption and justification 
for the 
removal. The assumption (A31) is that if the warning message audio is correctly sent 
to the headphones, then the Pilot will (highly likely) hear and understand the correct 
message. 
The requirement relating to the Pilot is transformed to relate to the Speaker domain. 
For example, Rla contains the term "play the correct audio message to the pilot". 
Under the transformation, this will be rephrased in R2a to refer to the Speaker by 
making (and justifying) transformations from Pilot-oriented phenomena into Speaker- 
oriented phenomena. In this case the re-phrase will be to "play the correct audio 
message through the Speaker". Rlb will be updated in R2b to require that the audio 
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message sound levels are adequately above the ambient level (in this case 60 dB). 
This will add the assumption (A32) that the Pilot can actually hear the message as it 
issues from the Speaker, i. e. 60 dB above ambient is adequate. That we rely on the 
assumptions A31 and A32 holding is the justification J3 for this progression. 
Transforming R1 in this way yields a new requirement called R2, in which Rla becomes 
R2a and Rlb becomes R2b. Requirements Rlc and Rld are not changed by the 
transformation (they do not mention Pilot phenomena) and become R2c and R2d 
unchanged, respectively. RS also remains unchanged. 
These requirement transformations do not require additional information not already 
in the interface nor do they refer to future events. However they do rely on information 
from the domain being removed being "saved" as part of the assumption that justifies 
the transformation. That is, we have that Pilot, R2 l- R1 which states that R2 requires 
assistance from the Pilot domain environment to satisfy the higher level requirement 
R1. Therefore this is an example of an Environment Constraint requirement. 
R2a When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the system 
to play the correct audio message through the Speaker. 
R2b Message levels shall be at 60dB above the ambient cockpit level. 
R2c If more than one system has failed messages shall be selected for play in the order: 
stat_cat fail , stat_sys fail. 
R2d If no system failures are detected, then no message shall be played. 
RS For hazards H1 and H2 defined above, their respective safety targets (10-Tfpfh 
and 10-5fpfh) shall be satisfied. 
The domain Pilot is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The problem is transformed from PEXP into PRui1 which is shown in POSE sequent 
form as follows. 
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Figure F. 2: The Warning System After Pilot Removal 
CS(stat_cat)cat, SYS(stat_sys)8bs, Speaker (audio)messageý 
AOS, messdig AODmessage FDstatus FAsel R2audio 
sel, "", dig ý cat, sysý status stat_cat, atat_sys 
The reduced Warning System is shown in PF problem diagram form in Figure F. 2. 
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CLAIM: The pilot's intention is correctly represented by the phenomena relationships 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The constraint being relied upon is that the Pilot effect of 
hearing and understanding the audio sel_audio corresponds directly to the phenomena 
audio generated by the Speaker domain. This is satisfied as noted above (e. g. refer to 
the derivation of R2b). 
PHENOMENA: None 
F. 3 PPT Applied to the Speaker Domain 
The next domain removed is the Speaker. 
WPS4: Application of the PPT for Speaker Domain Removal to 
problem PRj1 to form PRed2 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J4: The Speaker domain removal is based on the process given in 
section 5.1.2. The Speaker domain is adjacent to the requirement R2. The Speaker 
domain is constrain-type. The Speaker domain effect is play the selected warning mes- 
sage audio through the headphones. This audio effect is caused by the message audio 
signal output from the AOD. 
In this case R2 is transformed into R3. This time R2a that refers to the Speaker 
has to be re-phrased in terms of the AOD audio output stream (message) that drives 
the Speaker, to become R3a. R2b requires the message audio signal levels to be 60 
dB above ambient, this translates into Rib requiring the message audio amplitude to 
be within the defined range (to achieve the 60 dB above ambient at the headphones). 
As before R1c becomes R2c without change. Next consider transforming R2d into 
Rid. The term "no message played" through the Speaker translates into "no analogue 
audio message generated" at the AOD. The Speaker is a component of the headphones 
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system which has a high reliability and is checked/validated by other audio functions 
- so no failure budget is required 
for the Speaker domain and therefore RS is also 
unchanged. 
The domain removal assumption (A4) is that generating the correct audio message at 
the output of AOD will cause the correct audio message stream to correctly drive the 
Speaker within the specified comfortable audio range, to produce the desired warning 
message (justification J4). 
Therefore the PPT application transforms the problem from PRj1 into PRea2, and R2 
is transformed into R3 as follows: 
R3a When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the system 
to generate the correct audio message sequence at the output of AOD 
Rib The AOD message audio amplitude levels shall be within the defined 
range. 
Ric If more than one system has failed messages shall be selected for play in the order: 
stat_cat fail , stat_sys 
fail. 
R3d If no system failures are detected, then no analogue audio message shall be 
generated. 
RS For hazards H1 and H2 defined above, their respective safety targets (10-7fpfh 
and 10-5fpfh) shall be satisfied. 
The constraint being relied upon is that the Speaker effect audio output level corre- 
sponds directly to the input phenomena message audio signal level generated by the 
AOD domain. 















Figure F. 3: The Warning System After Speaker Removal 
The software problem is transformed into PRed2, which is shown in POSE sequent form 
as follows. 
PRed2: 
CS(stat_cat)C6t, SYS(stat_sys)'g', AOSeEý°adigý 
AOD(message) FDatatus PA"-' ý- R3message 
mesadig+ cat, sys9 status atat_cat, atat-sys 
The reduced Warning System is shown in PF problem diagram form in Figure F. 3. 
PHENOMENA: None 
__ý 
F. 4 PPT Applied to the AOD Domain 
WPS5: Application of the PPT for AOD Domain Removal to 
problem PRad2 to form PR 3 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J5: The AOD domain removal is based on the process given in 
section 5.1.2. The AOD domain is adjacent to the requirement R3. The AOD domain 
is constrain-type. The AOD domain effect is output correct analogue audio stream of 
the selected message. This audio effect is caused by the measdig digital input stream 
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of the selected message from the AOS. The AOD consists of a Digital-to-Analogue 
Converter (DAC) to convert the digital input stream into an analogue signal equivalent, 
this is then passed through an amplifier to boost the signal to a level that ensures the 
analogue output is capable of driving the headphones at an appropriate level - there 
is also volume limiting circuitry to ensure that the output signal does not overdrive 
the headphones. The AOD does not affect Hl, but its failure to produce an analogue 
output can cause H2, so some of the H2 failure budget (10-5fpfh) must be allocated to 
it. 
In this case R3 is transformed into R4. Therefore R3a that refers to the AOD and 
message needs to be re-phrased as R4a in terms of the input stream messdig and 
the domain AOS. Rib refers to signal levels being within a defined range. This is 
implicitly encoded in the operation of the AOD domain and has no relevance once the 
AOD has been removed. As before Ric becomes R2c without change. Next consider 
transforming R3d into R4d. The term "no analogue audio message shall be generated" 
translates into "no digital message stream shall be generated". RS is also unchanged 
apart from noting that some of the failure budget for H2 must be assigned to the AOD. 
This is captured as part of the assumption generated by the removal of AOD. Therefore 
RS becomes R4S. 
The assumption (A5) associated with removing the AOD domain is that "the AOD 
converts the selected digital input message stream into an analogue equivalent signal 
which is amplified to a level to ensure that it will adequately drive the pilot's head- 
phones. Part of the H2 failure budget must be assigned to the AOD" . 
Therefore the PPT application transforms the problem from PRM2 into P1 3, and R3 
is transformed into R4 as follows: 
R4a When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the system 
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Figure F. 4: The Warning System After AOD Removal 
output of AOS 
R4b Null 
R4c If more than one system has failed messages shall be selected for play in the order: 
stat_cat fail , stat_sys fail. 
R4d If no system failures are detected, then no digital message stream shall be 
generated. 
R4S For hazards H1 and H2 defined above, their respective safety targets (10-7fpfh 
and 10-5fpfh) shall be satisfied. (Note some of H2 budget used for AOD). 
The constraint being relied upon is that the AOD effect message (analogue output) 
signal corresponds directly to the digital input phenomena messdig signal generated by 
the AOS domain. 
The domain AOD is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The software problem is PRad3, which is shown in POSE sequent form as follows. 
PRed3 * 
CS(stat_ca. t)cat, SYS(stat_sys)'y", AOS(messdig),.,, 
FDstatw FAse! ý R4'"e'ad4y cat, sys+ atatus stat_cat, statays 




F. 5 PPT Applied to the SYS Domain 
WPS6: Application of the PPT for SYS Domain Removal to 
problem PRed3 to form PRed4 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J6: The SYS domain removal is based on the process given in sec- 
tion 5.1.2. The SYS domain is adjacent to the requirement R4. The SYS domain 
is reference-type. The SYS domain effect is output the health status, stat_sys, of the 
monitored systems. This stat_sys effect causes the sys phenomena at the input to the 
FD. 
In this case R4 is transformed into R5. The phenomena stat_sys is not involved in 
R4a, R4b or R4d, so these remain unchanged for R5. However stat_sys does occur in 
Roc and this is modified by replacing the effect stat_sys with the phenomena sys that 
it causes in RSc. The failure of SYS cannot impact on Hi or H2 which relate to the 
cat phenomena because of the selected architecture - therefore R4S becomes R5S. 
The assumption (A6) associated with removing the SYS domain is that "the SYS 
converts the individual health statuses of the monitored systems into a combined health 
status value represented by sys". 
Therefore the PPT application transforms the problem from PRM3 into PRed4, and R4 
is transformed into R5 as follows: 
R5a When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the system 
I 
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to generate the correct digital message stream sequence, messdig, at the output 
of AOS. 
R5b Null 
R5c If more than one system has failed messages shall be selected for play in the order: 
stat_cat fail , sys fail. 
R5d If no system failures are detected, then no digital message stream shall be gener- 
ated. 
R55 For hazards H1 and H2 defined above, their respective safety targets (10-7fpfh 
and 10-5fpfh) shall be satisfied. (Note some of H2 budget used for AOD, but 
SYS has no impact). 
The constraint being relied upon is that the SYS effect stat_sys corresponds directly 
to the phenomena sys that is input to the FD domain. 
The domain SYS is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The software problem is Pj4i which is shown in POSE sequent form as follows. 
Pe. 
". ie : 
i, CS(stat_cat)86t, AOS(messdig),. 
F- RSmessdi FD(sys)ýtt"', FAeiätua atat_cal, ays 
The reduced Warning System is shown in PF problem diagram form in Figure F. 5. 
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Figure F. 5: The Warning System After SYS Removal 
F. 6 PPT Applied to the CS Domain 
WPS7: Application of the PPT for CS Domain Removal to 
problem PRed4 to form PRed 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J7: The CS domain removal is based on the process given in section 
5.1.2. The CS domain is adjacent to the requirement R5. The CS domain is reference- 
type. The CS domain effect is output the health status, stat_cat, of the Catastrophic 
System, CS. This stat_cat effect causes the cat phenomena at the input to the FD. 
In this case R5 is transformed into R6. The phenomena stat_cat is not involved in 
R5a, R5b or R5d, so these remain unchanged for R6. However stat_cat does occur in 
R5c and this is modified by replacing the effect stat_cat with the phenomena cat that 
it causes in R6c. The failure of CS can impact on both H1 or H2, therefore some of 
the failure budgets for both H1 and H2 must be allocated to this CS domain - R5S 
becomes R6S. 
The assumption (A7) associated with removing the CS domain is that "the CS converts 
the health status of the Catastrophic System into a health status value represented by 
cat. Some of the failure budget for H1 and H2 must be allocated to CS". 
Therefore the PPT application transforms the problem from PRed4 into PRj, and R5 









Figure F. 6: The Warning System After CS Removal 
R6a When the CS or a monitored system has failed, the FA shall control the system 
to generate the correct digital message stream sequence, messdig, at the output 
of AOS. 
R6b Null 
R6c If more than one system has failed messages shall be selected for play in the order: 
cat fail , sys fail. 
R6d If no system failures are detected, then no digital message stream shall be gener- 
ated. 
R6S For hazards H1 and H2 defined above, their respective safety targets (10-7fpfh 
and 10-5fpfh) shall be satisfied. (Note some of Hi budget used for CS; some of 
H2 budget used for AOD and CS, but SYS has no impact ). 
The constraint being relied upon is that the CS effect stat_cat output level corresponds 
directly to the phenomena cat that is input to the FD domain. 
The domain CS is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The software problem is Pp, which is shown in POSE sequent form as follows. 
PRed : AOS(messdig),, j, FD(cat, sys)'ý6t"', 
FA; Qi,,, F- R6cat's"ds 




F. 7 POSE/Alloy Model of the Modified Audio 
Warning System 
//### Problem P'Equiv: Modified ADS t Time Control FD ### 
module AudioVarn 
open util/ordering[Time7 as Ti 
open NatNumbers as nat 
// open Derek/Alloy4/NatNumbere as nat 
// Define the Time Component 
sig Time {} 
// Define the OK Component 
sig OK {} 
one sig yes, noo extends OK {} 
// Define the Status Component 
sig Status {} 
one sig catnon, sysnon , catsys, non extends Status {} //gi 
// Define the Select Message Component 
sig Sol * 
one sig ml, m2, m3, ni extends Sol {y 
If Define the Message Component 
Big Mess {} 
one sig mesa, mes2, mes3, noni extends Mess {} 
// Define the single FA State - eel and mute 
one sig FA { sel : Sol -> Time, mute : OK -> Time } {} 
// Define the single FD State domain - status 
one sig FD (status : Status -> Time) {} 
// Define the single AOS' State domain - mesedig and id 
one Big ADS {mss : Mess -> Time, id : OK -> Time} {} 
// fl*# DEFINE OPERATIONS qi** 
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// FABehave models the behaviour of the safety critical controller. 
pred FABehave(t, t' : Time) { FA. sel. t' - extract [FD. status. t] kk 
FA. mute. t' - chsckid[t, t'] } 
// FDBehave models the behaviour of the FD domain 
prod FDBehave (t, t' : Time) { trange[t, 0,1] -> FDSame[t, t'] 
else trange[t, 2,4] -> (FD. status. t' - catnon 
else trange[t, 5,6] -> (FD. status. t' - non 
else trange[t, 7,9] -> (FD. status. t' - sysnon 
else trange[t, 10,1i] -> (FD. status. t' - non 
else trange[t, 12,13]  > (FD. status. t' - catsys 
else trange[t, i4,16] -> (FD. status. t' - non 
else trange[t. 16,24] -> (FD. status. t' - catnon 
also trange[t, 26,263 -> (FD. status. t'   non 
else FDSame[t, t'] } 
AOSBehave models the behaviour of the A0S' domain. If auto is 
// active then the message is net to noni (no message). 
pred AOSBehave (t, t' : Time) { AOS. mes. t' " (FA. mute. t " noo "> 
decode[FA. sel. t] else noni) kk 
AOS. id. t' " setid(t, t']) 
prod FDSame (t, t' : Time) { FD. status. t' - FD. status. t } 
If predicate trangs returns true it t is in the range from trs to ti. 
prod trange [t: Time, te, tf: Int] {*prevs[t] >1 is tt //06 
#prsvs[t] -< tf} 
// Fun extract returns the message selected by the FD status input (status) 
fun extract (it: Status] : Sei {(st-catnon or stIcatsys) //07 
-> ml else at - sysnon -> m2 else nil 
// Fun decode returns the message selected by the FA status input 
(set) 
fun decode [s: Sol] : Mesa {s. al .> mesi 1/08 
She 8  m2 "> mes2 else noni) 
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// Fun checkid confirms message id corresponds to selected message #11 
fun checkid[t. t' : Time]: OK {AOS. id. t - yes "> noo else yes) 
// Fun setid determines if message identifier, id, in AOS' is ok at specified time "12 
fun setid[t, t' : Time]: OK { trange[t, 0,18] -> yes 
else trange[t, 19,23] -> noo 
oleo yen } 
//*1ti Define Trace Model cif! #9 
prod snit [t . Time] {FD. statue. t - non kt FA. sel. t - ni AA AOS. mes. t - noni 
k& FA. mute. t - yes At AOS. id. t - noo } 
fact traces { 
init[Ti/first[]] 
all t: Time - Ti/last[] i let t' - Ti/next[t] 
I FDBehave[t, t'] Aa FABehave[t, t'] k& 
AOSBehave[t. t'] } 
// ***** PROPERTIES ***** *10 
pred shows() 0 
run shows for 30 but 6 int //Set bit width to cover -32 to +31 
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Appendix G 
Some Further Feasible 
Requirement Examples 
This chapter considers the other two examples of non-feasible/feasible requirement 
as discussed in section 2.4. 
G. 1 A Future Reference Example 
Future Reference covers the case when the satisfaction of the overall system require- 
ment (R) requires information that is available only in the future. Its solution often 
involves either (a) sharing additional information (similar to Unshared Information) 
or (b) making reasonable assumptions about the required behaviour. In both cases 
use is made of domain information to provide a solution. 
In the Audio Warning FAS messages are played in a hierarchy (e. g. RTc) with 
cat fail messages having the highest priority. Therefore, if a sys message is being 
played, and a cat message is detected, then the required behaviour is that the 8118 
warning message should be stopped, and the cat warning message started as quickly 
as possible. If a sys message is being played and another Sys failure is reported 
from a different monitored system, the question arises as to when should this new 
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message be played? The desired behaviour is that it should be played after the 
current message has finished. However, how does the system know when a message 
has finished? This is a Future Reference issue and there are two possible design 
solutions based on the solution types discussed above, namely: (a) based on sharing 
additional information and (b) based on making reasonable assumptions about a 
known property of the system. 
The first alternative solution requires the derived requirement DR -A to be 
added to the requirement associated with the software problem PEA;,,,. DR -A has 
the form: 
Include a flag mechanism for denoting the end of a message, which is 
flagged to the FA from the AOS' when detected, so that the FA knows 
the currently playing message is completing and the next can be started. 
In addition the phenomena eom (End Of Message) needs to be added to allow the 
AOS' to flag to the FA that the current message has finished. These behaviour 
refinements are added to the problem domain through a series of POSE transfor- 
mations. These are included into the problem domain through a step, WPS8A, 
which includes the appropriate justifications. The step will include the following 
transformations (with associated justifications): (a) requirement interpretation to 
include DR - A, (b) domain interpretation to introduce the phenomena corn into 
AOS', (c) solution interpretation to include a reference to the phenomena eom into 
FA, and (d) the expansion transformations that include these interpretation trans- 
formations into the software problem which transforms from PEqt into P3OL4. 
The second alternative solution requires the derived requirement DR -B to be 
added to the requirement associated with the software problem PE"i, '. DR -B has 
the form: 
All messages last less than five seconds in duration and the FA knows 
when a message is started. Use this information to start playing the next 
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message, five seconds after the current message was started and so on. 
No new interface phenomena are need to be added to the problem, since FA knows 
when it requested the start of a message and it can run a clock to count off the 5 
second duration of the message. Therefore the step, WPS8B, associated with this 
alternative solution only requires a requirement interpretation /expansion transfor- 
mation pair to be justified. 
Comparison of the two alternatives indicates that the second approach is the 
easiest to implement and so it was adopted in this case. The main factor favouring 
the second alternative was that there was no need to complicate the interface between 
the FA and the AOS' with new phenomena. 
G. 2 Directly Implementable Requirement : Emer- 
gency Stop function 
The fourth type of requirement discussed in section 2.4 are those that are directly 
implementable. A typical example is shown in Figure G. 1 which satisfies a require- 
ment for an emergency stop (ES) that is added to the list of the Audio Warning, 
FAS, requirement with the aim of mitigating the "Message played too loud" issue 
identified in section 6.3.6. The idea being that the Pilot uses the emergency stop 
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Figure G. 1: The Emergency Stop Function 
The requirement is that message processing in the FA should halt immediately 
if the emergency stop button is pressed. In Figure G. 1 the emergency stop button 
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is represented by the ES domain which shares the stop phenomena with the FA. 
When the ES button is pressed. the stop input to the FA causes the FA to halt 
processing as required. The diagram shows that the requirement phenomena (halt, 
stop) relate directly to the FA phenomena relevant to the emergency stop processing. 
There are no intervening domains that need to be removed or requirement phenom- 
ena that have to be transformed. Therefore a directly implementable requirement 
can be identified from the PF diagram by (a) there is at most a single functional 
domain between the to be designed domain (FA in this case) and the requirement, 
and (b) the requirement phenomena are equivalent to the design phenomena. In 
situations where the requirement phenomena and design phenomena are close, but 
do not quite coincide. then the application of Sharing Removal from the PPT can 
solve the problem. This is similar to its use to transform Prima into PEqu= at the 
end of section 6.3.3. Also, the term "functional domain" is used to preclude the 
introduction of dummy identity domains which in theory could introduce an arbi- 
trary number of domains between the to be designed domain and the requirement 
without affecting functionality. 
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Appendix H 
Revised DC Case Study 
The aim of this case study is to show that POSE works well with requirements 
presented in a standardised good practice form based on (118), and to again show 
that utility of applying the full POSE safety pattern based on the work in Chapter 6. 
H. 1 POSE Safety Pattern Activity 1 
The goal is to derive a machine specification that can satisfy its safety requirements 
(H1 and H2) and thus form a good basis for the rest of the development process, 
and this is achieved by applying the POSE safety pattern introduced in Chapter 
6. 
The first activity is Context and Requirement Interpretation and this uses the re- 
quirements and domain information based on Appendix A. 3, except this time the 
aim is to use a structured form of the requirements based on current Company 
procedures [1181 and the abstraction heuristic check (i. e. a requirement should 
only refer to domains and phenomena that are adjacent to it). The resulting set of 
requirements R are: 
R. 1 The DS shall command (DS-sel) which flare is selected for release from the DU 
(flare-select). 
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R. 2 The DS shall command (DSJire) when a flare is to be released by the DU 
(flare-fire). 
R. 3 The selected flare shall only be released from the DU if the DS has issued a 
flare release command when the input interlocks are satisfied. 
R. 4 The three input interlocks are: 
R. 4.1 The aircraft shall be in the air (air_gnd). 
R. 4.2 The safety pin shall be removed (pin-st). 
R. 4.3 The Pilot has issued an allow release command (p_int). 
RS The DC shall mitigate Hl & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
These requirements were reviewed and found to be apposite. The result is the Initial 
Problem transformation step, PSA1. 
PSA1: Initial Problem application to transform problem Pn, ai 
into Prniteat 
JUSTIFICATION J1: The identified requirement, domains and their relevant properties 
are summarised above. The combined justification for the set of transformations used 
to introduce the context, requirements and initial solution system architecture are: 
J1 = Ja A Jb A Jc. 
The resulting software problem is Plnitiai as follows: 
DS(DS_sel, DSfire)CO7't, DU (flare_select, fiarefire) fire 8el, 
Plnitiat : SP(pin. _st)pi", 
AS(air_gnd)st, 
P(p-int)aUon, set, fire 'ßaneýelect, /iareire 
ý 
Dý! 
st, pin, attow, cant 
F RDS-set, 
DS-fire, air_gnd, pinust, p_int 
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PHENOMENA: Phenomena and their control and sharing (see are known from 
the existing system components. 
CLAIM: The interpretations are well-founded 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The choice of domains follows from the aircraft level safety 
analysis and the required choice of interlocks. The DS, DU, AS and SP are existing 
components of the avionics system, with well-known, validated properties. The Pilot 
is trained to follow protocols rigorously. 
The customer functional requirements (R. 1 to R. 4) were provided as an input to the 
developer team, and were validated with the customer. The development of the safety 
requirement RS is as discussed in section 4.1.1. 
CLAIM: The overall architecture is feasible 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The selected overall system architecture has been used 
successfully on similar safety systems. Inspection confirms that the identified domains 
and their associated phenomena can interact as needed - aim being to avoid Unshared 
Information issues later in the development. 
CLAIM: Sound judgement followed 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The development is based on IPDP used successfully on 
many previous developments and enhanced with POSE to mitigate some known issues 
with IPDP. Claim this follows normal and not radical dealgn ccotirepts as defined in 
[1311. 
CLAIM: In-air indicator in Aircraft Status System is reliable 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The in-air indicator is obtained from the weight on wheels 
and landing gear up indications: if the landing gear is up and there is no weight on the 
wheels then the aircraft is assumed to be in the air. The landing gear is detected as 
being up by a number of sensor switches. The switches use a multi-pole arrangement 
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of appropriately selected "Normally open/Normally closed" contacts. This imbues an 
error detection capability that is used to achieve very good failure rates, well within 
the required margins. 
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Figure H. 1: PF Problem Diagram for the DC Problem, Pjnttiai 
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Figure H. 2: Modified DM' Architecture 
291 
H. 2 POSE Safety Pattern Activity 2 
The second activity in the POSE safety pattern is Solution Interpretation and Ex- 
pansion. In this case the results of the previous analysis work will be assumed and 
the expanded system architecture to replace the DC domain will be the domains 
SC, II and DM and where the DM domain has the modified form shown in Fig- 
ure H. 2. The result of this activity is the problem transformation step PSA2 shown 
below. 
PSA2: Solution Interpretation and Expansion applied to 
problem Pjnjtj U to form PE 
JUSTIFICATION J2: The identified system architecture, its components and relevant 
properties are as summarised in Figure H. 3. The justification for this (architecture) 
solution expansion transformation is that this system architecture was successfully de- 
veloped as a prototype and is known to be capable of satisfying the functional require- 
ments. 
The requirements are left unchanged by this expansion because the changes occur to 
domains that are not adjacent to the requirements. 
The software problem is transformed from Pj,,; nd to Ppp as shown below, and an 
equivalent PF representation is shown in Figure H. 3. 
DS(DS_sel, DSfire)`°"t, DU (fiare-select, flare fire)fire, 
"e,, 
PE--p * SP(pin_st)p'", AS(air_gnd)"t, P(p_int)111*1, 
t Ilat 
p tn, allow+ D1: ý1 




The solution system architecture is introduced using the Solution Interpretation trans- 
formation and the AStruct[... J. 
CLAIM: Ptnitiw and Pap an equivalent 
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ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The requirement R and the interface phenomena adjacent 
to R are not changed by the transformation, although new phenomena are introduced 
to represent the interactions between the introduced domains . 
CLAIM: The choice of candidate solution architecture exhibits sound safety engineer- 
ing judgement 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The system architecture is chosen to minimise the number 
and extent of the safety related functions, localising them to simple, distinct blocks in 
accordance with best practice. 
CLAIM: The chosen solution architecture does not prevent the satisfaction of R' (Fea- 
sibility). This claim is not yet supported. 
PHENOMENA: The new phenomena introduced by the architecture are: 
fire? - Command to release the selected 
flare type 
int - Status of combined interlocks 
DS! {com) 
Figure H. 3: Problem PE 
after Solution Interpretation and Expansion 
H. 3 POSE Safety Pattern Activity 3 
The third activity in the POSE safety pattern is problem progression and involves 
applying the PPT introduced in section 5.1.2 to remove domains from the problem to 
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allow the machine specification to be recovered. The first domain to be transformed 
is the pilot domain P and the activities involved are captured in the PSA3 problem 
transformation step. 
H. 3.1 PSA3 Pilot Domain Removal 
PSA3: Application of the PPT for Pilot Domain Removal to 
problem PEA to form PRedl 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J: The Pilot domain removal is based on the process given in sec- 
tion 5.1.2. The pilot P domain is adjacent to the requirement R. The P domain 
control phenomena allow maps directly to its output behaviour phenomena which is 
p-int. Therefore pint (representing the pilot's intention) appears in the reference part 
of the requirement phenomena before the transformation, but will be replaced with its 
effect, allow, by the transformation. The requirement R is as detailed at the beginning 
of this section, and inspecting it indicates that only R. 4.3 involves a reference to p_int. 
Consider the transformation from R. 4.3 into R1.4.3 which involves the phenomena 
pint and allow as noted above. 
R. 4.3 : The Pilot has issued an allow release command (p-int). 
R1.4.3: II observes pilot input of allow. 
Pilot Domain Description: The pilot sets the Allow switch to active to indicate that 
the intention is to allow flare release, otherwise it is set inactive. The Allow switch uses 
a multi-pole arrangement of appropriately selected "Normally open/Normally closed" 
contacts. This imbues an error detection capability that is used to achieve very good 
failure rates, well within the required margins. The setting of the Allow switch is 
determined by the pilot P domain and is output using the phenomena allow, where 
allow = yes means the Allow switch is active, whilst allow = no means the allow switch 
is inactive. Therefore allow = yes corresponds to allow flare release, whilst allow = no 
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corresponds to inhibit flare release. 
The justification for this problem progression is that, 
RI-4.3 A Assumption(p_int, allow) =:,. R. 4.3. 
The Al = Assumption(p-int, allow) is given by the Pilot Domain Description. Inspec- 
tion of R1.4.3 in conjunction with the Pilot Domain Description shows they imply 
R. 4.3 as required. 
This requirement transformation does not require additional information not already 
in the interface nor does it refer to future events. However it does rely on the useful 
behaviour from the domain being removed being "saved" as part of the assumption 
that justifies the transformation - it is an example of an Environment Constraint non- 
feasible requirement which is discussed in a POSE context in [83]. As noted above, this 
useful behaviour contribution is contained in the Pilot Domain Description. 
The PPT application transforms the problem from PEa, into PRd1, and R is trans- 
formed into R1 (using the Requirements Interpretation part of the PPT) as follows: 
R1.1 The DS shall command (DS-sel) which flare is selected for release from the DU 
(flare-select). 
R1.2 The DS shall command (DSJire) when a flare is to be released by the DU 
(flare. re). 
R1.3 The selected flare shall only be released from the DU if the DS has issued a flare 
release command when the input interlocks are satisfied. 
R1.4 The three input interlocks are: 
R1.4.1 The aircraft shall be in the air (air_gnd). 
R1.4.2 The safety pin shall be removed (pin-st). 
R1.4.3 II observes pilot input of allow. 
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RS The DC shall mitigate H1 & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 filth). 
The pilot domain P is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The software problem is transformed to PRj1: 
DS(DS_sel, DS_fcre)COnt, DU(flare 
_select, 
flare fire) fi, r, el, 
PRedl : SP(pin_st)pin, AS(air_gnd)'t, 
II(allow)int DMad, Jin? S, Cfite ý Rijtarc_selec. t, /iarc-Jire 
st, pin+ cant , snt fin? D, S_eel, llSCrr, air_gnd, pinat, allow 
An equivalent PF representation is shown in Figure H. 4. 
CLAIM: The pilot's intention with respect to allowing flare release is represented by 
the phenomena allow. 





Figure H. 4: Problem Pjw1 
after Pilot Domain removal 
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H. 3.2 PSA4 SP Domain Removal 
The next domain to be removed is the safety pin domain SP, and the activities 
involved are captured in the PSA4 problem transformation step shown below. 
PSA4: Application of the PPT for SP Domain Removal to 
problem PRm1 to form PRed2 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J: The SP domain removal is based on the process given in sec- 
tion 5.1.2. The SP domain is adjacent to the requirement R1. The SP domain control 
phenomena pin-st maps directly to its output behaviour phenomena pin. Therefore 
pin-st will appear in the reference part of the requirement phenomena before the trans- 
formation, but will be replaced with the effect it causes, pin, after the transformation. 
The requirement RI is as detailed in step PSA3 on page 294. Inspection of R1 indicates 
that only R1.4.2 involves a reference to pin-st. 
Consider the transformation from R1.4.2 into R2.4.2 which involves the phenomena 
pin-at and pin as noted above. 
R1.4.2 : The safety pin shall be removed (pin-st). 
R2.4.2 : II observes input pin = out. 
SP Domain Description : The safety pin status is obtained from sensor switches. The 
switches use a multi-pole arrangement of appropriately selected "Normally open/Normally 
closed" contacts. This imbues an error detection capability that is used to achieve very 
good failure rates, well within the required margins. The setting of the safety pin star 
tus is determined by the SP domain and is output using the phenomena pin, where 
pin = out means the safety pin has been removed, whilst pin = in means the safety 
pin is present (and inhibiting flare release). 
The justification for this problem progression is that: 
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R2.4.2 A Assumption(pin_st, pin) =*. R1.4.2. 
The A2 = Assumption(pin_st, pin) is given by the SP Domain Description. Inspection 
of R2.4.2 in conjunction with the SP Domain Description shows they imply R1.4.2 as 
required. The constraint being relied upon is that pin = out means the safety pin has 
been removed - see claim below. 
This requirement transformation does not require additional information not already 
in the interface nor does it refer to future events. However it does rely on the useful 
behaviour from the domain being removed being "saved" as part of the assumption 
that justifies the transformation - it is an example of an Environment Constraint non- 
feasible requirement which is discussed in a POSE context in [83). As noted above, this 
useful behaviour contribution is contained in the SP Domain Description. 
The PPT application transforms the problem from PRut1 into PRed2, and R1 is trans- 
formed into R2 (using the Requirements Interpretation part of the PPT) as follows: 
R2.1 The DS shall command (DS. sel) which flare is selected for release from the DU 
(flare-select). 
R2.2 The DS shall command (DSJire) when a flare is to be released by the DU 
(flare-ire). 
R2.3 The selected flare shall only be released from the DU if the DS has issued a flare 
release command when the input interlocks are satisfied. 
R2.4 The three input interlocks are: 
R2.4.1 The aircraft shall be in the air (air_gnd). 
R2.4.2 II observes input pin = out. 
R2.4.3 II observes pilot input of allow. 
RS The DC shall mitigate H1 & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
The domain SP is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
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The software problem is transformed to PRed2: 
DS(DS_sel, DS fire)°Oft, DU(flare_select, flare 
_fire)fie, sel, 
PRed2 : AS(air_gnd)st, II (allow, pin) int, 





DS.. fire, air_gnd, pin, allow 
An equivalent PF representation is shown in Figure H. 5. 
CLAIM: The safety pin status is represented by the phenomena pin. 





{: ý;. äýý 
Figure H. 5: Problem PRea2 
after SP Domain removal 
ASI(st} 
299 
H. 3.3 PSA5 AS Domain Removal 
The next domain to be removed is the air status domain AS, and the activities 
involved are captured in the PSA5 problem transformation step shown below. 
PSA5: Application of the PPT for AS Domain Removal to 
problem PRed2 to form PRed3 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J: The AS domain removal is based on the process given in sec- 
tion 5.1.2. The AS domain is adjacent to the requirement R2. The AS domain control 
phenomena air_gnd maps directly to its output behaviour phenomena at. Therefore 
air_gnd will appear in the reference part of the requirement phenomena before the 
transformation, but will be replaced with the effect it causes, st, after the transforma- 
tion. The requirement R2 is as detailed in step PSA4 on page 297. Inspection of R2 
indicates that only R2.4.1 involves a reference to air-gnd. 
Consider the transformation from R2.4.1 into R3.4.1 which involves the phenomena 
air_gnd and at as noted above. 
R2.4.1 : The aircraft shall be in the air (air_gnd). 
R3.4.1 : II observes input at = air. 
AS Domain Description : The in-air indicator is obtained from the weight on wheels 
and landing gear up indications: if the landing gear is up and there is no weight on the 
wheels then the aircraft is assumed to be in the air. The landing gear is detected as 
being up by a number of sensor switches. The switches use a multi-pole arrangement 
of appropriately selected "Normally open/Normally closed" contacts. This imbues an 
error detection capability that is used to achieve very good failure rates, well within the 
required margins. The setting of the in-air indicator is determined by the AS domain 
and is output using the phenomena at, where at = air means the aircraft is in the air, 
whilst at = gnd means the aircraft is on the ground. 
The justification for this problem progression is that: 
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R3.4.1 A Assumption(air_gnd, st) =; ý, R2.4.1. 
The A3 = Assumption(air_gnd, st) is given by the AS Domain Description. Inspection 
of R3.4.1 in conjunction with the AS Domain Description shows they imply R2.4.1 as 
required. The constraint being relied upon is that st = air means the aircraft is in the 
air - see claim below. 
This requirement transformation does not require additional information not already 
in the interface nor does it refer to future events. However it does rely on the useful 
behaviour from the domain being removed being "saved" as part of the assumption 
that justifies the transformation - it is an example of an Environment Constraint non- 
feasible requirement which is discussed in a POSE context in [83]. As noted above, this 
useful behaviour contribution is contained in the AS Domain Description. 
The PPT application transforms the problem from PxW2 into PRed3, and R2 is trans- 
formed into R3 (using the Requirements Interpretation part of the PPT) as follows: 
R3.1 The DS shall command (DS. sel) which flare is selected for release from the DU 
(flare elect). 
R3.2 The DS shall command (DS-fire) when a flare is to be released by the DU 
(flare-fire). 
R. 3.3 The selected flare shall only be released from the DU if the DS has issued a flare 
release command when the input interlocks are satisfied. 
R3.4 The three input interlocks are: 
R3.4.1 II observes input st = air. 
R3.4.2 II observes input pin = out. 
R3.4.3 II observes pilot input of allow. 
RS The DC shall mitigate Hl & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
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The domain AS is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
The software problem is transformed to Pjj3: 
DS(DS_sel, DS fire)CO^t, DU(Jlare_select, flare ficre)h, L,,,,, 1, 
Ptteta : II (allow, pin, st)i+ºt, 
@el DMsconýre?, SCfntýfireý ý R3DS_sel DSýn, sýpsn, altow 
An equivalent PF representation is shown in Figure H. 6. 
CLAIM: The in-air status of the aircraft is represented by the phenomena st. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This is covered by the AS Domain Description. 
PHENOMENA: None 
Ogl(ood} 
Figure H. 6: Problem PRed3 
after AS Domain removal 
302 
H. 3.4 PSA6 DS Domain Removal 
The next domain to be removed is the Defence System domain DS, and the activities 
involved are captured in the PSA6 problem transformation step shown below. 
PSA6: Application of the PPT for DS Domain Removal to 
problem PRed3 to form PRed4 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J: The DS domain removal is based on the process given in sec- 
tion 5.1.2. The DS domain is adjacent to the requirement R3. The DS domain control 
phenomena DS_sel and DS fire map directly to its output behaviour phenomena cont. 
Therefore DS_sel and DS fire will appear in the reference part of the requirement phe- 
nomena before the transformation, but will be replaced with the effect they cause, cont, 
after the transformation. The requirement R3 is as detailed in step PSA5 on page 300. 
Inspection of R3 indicates that R3.1 refers to DS_sel, R3.2 involves a reference to 
DS fire and R3.3 refers to the DS. 
Consider the transformation from R3.1 into R4.1 which involves the phenomena 
DS_sel and cont as noted above. 
R3.1 : The DS shall command (DS_sel) which flare is selected for release from the DU 
(flare-select). 
R4.1 : The DM shall decide which flare to select by observing a field in the coast 
message it receives. 
Next consider the transformation from R3.2 into R4.2 which involves the phenomena 
DS fire and coast as noted above. 
R3.2 : The DS shall command (DS-fire) when a flare is to be released by the DU 
(flare-'ire). 
R4.2 : The DM shall decide to release a flare by observing a field in the cont message 
it receives. 
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Next consider the transformation from R3.3 into R4.3 which involves DS as noted 
above. 
R3.3 : The selected flare shall only be released from the DU if the DS has issued a flare 
release command and the input interlocks are satisfied. 
R4.3 : The selected flare shall only be released from the DU if the DM has received a 
flare release command and the input interlocks are satisfied. 
DS Domain Description : The DS monitors many systems (e. g. early warning radar, 
GPS/INS positioning) to determine any threats to the aircraft. These systems are not 
pertinent to this problem so are abstracted through the statement: 
The DS is the defensive aids suite controller function which selects the flare 
type for release and if and when a flare is released in response to any threats 
it determines from its monitoring functions. The DS achieves this by for- 
matting the flare selection and fire commands into its cont message which 
it transmits to the DM. 
The DM knows the structure of the coast message it receives from the DS, so it can 
decode the coat message to determine the flare selection (sel) and fire (fire) components. 
The justification for this problem progression is that: 
R4.1 A Assumption(DS_sel, cont) R3.1. 
R4.2 A Assumption(DS fire, cont) = R3.2. 
R4.3 A Assumption(DS, DM) R3.3. 
The A4 = Assumption(DS_sel, DS fire, cont, DS, DM) is given by the AS Domain 
Description. Inspection of R4.1, R4.2 and R4.3 in conjunction with the DS Domain 
Description shows they imply R3.1, R3.2 and R3.3 as required. The constraints being 
relied upon is that cont contains the fire and select commands issued by the DS, and 
that the DM decodes them using cont. 
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This requirement transformation does not require additional information not already 
in the interface nor does it refer to future events. However it does rely on the useful 
behaviour from the domain being removed being "saved" as part of the assumption 
that justifies the transformation - it is an example of an Environment Constraint non- 
feasible requirement which is discussed in a POSE context in [83]. As noted above, this 
useful behaviour contribution is contained in the DS Domain Description. 
The PPT application transforms the problem from PRM3 into PRet4, and R3 is trans- 
formed into R4 (using the Requirements Interpretation part of the PPT) as follows: 
R4.1 The DM shall decide which flare to select by observing a field in the cont message 
it receives. 
R4.2 The DM shall decide to release a flare by observing a field in the cont message 
it receives. 
R4.3 The selected flare shall only be released from the DU if the DM has received a 
flare release command when the input interlocks are satisfied. 
R4.4 The three input interlocks are: 
R4.4.1 II observes input st = air. 
R4.4.2 II observes input pin = out. 
R4.4.3 II observes pilot input of allow. 
RS The DC shall mitigate H1 & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
The domain DS is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 




fiare_fire) fi, c e, j, 
II(allow, pin, st)int, 
DM(cont)ael, fin?, SC, n ýý, ý ý R4Jianýekct, 
ýian_/'in 
cont, st, pin, albw 
An equivalent PF representation is shown in Figure H. 7. 
CLAIM: The flare selection (DS_sel) and flare fire (DS-fire) commands are represented 
by the phenomena con. 
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ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: This is covered by the DS Domain Description. 
PHENOMENA: None 
Figure H. 7: Problem PRj4 
after DS Domain removal 
I 
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H. 3.5 PSA7 DU Domain Removal 
The next domain to be removed is the Dispenser Unit domain DU, and the activities 
involved are captured in the PSA7 problem transformation step shown below. 
PSA7: Application of the PPT for DU Domain Removal to 
problem PRed4 to form PRCd 
INCLUDES: None 
JUSTIFICATION J: The DU domain removal is based on the process given in sec- 
tion 5.1.2. The DU domain is adjacent to the requirement R4. The DU domain control 
phenomena are the sel flare selection input from the DM and the fire flare release com- 
mand from the SC. These map directly to its output behaviour phenomena flare-select 
and flare-fire respectively. Therefore the effects flare-select and flare-fire will appear 
in the reference part of the requirement phenomena before the transformation, but will 
be replaced with their direct causes, sel and fire, after the transformation. The require- 
ment R4 is as detailed in step PSA6 on page 303. Inspection of R4 indicates that only 
R4.3 involves a reference to the D U. 
Consider the transformation from R4.3 into R5.3 which involves the DU as noted 
above. 
R4.3 : The selected flare shall only be released from the DU if the DM has received a 
flare release command and the input interlocks are satisfied. 
R5.3 : The flare selected by the DM sel phenomena shall only be released by the SC 
issuing a fire command if the DM has received a flare release command and the input 
interlocks are satisfied. 
DU Domain Description : The flare selected for release from the DU (flare_sel) is 
determined by the sel phenomena input from the DM. The DU will release the selected 
flare (flarefire) when it receives a fire command input from the SC. 
The justification for this problem progression is that: 
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R5.3 A Assumption (flare 
_sel, flare fire, sel, fire) = R4.3. 
The A5 = Assumption (flare _sel, 
fare-fre, sel, fire) is given by the DU Domain De- 
scription. Inspection of R5.3 in conjunction with the DU Domain Description shows 
they imply R4.3 as required. 
This requirement transformation does not require additional information not already 
in the interface nor does it refer to future events. However it does rely on the useful 
behaviour from the domain being removed being "saved" as part of the assumption 
that justifies the transformation - it is an example of an Environment Constraint non- 
feasible requirement which is discussed in a POSE context in [83]. As noted above, this 
useful behaviour contribution is contained in the DU Domain Description. 
The PPT application transforms the problem from PRj4 into PRj, and R4 is trans- 
formed into R5 (using the Requirements Interpretation part of the PPT) as follows: 
R5.1 The DM shall decide which flare to select by observing a field in the cont message 
it receives. 
R5.2 The DM shall decide to release a flare by observing a field in the cont message 
it receives. 
R5.3 The flare selected by the DM sel phenomena shall only be released by the SC 
issuing a fire command if the DM has received a flare release command when the 
input interlocks are satisfied. 
R5.4 The three input interlocks are: 
R5.4.1 II observes input st = air. 
R5.4.2 II observes input pin = out. 
R5.4.3 II observes pilot input of allow. 
RS The DC shall mitigate H1 & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
The domain DU is no longer referenced in the model and can be removed. 
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The software problem is transformed to PRj: 
PRed : 
II(allow, pin, st)nt, 
DM(cont, sel)fi', SC(fire)jnt, fi, ý 




I- RScoln at, pin, nllow 
'---.. --"----- lm. l -'-"-_ '". 
---.. -----.... _: 
Y. 
------------------------------------------- (. ý. wn- u) R5 
Figure H. 8: Problem PR 




H. 3.6 The PrePSA Step for the Revised DC Case Study 
To derive an Alloy model from PRA requires reconciliation of the requirements and 
domain phenomena, i. e., the relationship between them needs to be established. 
This could be achieved by applying the PPT to remove the DM and II domains to 
allow the specification to be derived, but as in the FA case study the preferred way 
forward (as the model is useful for the PSA) is to just apply the REQUIREMENTS 
INTERPRETATION transformation to extract the relationship between the phenom- 
ena. This can be captured as the PrePSA problem transformation step below, which 
forms the last part of the Pattern Problem Simplification task. 
The PrePSA Step manages the transformation of PRd into PEquiv, which can be 
used to directly derive the specification of the SC and forms the basis of the PSA 
work. 
PrePSA8: Application of REQUIREMENT INTERPRETATION to 
problem PRA to form PEquiv 
CONCERNS: Reconciliation of the requirements and domain phenomena. The re- 
quirement R5 (associated with PRA) refers to cont, sel, fire, st, pin, and allow, whilst 
the SC relates to fire?, fire and int. Therefore there is a need to apply REQUIRE- 
MENTS INTERPRETATION to identify the relationship between these phenomena, as in 
section 5.5.3. 
JUSTIFICATION J: Inspection of the useful behaviour relation for the DM, II and 
SC domains indicate the logical equivalence of. int to allow, pin and st; fire? to cunt; 
fire to fire. Further, the functionality of the SC does not involve flare selection, so the 
phenomena sel is not part of its specification. 
This is justified by identifying the useful behaviour relations (domain contributions) of 
the DM, II and SC domains. The DM domain effects are concerned with decoding 
cont to extract the flare selection, sel, and whether a flare is to be released, fire?. The 
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DM sends the status of the fire request, fire?, to the SC which uses this information 
(in conjunction with int) to determine whether to output the flare release phenomena, 
fire. The II domain effect is to combine the input information it obtains from the 
phenomena allow, pin and st, and output this as the phenomena int sent to the SC. 
The requirements R5 can be updated to R6 (the SC specification) as follows: 
R6.1 Null 
R6.2 The SC shall evaluate whether to release a flare by observing the fire? message 
it receives. 
R6.3 A flare shall only be commanded to be released by the SC issuing afire command 
if it has received a fire? message when the input interlocks are satisfied. 
R6.4 The input interlocks are determined by int. 
RS The DC shall mitigate H1 & H2 (Target: safety critical 10-7 fpfh). 
These updates allow the problem to be transformed from PRd into PE9. i as follows. 
PEquiv : II(int), DM(fire? ), SC(fire)int, fine? F- R6ný tfine? 
CLAIM: The software problem PEquiv allows the specification of SC to be derived. 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: The requirement R6 uses the same phenomena as the 
domains, i. e., R6 is the specification. 
CLAIM: The requirements model is a valid representation of the system 
ARGUMENT & EVIDENCE: Informally, the SC receiving a valid fire? command when 
the II contribution, int, indicates the interlocks are satisfied combine to satisfy R6.3. 
Note that R6.2 is part of R6.3. The II contribution covers R6.4. The PSA con- 
siders RS. Therefore, (informally) the POSE requirements model (PEA;,, ) satisfies the 
requirement (specification) R6. This will be formally checked as part of the Alloy 
simulation and proof work. 
I 
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H. 4 POSE Safety Pattern Activity 4 
The fourth activity in the POSE safety pattern is to perform the safety analysis 
tasks required by the PSA. 
The validation and safety analysis (PSA) of the case study makes use of for- 
mal modelling using Alloy and is based on the four part process summarised in 
section 6.4: 
1. Derive the Alloy model directly from the POSE software problem description 
- using a template. 
2. Use the following four-part process for applying the formal modelling: 
(a) use simulation to develop the model and gain confidence it has the re- 
quired behaviour; 
(b) perform formal proof to validate the model; 
(c) use the model to prove safety properties (if necessary) 
(d) investigate any specific problem areas using simulation. (This process is 
efficient because the more expensive proof work is only undertaken once 
simulation has provided confidence in the efficacy of the model. ) 
3. Use the FFA/FTA and modified HAZOPS form for domains not formally 
modelled. 
The formal analysis was conducted using a variety of Alloy files to cover sim- 
ulation, proof of requirements and investigation of the model's properties. The 
simulation and proof results were used to develop an in-depth understanding of the 
model and guided its development as follows. 
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H. 4.1 DC Model Simulation 
The initial model of the DC system used a simple version of the SC which is shown 
below 
iii Define Behaviour 
prod SCBehava (t, t': Time]{ //R6.3 
(II. intl. t - val tt DM. fireq. t - rel) -> SC. fire. t' - rel 
else SC. fire. t' - noac } 
When doing the simulation with the above simple model for the SC, the results 
showed that SC. fire was set to rel in the next time instant as long as the interlocks 
were valid (II. intl = val) and DM. fireq was rel in the current time instant. This 
allowed DM. fireq to be rel at the same time instant as II. intl = val. However, 
the intention was to improve integrity by requiring that DM. fireq should be the 
initiating event for flare release - that is, the interlocks should become (and remain) 
valid prior to DM. fireq being set to rel, other combinations should inhibit flare 
release. The specification R6 and the requirement R do not specify this explicitly 
and a derived requirement RD was introduced to cover this desired behaviour: 
RD: 
The SC shall only send the fire message if it has received an active fireq 
with the interlocks being valid. The interlocks must be valid prior to the 
arrival of fireq and continue to be valid through the flare release process. 
The specification was modified to become R6+ (R6+ = R6 + RD). 
H. 4.2 DC Model Formal Proof 
The formal proof of requirements to validate the model used the Alloy model shown 
below. The assert statements R63full, R51, R52, R53full and R54 validate that the 
specification R6.3, and the requirements R5.1, R5.2, R5.3 and R5.4 respectively, are 
satisfied by the model. 
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//### Problem:: - Decoy Controller: DC 
// Model based on R5/PRed/Figure 2.7 -- Reduced model including eel behaviour. 
open util/ordering[Time] as Ti 
sig Timet} 
If#*# Define Phenomena 
sig FIR {} 
one sig noac, rel extends FIR {} // Fire command has two states; no action or fire. 
sig INL {} 
one sig Val, nov extends INL {} Jj Status of II. int. t is either valid or not valid. 
sig CONT {} 
one sig cO, cl, c2, c3 extends CONT {} // co is default and selects s0; cl and c3 select 81 and 83; 
// c2 is a fire command, leaves flare selection unchanged. 
sig SEL {} 
one sig s0, el, e3 extends SEL {} 
sig AIR {} 
one sig air, gnd extends AIR {} 
sig PIN * 
one sig out, inn extends PIN {} 
Big OK {} 
one Big yes, noo extends OK {} 
Flare selection: sO is default, el and s3 are other flare types 
Aircraft status, either in the air or on the ground. 
// Safety pin is either in or out. 
// Used for PILOT Allov choice and others 
/f*$* Define Domains 
one sig SC { fire : FIR -> Time} {} 
one sig DM { eel SEL->Time, fireq: FIR -> Time) {} 
one sig II { intl : INL -> Time} {} 
// EXT represents the external interlace of the model 
one gig EXT { coat : CONT -> Time, alloy : OX->Time, Pin : PIN->Time, at : AIR->Time) {} 
prod SCBehave It, t': Time){ let tp - prevlt) I //R6.3 + RD 
(II. intl. tp - val &A Il. inti. t " val tk DM. fireg. t " rei) "> SC. fire. t' " rel 
else SC. fire. t' " noac } 
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prod DMBehave [t, t': Time]{ 
//R5.1 
C EXT. cont. t - CO DM. sel. t' - s0 
else EXT. cont. t ý cl -> DM. sel. t' - sl 
else EXT. cont. t - c2 -> DM. sel. t' - DM. sel. t 
else EXT. cont. t - c3 -> DM. sel. t' - s3) 
ak 
//R5.2 
( EXT. cont. t - c0 DM. tireg. t' - noac 
also EXT. cont. t ý cl -> DM. tireq. t' - noac 
else EXT. cont. t - c2 -> DM. iireg. t' - rel 
also EXT. cont. t - c3 -> DM. Sireg. t' - noac)) 
prod IIBehave [t, t': Time]{ //A5,4 
((E(T. allov. t - yes kk EXT. pin. t - out kk EXT. st. t - air) -> Il. inti. t' - val 
else IU. inti. t' - nov )} 
// EXT version set to support proof work 
prod EXTBehave [t, t': Time]{ 
(EXT. cont. t' - cO or ECT. cont. t' - cl or EXT. cont. t' - c2 or EXT. cont. t' - c3 ) kk 
(ECT. allow. t' - noo or EXT. allov. t' - Yes) kk 
( EXT. pin. t' - out or EXT. pin. t' - inn) kk 
(EXT. at. t' - gad or EXT. st. t' - air)} 
// Predicate trange returns true if t is in the range from is to ti. 
prod trange [t : Time, to, tf : Jut] { *prevs[t] > is tt *preve[t] -< tf} 
// Predicate change returns true if the phenomena a has changed state. 
fun change [a : FIR -> Time, ti : Time] : OK {a. ti 1- a. (prev[tl]) a> yes also noo) 
// Predicate timeorder returns true if the times tl, t2, and t3 are in an ascending sequence. 
fun timeorder [tl, t2, t3 : Time] : OK { 
(ti - prev[t2] !t t2 - prev[t3] tU ti - prev[prov[t3]]) -> pea else noo} 
//* Define the Trace Model 
prod init [t : Time] {SC. fire. t - noac !t D[i. sel. t - s0 ü DlS. fireg. t - noac kk Ii. inti. t-nov tt 
EXT. cont. t - CO fk EXT. allow. t - noo tt EXT. pin. t - out kk ETl. st. t-gad) 
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fact traces { init[Ti/first[]] 
all t: Time - Ti/last[] I let t' " Ti/nest[t] I SCBehave[t, t'] ti DMBehave[t, t'] U 
IIBehave[t, t'] tt EXTBehave[t, t'] ) 
//## Investigate Properties 
assert R63fu11 {all t1, t2, t3 : Time I 
(timeorder[t1, t2, t3]-yes kk II. intl. tl-val U Il. intl. t2-va1 tß DM. fireg. t2-re1 -> SC. fire. t3-re1) 
kk 
(timeorder[tl, t2, t3]-yes kk not(II. intl. tl-val kk Il. intl. t2-va1 kk DM. fireq. t2-re1) -> SC. fire. t3lnoac)} 
assert R51 (all ti, t2, t3 : Time I 
( timeorder[tl, t2, t3] ý yes tt ExT. cont. tl . co DM. sel. t2 - s0) !i 
( timeorder[tl, t2, t3] ý yes 1k EIIT. cont. tl - cl DM. sel. t2 ,  1) U 
( timeorder[ti, t2, t3] ý yes Ok EXT. cont. ti - c3 ý> DM. sel. t2 - s3) ) 
assert R52 {all tl, t2, t3 : Time I 
( timeorder[tl, t2, t3] yes tt EIIT. cont. tl ý co DM. fireq. t2   noac) tt 
( timeorder[tl, t2, t3] yes tt EXT. cont. tl ý cl DM. fireq. t2   noac) tt 
( timeorder[tl, t2, t3] ý yes tt ExT. cont. tl c2 DM. fireg. t2 ý rel) tt 
( timeorder[tl, t2, t3] yes U E>(T. cont. tl ý c3 DM. fireq. t2   noac) } 
assert R53fu11 {all tl, t2, t3 : Time I 
(timeorder[ti, t2, t3)-yes tt DM. sel. t2-s0 tt II. intl. tl-val tk II. inti. t2wal tt DM. fireq. t2wrel 
U 
EXT. cont. tl - c2 -> (SC. fire. t3 - rel )) !t 
(timeorder[tl, t2, t3]-yen kk DM. sel. t2-s1 t! Il. inti. tlwal kk II. intl. t2wa1 kk DM. fireg. t2-re1 
U 
ExT. cont. tl - c2 -> (SC. fire. t3 - rel )) kk 
(timeorder[t1, t2, t3]-yen kk DM. sel. t2-s3 kk II. intl. tllval kk II. inti. t2-va1 kt DM. fireq. t2, re1 
it 
E7IT. cont. tl - c2 -> (SC. fire. t3 - rel )) 
kk 
(timeorder(tl, t2, t3]ryes kk not(II. intl. tival tt II. inti. t2-va1 kk DM. fireg. t2 rel) "> SC. 
fire. t3'noac )] 
assert R54 {all tl, t2, t3 : Time I 
(timeorder[tl, t2, t3]-you tt EIT. allov. tl-yes kt E1Cr. pin. tl, out t! ERT. st. tl air  > Il. intl. t2wa1) 
kk 
(timeorder(t1, t2, t3]ryes it not(EZT. allov. tl. yes it ExT. pin. tl-out it EIT. st. ti-air) "> 
II. intl. t2mmov)} 
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prod ehovi[] {} 
run ehovi for 24 but 6 int 
check R63fu11 for 24 but 6 int 
check R51 for 24 but 6 int 
check R52 for 24 but 6 int 
check R53full for 24 but 6 int 
check R54 for 24 but 6 int 
H. 4.3 DC Model Safety Analysis 
The validation proof for the Alloy model assert R53full (refer to the Alloy model 
above) demonstrates that the system represented by the specification R6+ (includ- 
ing derived requirement RD) provides mitigation for Hl & H2. 
The safety analysis was based on the FFA/HAZOPS/FTA approach and followed 
the work presented in section 5.2.2. Table 5.3 contains the summary for the HAZOPS 
and the entries in this table were investigated further using the simulation model, 
the results of this work are presented in the next section. 
H. 4.4 DC Model Investigate Problem Areas 
The simulation of the entries in Table 5.3 was performed using the timing model 
introduced in section 5.5.4. The external inputs for the safety model (based on R5) 
were modelled using the domain EXT and the input timing was varied using the 
structure shown below. 
// EXT version not to support simulation work 
pred EXTBehave [t, t': Time]{ 
(trange[t, 0.2] a> EXT. cont. t' - cO 
else trange[t. 3,5] -> EXT. cont. t' - c2 
else trange[t, 6.8] -> EXT. cont. t' I c3 
also trange[t, 9,10] "> EXT. cont. t' - cl 
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else trange[t, 11,21] -> EET. cont. t' - c2 
else trange[t, 22,24] -> ExT. cont. t' I c0) 
ka 
(trange[t, 0,11 -> E%T. allow. t' = noo 
else trange[t, 2,5] _> EbT. allow. t' ý yes 
else trange[t, 6,8] -> EXT. allow. t' - noo 
else trange[t, 9,11] -> EXT. allow. t' noo 
else trange[t, 12,18] '> EXT. allow. t' ' yes 
else trange[t, 19,24] -> EXT. alloa. t' ' noo) 
(trange(t, 0,1] -> E(T. pin. t' - inn 
else trange(t, 2,5] -> ECT. pin. t' out 
else trange[t, 6,8] -> EXT. pin. t' - out 
else trange[t, 9,11] -> EXT. pia. t' - out 
else trange[t, 12,19] -> EXT. pin. t' - out 
else trange[t, 20,24] -> EXT. pin. t' - inn) 
kk 
(trange[t, 0,13 -> ECT. st. t' - gnd 
else trange[t, 2,5] -> ERT. st. t' ý air 
else trange[t, 6,8] -> EXT. st. t' - air 
else trange[t, 9,11] -> EXT. et. t' I air 
else trange[t, 12,20] .> EXT. et. t' - air 
else trange[t, 21,24] -> EXT. st. t' - gad) } 
The simulation work validated the outcomes defined in Table 5.3, but also found 
some problematic behaviour. The simulation for the cases where continuous fireq 
(fire? in Table 5.3) was received, H4 and H5, indicated that a flare release could 
occur whenever consecutive periods of II. int 1= val were encountered - which is 
the outcome outlined in section 4.4. The current specification (R6+) assumes that 
fireq is a single initiating entity of relatively short duration, but this is not the case 
when a failure such as H4 occurs. The integrity of the model needs to be further 
improved to mitigate the case where fireq has failed active by adding an additional 
derived requirement as follows: 
RDD: 
The SC shall only send the fire message if it detects a transition of 
fireq going from inactive (noac) to active (rel) with the interlocks being 
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valid prior to the arrival of fireq going active and continuing to be valid 
through the flare release process. 
The behaviour of SC in the model (SCBehave) was modified as follows to incor- 
porate the derived requirement RDD: 
prod SCBehave [t, t': Time]{ let tp - prey (t) I //R5.3 + ADD 
(II. intl. tp - va1 k, k II. inti. t - val kk DM. fireq. tp . noac kk DM. fireg. t - rel) 
-> SC. fire. t' - rel else SC. fire. t' - noac } 
The simulation was repeated and the model behaved correctly with respect to 
dealing with fireq failing active. Therefore the derived requirement RDD was added 
to replace RD, and this formed the specification R6++ = R6+RDD. The validation 
proofs of R5.1, R5.2 and R5.4 were repeated successfully on the revised model. The 
assert statements for R6.3 and R5.3 were amended to reflect RDD and successfully 
proved for the model - the revised assert for R6.3 is shown below. 
assert R63tu11 (all t1, t2, t3 : Time I 
(timeorder[tl, t2, t3]-yes kt II. intl. tl-val tt II. inti. t2wal Lt DK. lireq. tl-noae U DM. fireq. t2-re1 
-> 3C. Iire. t3 - rel ) 
tk 
(timeorder(tl, t2, t3]ryea kt not(II. inti. ti-val kk II. intl. t2-val ü DM. iireq. tlýnoac kk DM. Sireg. t2. rel) 
-> SC. fire. t3 - noac )} 
H. 5 Revised DC Case Study Discussion 
The revised DC case study has demonstrated another successful application of the 
POSE safety pattern using the "good" practice requirements form based on [118] 
introduced in section 4.1.1). 
The case study provided further support for the properties Simplification, 
[NecessaryP] and mitigation of the issue [Latel3]. Support for the property 
Simplification was demonstrated through the problem progression steps in sec- 
tion H. 3.1 through H. 3.5, whilst support for [NecessaryP] was demonstrated through 
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the derivation of the specification in section H. 3.6. Mitigation of the issue [Late13] 
was provided by the safety analysis work covered in section H. 4. 
The case study again demonstrated the successful use of the four part formal 
POSE/Alloy modelling process summarised in section 6.4. The modelling identified 
a shortfall in the safety integrity which was rectified by augmenting the requirements 
with a derived requirement and then validated using the process. The problem was 
that the requirement R6.3 was not specific enough to exclude unwanted behaviours 
and it allowed a flare release even when the interlock became valid at the same time 
as the fire command had been received - this was corrected by 
defining the derived 
requirement RD. The approach also identified the problem with fireq failing active 
and this was resolved by adding the derived requirement RDD to replace RD to 
form the specification R6 + +. 
The modelling process allows the behaviour of the proposed development to be 
investigated in detail, and any shortcomings highlighted and resolved. In this case 
study the requirement R (see section H. 1) and specification R6 were improved by 
the definition of the derived requirement RDD to clarify the desired behaviour. 
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Appendix I 
Analysis of Research Contribution 
The goal of this appendix is to present a more detailed analysis of my research con- 
tribution on using POSE in the early stages of a safety critical system development, 
as an extension of the work presented in section 7.5. As noted in noted in section 7.5 
my contribution has three main parts: 
" developing and extending the theory of Problem Orientation; 
" applying the extended theory in a safety critical engineering setting; 
" providing partial validation for the extended theory within that setting. 
These three elements of my contribution are depicted in Figure I. 1 and each is 





Figure I. 1: Contribution Summary 
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Figure 1.2: PPT for Safe Systems Development 
I. 1 Detailed Discussion of Develop the Theory 
I. 1.1 Develop the Theory Detailed 1- Problem Progression 
The problem progression transformations were raw and relatively undeveloped, and 
I developed - in parallel with other work in this by Jon Hall, Lucia Rapanotti and 
Zhi Li -a process for applying them (as published in the FASE07 [87] paper). 
This culminated in the POSE problem progression for safety systems discussed in 
section 5.1.2 - the basic elements of this development are depicted in Figure 1.2. 
A contribution to knowledge is the resulting engineering form of the PPT and 
a method to support its application (IWAAPF08 [831 paper , and section 
5.1.2). 
Also, this research allowed me to comment further on the relationship between the 
notion of a domain's useful behaviour and the work on non-implementable require- 
ments from Zave and Jackson's Four Dark Corners paper [133) - as discussed in the 
IWAAPF08 [83] paper, and presented in section 5.1.1.1 and section 5.1.1.2. 
As noted, another contribution is a collection of useful heuristics for engineers 
for its application (IWAAPF08 [83] paper, and section 5.1.2) that substantiate the 
practical nature of Jackson's original idea sketch. These were used extensively in 
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Figure 1.3: POSE Abstraction Hierarchy 
I. 1.2 Develop the Theory Detailed 2- How to Sequence 
Another contribution to knowledge is the ability to sequence the transformations 
through the abstraction provided by the POSE safety pattern (FASE07 [87], SSSO8 
[88], and in section 6.1) and the use of problem transformation steps (refer to sec- 
tion 4.1.4.2) which collect basic POSE transformations into meaningful engineering 
steps in the development process - and allows appropriate validation at that level. 
The resulting hierarchy is shown in Figure 1.3. 
This abstraction hierarchy is useful for managing development tasks. Further, 
this work was extended by my supervisors to be the POE Process Pattern (Assurance- 
Driven Development in POE [37]). 
1.2 Detailed Discussion of Application 
1.2.1 Application 1 
Develop the applicability aspects of POSE using the case studies as exemplars. The 
case studies contribute to knowledge in a number of ways, e. g. they provided evi- 
dence to demonstrate that an extended POSE is a capable SSSD (Safe Software Sys- 
tem Development) approach. This contribution is phrased in terms of 10 identified 
properties (Table 2.3), which showed that, from a practical engineering perspective, 
3. Transformations 
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extended POSE was a suitable SSSD approach. 
The applicability aspect was also explored with respect to the Research Objec- 
tives (refer to section 1.2), the results being that: 
1. a suitable specification can be derived using the PPT (FASE07, IWAAPF08, 
and sections 5.1.3,5.5.3 and 6.3.3 etc. ); 
2. the PrePSA step (e. g. page 168 and page 180) was developed to support 
deriving the specification; 
3. the safety analysis involving HAZOPS could be enhanced using the structure 
and information provided by POSE (refer to section 5.2); 
4. the traceability and iteration capabilities under POSE assist backtracking (ex- 
tension of HASE07 first presented in IET07, and developed in section 5.3); 
5. analysis under POSE is efficient because the model used for the safety analysis 
was the same as that used in the development (e. g. SSSO8 and section 7.2.8). 
Further, the POSE safety pattern and the satisfaction of the property Context 
satisfies the research objective of capturing and separating contextual knowledge 
from the design of the system and its desirable properties. 
1.2.2 Application 2 
The assessment was conducted against six issues and four properties, which were 
identified by analysis and experience of using IPDP (refer to section 3.4.5) and 
evidenced from the (retrospective) case studies - DC (introduced in section 4.1.1), 
SMS (introduced in section 5.5.1) and FAS (introduced in section 6.3). As part of 
this contribution, we have argued that, as validation and verification (V&V) are an 
important aspect of the safety standards, the extended POSE caters for them at a 
number of levels: all transformations are justified, the problem transformation steps 
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include obligations that have to be discharged and the POSE safety pattern includes 
the PSA step (FASE07, SAFECOMP08 and section 6.1). The POSE safety pattern 
and the problem transformation steps (e. g. PS1 in section 4.2) provide structuring 
that supports the objective of keeping track of safety artefacts for validation and 
certification purposes. 
As a final contribution in this section, this research provides evidence that POSE 
can be used with formal notations to provide formal proof and simulation capabilities 
(e. g. SSSO8, section 6.3.4, section 6.3.6 and section 6.3.7) including the following 
developments: 
1. Techniques for forming Alloy model directly from POSE model (e. g. sec- 
tion 5.5.4 and section 6.3.4.1) 
2. Development of the Timing model (e. g. section 5.5.4) 
3. Proposed means of performing formal analysis based on 4-step process (refer 
to section 6.4). 
The work in section 5.2 and the subsequent case study results demonstrated that 
the extended POSE satisfies the research objective concerning the allowing for both 
formal and informal safety analysis techniques to take place. 
I. 3 Partial Validation 
The three, varied case studies provide some evidence to support and validate the 
engineering application, as does the industrial use reported in the thesis (refer to 
section 7.3). They also show that extended POSE integrates well with the IPDP 
and satisfies the provisions of a number of important safety standards and guidelines 
(e. g. DS 00-56 [125], IEC61508 [51] and DO-178B [108]) providing support for the 
integrating with current safety engineering practice research objective. 
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The case studies were retrospective so it is always difficult to counter the argu- 
ment that hindsight rather than the capabilities of the approach were responsible for 
finding the issues. To counter this hindsight issue, the case studies were organised 
to integrate with the IPDP and follow its standard course - care was taken to avoid 
performing analyses which were known to be capable of detecting the issues if they 
were not part of the standard approach or were not part of the extensions provided 
by using POSE. For example, the requirements were based closely on those used 
with the original development and were not (apart from the work reported in Ap- 
pendix H on the revised DC case study) "improved" to a more idealised form. The 
ongoing industrial work is not retrospective and is proceeding with some success - 
providing good validation of the approach and demonstrating that extended POSE 
does improve the capabilities of the early phases of IPDP. 
1.4 Thesis Contribution Summary 
The POSE safety pattern and its associated case study work demonstrate that ex- 
tended POSE does support the integration of safety analysis into the early phases of 
a system development, which satisfies the first research objective listed in section 1.2. 
In summary POSE, as extended by the research work reported in this thesis, 
does satisfy the research objectives listed in section 1.2 of: 
1. integrating safety analysis within the early phases of development, particularly 
requirement analysis and high level architectural design (this section) 
2. allowing for both formal and informal safety analysis techniques to take place 
(section I. 2.2) 
3. capturing and separating contextual knowledge from the design of the system 
and its desirable properties (section 1.2.1) 
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4. keeping track of safety artefacts for validation and certification purposes (sec- 
tion 1.2.2) 
5. integrating with current safety engineering practice (section 1.3). 
The work in this thesis has also demonstrated that extended POSE can be used 
within IPDP to improve the capabilities of IPDP - thus satisfying the second objec- 
tive from section 1.2 of improving the early phases of an existing safety development 
process (section 1.3). 
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